TC:Small: Systems-Sensitive Cryptography

TC:Small：系统敏感密码学

• 批准号: 0915675
• 负责人: Mihir Bellare
• 金额: $ 49.9万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-10-01 至 2013-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0915675&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TC; Small; Systems; Sensitive; Cryptography

Cryptography often fails to impact practice because it is insensitive to the requirements and reality of the systems that implement and underlie it. This research aims to change this. Issues considered include legacy (changing the complex computer systems that make up today's world is expensive and error-prone, so assessing the security of existing methods can be more important than providing new ones), malware (system penetration is widespread, exposing the keys that cryptography relies on for security) and the realities of randomness (it lacks in practice the quality expected in theory, dooming many cryptographic schemes). Work to be done includes assessment of the security of SSL encryption in the face of widespread system compromise, technically known as selective opening; analysis of the PKCS#1 standard for password-based key derivation; design of hedged encryption schemes that retain as much security as possible when the randomness they are fed is of poor quality; and the study and design of cryptography secure against related-key attacks. The impact of this work is higher assurance for existing, deployed cryptography currently used by millions, and new cryptography that is well-placed to transition into real systems.

密码学通常无法影响实践，因为它对实现和支持它的系统的需求和现实不敏感。 考虑的问题包括遗产（改变构成当今世界的复杂计算机系统成本高昂且容易出错，因此评估现有方法的安全性可能比提供新方法更重要）、恶意软件（系统渗透很普遍，暴露了密码学所依赖的密钥）安全性）和随机性的现实（它在实践中缺乏理论上预期的质量，导致许多加密方案失败）。 要做的工作包括：面对广泛的系统妥协，评估SSL加密的安全性，技术上称为选择性开放;分析基于密码的密钥推导的PKCS#1标准;设计对冲加密方案，当它们提供的随机性质量差时，尽可能保持安全性;研究和设计防止相关密钥攻击的密码学。 这项工作的影响是为数百万人目前使用的现有已部署加密技术提供更高的保证，并为过渡到真实的系统提供新的加密技术。