Comparative Arbitration Procedures: The Role of Expectations in Dispute Rates

讨价还价的分歧往往代价高昂，因此需要彻底了解谈判失败的决定因素以及解决争端的不同程序的有效性。本研究将研究仲裁程序，本研究的一个主要目的是考察不同仲裁形式下的争议解决。也就是说，不同的仲裁规则如何影响谈判结果？这项研究将考察一种创新的仲裁程序以及目前使用的程序。用这一创新程序调查争端解决是很重要的，因为它在理论上有望比目前在实践中使用的程序更有效地解决争端。这项研究还将调查讨价还价者的期望在争端中所起的作用。如果议价者乐观地看待有关可能的仲裁和解的信息(即，每个议价者对可能的和解的看法都偏向于他/她)，那么这些乐观的预期可能会极大地助长这样一种可能性，即议价者将进行仲裁，而不是谈判自己的和解。具体地说，人们可以从理论上表明，乐观的预期可能会颠倒本项目所研究的仲裁程序中从最低到最有效的顺序。这项研究将使用受控的实验室谈判环境来审查上述问题，该环境允许操纵讨价还价者的预期和用于谈判僵局的仲裁规则。付费实验室受试者将就通用变量(即为实验室环境创建的价值项)的值进行谈判，这将为一个讨价还价者产生更高的回报，以获得较低的协议值，但为另一个讨价还价者产生更高的讨价还价以获得更高的协议值。因此，劳顾会在谈判中产生了利益冲突(即纠纷)。固定长度的谈判回合将在不同回合中利用不同套仲裁规则来解决回合结束时仍未解决的争端。实验环境还将通过提供更精炼(和客观)的信息形式来操纵受试者的预期，这些信息是关于在一半的实验中可能通过仲裁达成和解的。对这项研究结果的统计分析将揭示哪种仲裁程序在限制争议方面最有效，并将确定讨价还价者预期的单独贡献。

Bargaining disagreements are often quite costly, and so a thorough understanding of the determinants of bargaining failure and the effectiveness of different procedures to resolve disputes is needed. This research will study arbitration procedures, and one key objective of this research is to examine dispute resolution under different forms of arbitration. That is, how do different arbitration rules affect bargaining outcomes? This research will examine an innovative arbitration procedure as well as currently used procedures. It is important to investigate dispute resolution with this innovative procedure because it theoretically promises to resolve disputes more effectively than procedures currently used in practice. This research will also investigate the role that bargainer expectations play in disputes. If bargainers view information about likely arbitration settlements in an optimistic way (i.e., each bargainer's perceptions of likely settlements are biased in his/her favor), then these optimistic expectations may significantly contribute to the likelihood that the bargainers will arbitration rather than negotiate their own settlement. Specifically, one can show theoretically that optimistic expectations will likely reverse the ordering of least to most effective arbitration procedure from among those studied in this project. This research will examine the aforementioned issues using a controlled laboratory bargaining environment that allows for manipulation of bargainer expectations and arbitration rules used at bargaining impasse. Paid laboratory subjects will negotiate over the value of a generic variable (i.e., the item of value created for the lab environment), which generates higher payoffs to one bargainer for lower negotiated values but higher payoffs to the other bargainer for higher negotiated values of the variable. As such, the lab creates a conflict of interest (i.e., a dispute) in terms of payoff potential in the negotiations. Bargaining rounds of fixed length will utilize different sets of arbitrations rules in different rounds to resolve disputes that remain at the end of the round. The experimental environment will also manipulate subject expectations by providing a more distilled (and objective) form of information about likely arbitrated settlements for bargaining pairs in half of the experiments. Statistical analysis of the results from this research will reveal which arbitration procedure is most effective at limiting disputes and will also identify the separate contribution of bargainer expectations.