Comparative Arbitration Procedures: The Role of Expectations in Dispute Rates

讨价还价的分歧往往是相当昂贵的，因此有必要彻底了解谈判失败的决定因素和解决争端的不同程序的有效性。 本研究将研究仲裁程序，本研究的一个主要目标是审查不同形式的仲裁下的争议解决。 也就是说，不同的仲裁规则如何影响谈判结果？ 这项研究将审查一个创新的仲裁程序以及目前使用的程序。 这是重要的，以这种创新的程序来研究解决纠纷，因为它在理论上承诺解决纠纷更有效地比目前在实践中使用的程序。 本研究亦将探讨议价者期望在纠纷中所扮演的角色。 如果议价者以乐观的方式看待有关可能的仲裁解决方案的信息（即，每个讨价还价者对可能的解决方案的看法偏向于他/她的利益），那么这些乐观的预期可能会显著地促成讨价还价者仲裁而不是协商他们自己的解决方案的可能性。 具体而言，人们可以从理论上表明，乐观的期望将可能扭转最有效的仲裁程序从最少的顺序，在本项目中研究的。 本研究将使用一个受控的实验室议价环境，允许操纵议价者的期望和仲裁规则，在议价僵局中使用的上述问题进行研究。 付费实验室受试者将协商通用变量的值（即，为实验室环境创建的价值项），这对于较低的协商值向一个议价者生成较高的收益，但是对于变量的较高的协商值向另一个议价者生成较高的收益。 因此，实验室造成了利益冲突（即，在谈判中的潜在回报方面。 固定长度的谈判回合将在不同回合中使用不同的仲裁规则来解决回合结束时仍然存在的争议。 实验环境还将通过提供关于一半实验中的讨价还价对的可能仲裁解决方案的更精炼（和客观）形式的信息来操纵受试者的期望。 本研究结果的统计分析将揭示哪种仲裁程序在限制争议方面最有效，并将确定议价者期望的单独贡献。

Bargaining disagreements are often quite costly, and so a thorough understanding of the determinants of bargaining failure and the effectiveness of different procedures to resolve disputes is needed. This research will study arbitration procedures, and one key objective of this research is to examine dispute resolution under different forms of arbitration. That is, how do different arbitration rules affect bargaining outcomes? This research will examine an innovative arbitration procedure as well as currently used procedures. It is important to investigate dispute resolution with this innovative procedure because it theoretically promises to resolve disputes more effectively than procedures currently used in practice. This research will also investigate the role that bargainer expectations play in disputes. If bargainers view information about likely arbitration settlements in an optimistic way (i.e., each bargainer's perceptions of likely settlements are biased in his/her favor), then these optimistic expectations may significantly contribute to the likelihood that the bargainers will arbitration rather than negotiate their own settlement. Specifically, one can show theoretically that optimistic expectations will likely reverse the ordering of least to most effective arbitration procedure from among those studied in this project. This research will examine the aforementioned issues using a controlled laboratory bargaining environment that allows for manipulation of bargainer expectations and arbitration rules used at bargaining impasse. Paid laboratory subjects will negotiate over the value of a generic variable (i.e., the item of value created for the lab environment), which generates higher payoffs to one bargainer for lower negotiated values but higher payoffs to the other bargainer for higher negotiated values of the variable. As such, the lab creates a conflict of interest (i.e., a dispute) in terms of payoff potential in the negotiations. Bargaining rounds of fixed length will utilize different sets of arbitrations rules in different rounds to resolve disputes that remain at the end of the round. The experimental environment will also manipulate subject expectations by providing a more distilled (and objective) form of information about likely arbitrated settlements for bargaining pairs in half of the experiments. Statistical analysis of the results from this research will reveal which arbitration procedure is most effective at limiting disputes and will also identify the separate contribution of bargainer expectations.