Modes of Economic Governance

本研究探讨了不同经济治理体系的相对优势和劣势的来源，以及它们之间的相互作用。重点是这样的问题：在什么情况下哪种制度会更好？什么时候不同的制度可以共存，什么时候一种制度会取代其他制度？每个社会是否会选择最适合其国情的模式？新的系统是否会在适当的时候被采用，或者团体是否会被锁在旧的模式中，即使这些模式可能已经过时或功能失调？研究方法结合了理论分析，并对现有或新兴的案例研究进行了测试。 在发达的西方经济体中，经济契约是由公正有效的法律的体系来执行的。这使陌生人能够相互交往。在大多数其他国家，以及历史上所有国家，这样的法律的制度可能缺失，或腐败，或过于缓慢。其他的治理体系也随之发展。一种替代办法包括社会规范和制裁。小的紧密结合的团体可以有效地使用这些，因为他们彼此了解并保持着持续的关系。这一制度在许多东亚国家的企业中以及在因种族或类似关系而联系在一起的商人社区中很常见。非官方治理的其他方法包括私人利益驱动的第三方，他们收集和传递有关先前违反合同义务的信息;信用评级机构甚至在发达经济体中也履行了这类职能。最后，他们包括私人第三方，他们将通过惩罚任何违约行为来执行合同;有组织犯罪集团在官方国家崩溃时扮演了这个角色，例如在世纪后期的西西里，二战后的日本，以及苏联和东欧共产主义政权崩溃后。这些第三方替代方案在某些情况下的表现可以接受，但在另一些情况下却证明功能失调。 提高我们对经济契约执行机制的概念性理解在法经济学理论中具有明显的基础重要性。这项研究也有实际用途。例如，与治理方式不同的国家进行贸易或投资的美国公司可以更好地预见它们在促使当地合作伙伴和政府遵守承诺方面可能面临的任何问题，并可以设计出保护自己免受违约行为影响的方法。向欠发达国家提供结构改革咨询意见的世界银行和货币基金组织等多边组织如果了解改革后的企业必须在何种治理结构下运作，就可以更好地拟订建议;必要时，它们可以建议这些国家同时改革治理方法。

This research examines the sources of relative advantages and disadvantages of different systems of economic governance, and interactions among them. The focus is on questions such as: Which system will be better under what circumstances? When can different systems coexist, and when will one supplant the others? Will each society select the mode that is optimal for its circumstances? Will new systems be adopted when appropriate, or can groups remain locked into old modes even though these may be outdated or dysfunctional? The methodology of the research combines theoretical analysis, and testing this analysis against case studies that are available or emerging. In advanced western economies, economic contracts are enforced by an impartial and effective legal system. This enables strangers to deal with each other. In most other countries, and historically in all countries, such a legal system may be missing, or corrupt, or too slow. Other systems of governance then evolve. One alternative comprises social norms and sanctions. Small close-knit groups can use these effectively since they are well-informed about each other and in an ongoing relationship. This system is common among businesses in many East-Asian countries and among communities of traders linked by ethnic or similar ties. Other methods of unofficial governance include private profit-motivated third parties who collect and convey information about previous violations of contractual obligations; credit-rating agencies perform such functions even in advanced economies. Finally, they include private third parties who will enforce contracts by punishing any breaches; organized crime groups have played this role when the official state has broken down, for example in late 19th century Sicily, just after World War II in Japan, and just after the collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These third-party alternatives have performed acceptably in some circumstances and have proved dysfunctional in others. Improving our conceptual understanding of the mechanisms of enforcement of economic contracts is of obvious basic importance in the theories of law and economics. The research also has practical uses. For example, U.S. firms trading with, or investing in, countries with different governance practices can better foresee any problems they are likely to face in getting their local partners and governments to keep promises, and can devise methods to protect themselves against breaches of contract. Multilateral organizations like the World Bank and IMF that advise less-developed countries on structural reforms can design their recommendations better if they understand the governance structures under which the reformed enterprises must operate; where necessary, they can recommend simultaneous reforms of the methods of governance in these countries.