Modes of Economic Governance

本研究考察了不同经济治理制度相对优势和劣势的来源，以及它们之间的相互作用。重点是这样的问题：哪种系统在什么情况下会更好？什么时候不同的制度可以共存，什么时候一个制度可以取代另一个制度？每个社会会选择最适合其环境的模式吗？是否会在适当的时候采用新的系统，或者即使这些可能已经过时或功能失调，团体仍然可以被锁定在旧模式中？研究的方法结合了理论分析，并对现有的或正在出现的案例研究进行检验。在西方发达经济体，经济合同是由公正有效的法律体系执行的。这使陌生人能够彼此打交道。在大多数其他国家，历史上在所有国家，这样的法律制度可能缺失，或腐败，或太慢。其他的治理系统随之发展。一种选择包括社会规范和制裁。小而紧密的团体可以有效地利用这些，因为他们对彼此都很了解，并且在一段持续的关系中。这种制度在许多东亚国家的企业以及由种族或类似关系联系在一起的商人社区中很常见。其他非官方治理方法包括，由私人利益驱动的第三方收集和传达有关以前违反合同义务的信息；即使在发达经济体，信用评级机构也发挥着这样的作用。最后，它们包括私人第三方，它们将通过惩罚任何违约行为来执行合同；当官方国家崩溃时，有组织的犯罪集团就扮演了这个角色，例如19世纪末的西西里岛，二战后不久的日本，以及苏联和东欧的共产主义政权崩溃后不久。这些第三方替代方案在某些情况下表现尚可，但在其他情况下却被证明是不正常的。提高我们对经济契约执行机制的概念认识，在法学和经济学理论中具有明显的基础重要性。这项研究也有实际用途。例如，与治理实践不同的国家进行贸易或投资的美国公司可以更好地预见到他们在让当地合作伙伴和政府信守承诺方面可能面临的任何问题，并可以设计出保护自己免受违约的方法。世界银行和国际货币基金组织等向欠发达国家提供结构改革建议的多边组织，如果了解改革后的企业必须在其中运作的治理结构，就可以更好地设计建议；必要时，他们可以建议同时改革这些国家的管理方法。

This research examines the sources of relative advantages and disadvantages of different systems of economic governance, and interactions among them. The focus is on questions such as: Which system will be better under what circumstances? When can different systems coexist, and when will one supplant the others? Will each society select the mode that is optimal for its circumstances? Will new systems be adopted when appropriate, or can groups remain locked into old modes even though these may be outdated or dysfunctional? The methodology of the research combines theoretical analysis, and testing this analysis against case studies that are available or emerging. In advanced western economies, economic contracts are enforced by an impartial and effective legal system. This enables strangers to deal with each other. In most other countries, and historically in all countries, such a legal system may be missing, or corrupt, or too slow. Other systems of governance then evolve. One alternative comprises social norms and sanctions. Small close-knit groups can use these effectively since they are well-informed about each other and in an ongoing relationship. This system is common among businesses in many East-Asian countries and among communities of traders linked by ethnic or similar ties. Other methods of unofficial governance include private profit-motivated third parties who collect and convey information about previous violations of contractual obligations; credit-rating agencies perform such functions even in advanced economies. Finally, they include private third parties who will enforce contracts by punishing any breaches; organized crime groups have played this role when the official state has broken down, for example in late 19th century Sicily, just after World War II in Japan, and just after the collapse of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These third-party alternatives have performed acceptably in some circumstances and have proved dysfunctional in others. Improving our conceptual understanding of the mechanisms of enforcement of economic contracts is of obvious basic importance in the theories of law and economics. The research also has practical uses. For example, U.S. firms trading with, or investing in, countries with different governance practices can better foresee any problems they are likely to face in getting their local partners and governments to keep promises, and can devise methods to protect themselves against breaches of contract. Multilateral organizations like the World Bank and IMF that advise less-developed countries on structural reforms can design their recommendations better if they understand the governance structures under which the reformed enterprises must operate; where necessary, they can recommend simultaneous reforms of the methods of governance in these countries.