Democracy, Autocracy, and Bureaucracy

民主、独裁和官僚

基本信息

  • 批准号:
    0751043
  • 负责人:
  • 金额:
    $ 4.47万
  • 依托单位:
  • 依托单位国家:
    美国
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 财政年份:
    2008
  • 资助国家:
    美国
  • 起止时间:
    2008-04-01 至 2009-06-30
  • 项目状态:
    已结题

项目摘要

This project improves our conceptual understanding of the political process of making and implementing economic policy, by bringing together ideas and methods from political economy and organization theory. Political economy considers the process of policymaking - voting in elections, committees and legislatures in a democracy, and interaction among ruling groups in an oligarchy. Organization theory in this context studies the agencies or bureaucracies that implement economic policy, paying attention to the internal structure and incentives of the officials. However, the two should interact. Policymaking should recognize that the decisions are not going to be implemented by a perfect Weberian bureaucracy, and organizational theory should recognize that the incentives at the implementation stage will be influenced by the objectives and constraints on the politicians or oligarchs. The research consists of theoretical modeling of this interaction. The most immediate aim is to examine how this interaction leads to differences in economic outcomes of democracies and authoritarian regimes. Two such sources of difference are pertinent. First, the costs of giving incentive payments to bureaucrats differ for the two types of regimes. In democracies this is merely a transfer from one citizen to another; that may be costly because the transfer bucket may be leaky. But an autocrat or oligarch who seeks to extract private benefit from the economy has to bear the whole cost of the incentive payments. This larger cost leads the autocrat to give weaker incentives and accept worse economic outcomes than the democratic ruler; for example fewer or worse public goods will be provided in autocracies than in democracies. Second, if some types of rulers and some bureaucrats have other-regarding preferences where they care for the citizens' welfare while other types are purely selfish, then there can be a positive matching where benevolent rulers hire altruistic officials and kleptocratic rulers hire selfish bureaucrats. This again favors democracies.This basic model suggests more issues to explore, for example instead of (or in addition to) direct incentive payments, incentives in public agencies come from career structures in agencies, yardstick competition among bureaucrats, and monitoring of one agency by another. More generally, integration of political economy and organizational theory promises deeper understanding and enrichment of both fields.
该项目通过汇集政治经济学和组织理论的思想和方法,提高了我们对制定和实施经济政策的政治过程的概念理解。政治经济学考虑的是决策过程--民主国家的选举、委员会和立法机构的投票,以及寡头政治中统治集团之间的互动。在这种背景下,组织理论研究执行经济政策的机构或官僚机构,关注官员的内部结构和激励。然而,两者应该互动。政策制定应该认识到,决策不会被完美的韦伯官僚机构执行,组织理论应该认识到,在执行阶段的激励将受到政治家或寡头的目标和约束的影响。该研究包括这种相互作用的理论建模。最直接的目的是研究这种相互作用如何导致民主和专制政权的经济结果的差异。两个这样的差异来源是相关的。首先,两种体制下向官僚提供激励性薪酬的成本不同。在民主国家,这仅仅是从一个公民到另一个公民的转移;这可能是昂贵的,因为转移桶可能是泄漏的。但是,试图从经济中榨取私人利益的独裁者或寡头必须承担激励费用的全部成本。这种更大的成本导致独裁者给予更弱的激励,并接受比民主统治者更差的经济结果;例如,独裁者提供的公共产品比民主国家少或更差。第二,如果某些类型的统治者和某些官僚有其他方面的偏好,他们关心公民的福利,而其他类型的人则纯粹是自私的,那么就可能存在一种积极的匹配,即仁慈的统治者雇用利他的官员,而盗贼统治者雇用自私的官僚。这一基本模型也有利于民主,它提出了更多需要探讨的问题,例如,公共机构的激励来自于机构的职业结构、官僚之间的标尺竞争以及一个机构对另一个机构的监督,而不是直接的激励报酬(或者除了直接的激励报酬之外)。更一般地说,政治经济学和组织理论的整合承诺更深入的理解和丰富这两个领域。

项目成果

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Avinash Dixit其他文献

Theory and Policy: Reply to Tanzi
  • DOI:
    10.2307/3867429
  • 发表时间:
    1992-12-01
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    2.200
  • 作者:
    Avinash Dixit
  • 通讯作者:
    Avinash Dixit
The Optimal Mix of Inflationary Finance and Commodity Taxation with Collection Lags
  • DOI:
    10.2307/3867161
  • 发表时间:
    1991-09-01
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    2.200
  • 作者:
    Avinash Dixit
  • 通讯作者:
    Avinash Dixit
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE DYNAMICS OF HIGH INFLATION
NBER 工作论文系列 高通胀的动态
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    1999
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    L. Ball;Susanto Basu;Ben Bernanke;Marco Bonomo;Avinash Dixit;Lou Maccini
  • 通讯作者:
    Lou Maccini
Cross Frequency Adaptation for Radar-Based Human Activity Recognition Using Few-Shot Learning
使用少样本学习进行基于雷达的人类活动识别的跨频率适应
The past and future of monopolistic competition modeling
  • DOI:
    10.1016/j.rie.2017.10.003
  • 发表时间:
    2017-12-01
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
  • 作者:
    Avinash Dixit
  • 通讯作者:
    Avinash Dixit

Avinash Dixit的其他文献

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{{ truncateString('Avinash Dixit', 18)}}的其他基金

Collaborative Research -- Theoretical Investigations of Some Empirical Puzzles Regarding Behavior in Relationships with Asymmetric Information
合作研究——关于不对称信息关系中的行为的一些实证难题的理论研究
  • 批准号:
    0452494
  • 财政年份:
    2005
  • 资助金额:
    $ 4.47万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Modes of Economic Governance
经济治理模式
  • 批准号:
    0134891
  • 财政年份:
    2002
  • 资助金额:
    $ 4.47万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Agency and Dynamics in Political Economy
政治经济学中的代理与动态
  • 批准号:
    9817727
  • 财政年份:
    1999
  • 资助金额:
    $ 4.47万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Common Agency in Political Economy
政治经济学中的共同机构
  • 批准号:
    9514866
  • 财政年份:
    1996
  • 资助金额:
    $ 4.47万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
The Political Economy of Redistribution and Dynamic Resource Allocation
再分配和动态资源配置的政治经济学
  • 批准号:
    9507692
  • 财政年份:
    1995
  • 资助金额:
    $ 4.47万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Investment Under Uncertainty: Theory and Applications
不确定性下的投资:理论与应用
  • 批准号:
    9121490
  • 财政年份:
    1992
  • 资助金额:
    $ 4.47万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Trade Policy with Imperfect Markets
不完善市场的贸易政策
  • 批准号:
    8803300
  • 财政年份:
    1988
  • 资助金额:
    $ 4.47万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Issues of Trade Policy with Imperfect Markets
不完善市场的贸易政策问题
  • 批准号:
    8509536
  • 财政年份:
    1985
  • 资助金额:
    $ 4.47万
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
International Trade Policy in Oligopolistic Markets
寡头垄断市场中的国际贸易政策
  • 批准号:
    8308536
  • 财政年份:
    1983
  • 资助金额:
    $ 4.47万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant

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