Trade Policy with Imperfect Markets

对不确定性和不完全竞争的认识导致了对国际贸易和商业政策的经济理论的实质性反思。该项目旨在扩大这一研究的前沿在四个广泛的领域，其中的主题自然演变从作者以前的工作。a .贸易滞后性：当企业进入和离开一个市场必须付出成本时，短暂的货币失调会对进口量和价格产生持续的影响。以前关于这一现象的模型过于简化和不切实际。拟议的研究对汇率变动（特别是布朗运动）有简单但更现实的描述。对于竞争企业，已经得到了一些结果；未来的工作将包括不完全竞争，并研究石油进口税等相关政策问题。B.国际研发竞争：由于研发本身具有风险，因此对该领域政策的良好分析必须采用随机动态博弈模型。建立了这样的模型；这项研究将包括解决它所必需的大量数值计算。关于研发竞赛中适用于领先者和落后者的战略强度和风险的假设将得到检验。研究高新技术产业贸易和补贴政策的设计。C.国际政策冲突与协调：主要研究的问题是囚徒困境的避免：竞争性产业的标准关税报复性战争，寡头垄断的战略性进口关税或出口补贴。将研究贸易政策的许多维度上的囚徒困境，以及划分贸易自由化潜在收益的讨价还价游戏。D.不确定性下的贸易政策：集中和分配风险的市场往往是不完整的，尤其是在最不发达国家。然而，主张对保险使用贸易限制的随意论点经不起严格的分析。将研究更精确地描述市场失灵以及适当的政策反应。

The recognition of uncertainty and imperfect competition has led to a substantial rethinking of the economic theory of international trade and commercial policy. This project aims to expand the frontiers of this research in four broad areas, the themes of which evolve naturally from the author's previous work. A. Hysteresis in Trade: When firms must incur costs to enter and leave a market, transient currency misalignments have persistent effects on import volumes and prices. Previous models of this phenomenon were oversimplified and unrealistic. The proposed research has simple but more realistic descriptions of exchange rate movements (notably Brownian motion). Some results for competitive firms have been obtained; future work will include imperfect competition, and examine related policy issues like oil import taxes. B. International R & D Competition: Since R & D is inherently risky, good analysis of policy in this area must employ a stochastic dynamic game model. Such a model is formulated; the research will consist of extensive numerical computations necessary to solve it. Hypotheses about the intensity and the riskiness of strategies appropriate for leaders and laggards in the R & D race will be tested. The design of trade and subsidy policy for high-tech industries will be examined. C. International Policy Conflict and Coordination: The main issue to be researched is the avoidance of Prisoner's Dilemmas: the standard tariff retaliation war for competitive industries, and the strategic import tariff or export subsidy for oligopolies. Prisoners' Dilemmas over many dimensions of trade policies, and games of bargaining to divide the potential gains from trade liberalization, will be studied. D. Trade Policy Under Uncertainty: Markets for pooling and allocating risk are often incomplete, especially in LDC's. However, casual arguments that advocate the use of trade restrictions for insurance do not survive rigorous analysis. More precise formulations of the market failures, and appropriate policy responses, will be studied.