课题基金 / 基金详情

Trade Policy with Imperfect Markets

Trade Policy with Imperfect Markets
不完善市场的贸易政策
批准号:
8803300
负责人:
Avinash Dixit
金额:
$11.52万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
1988
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1988-08-01 至 1992-01-31

项目摘要

项目成果

Avinash Dixit的其他基金

相似基金

相关文献

中文摘要
翻译
点击翻译按钮获取中文摘要
英文摘要
The recognition of uncertainty and imperfect competition has led to a substantial rethinking of the economic theory of international trade and commercial policy. This project aims to expand the frontiers of this research in four broad areas, the themes of which evolve naturally from the author's previous work. A. Hysteresis in Trade: When firms must incur costs to enter and leave a market, transient currency misalignments have persistent effects on import volumes and prices. Previous models of this phenomenon were oversimplified and unrealistic. The proposed research has simple but more realistic descriptions of exchange rate movements (notably Brownian motion). Some results for competitive firms have been obtained; future work will include imperfect competition, and examine related policy issues like oil import taxes. B. International R & D Competition: Since R & D is inherently risky, good analysis of policy in this area must employ a stochastic dynamic game model. Such a model is formulated; the research will consist of extensive numerical computations necessary to solve it. Hypotheses about the intensity and the riskiness of strategies appropriate for leaders and laggards in the R & D race will be tested. The design of trade and subsidy policy for high-tech industries will be examined. C. International Policy Conflict and Coordination: The main issue to be researched is the avoidance of Prisoner's Dilemmas: the standard tariff retaliation war for competitive industries, and the strategic import tariff or export subsidy for oligopolies. Prisoners' Dilemmas over many dimensions of trade policies, and games of bargaining to divide the potential gains from trade liberalization, will be studied. D. Trade Policy Under Uncertainty: Markets for pooling and allocating risk are often incomplete, especially in LDC's. However, casual arguments that advocate the use of trade restrictions for insurance do not survive rigorous analysis. More precise formulations of the market failures, and appropriate policy responses, will be studied.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Democracy, Autocracy, and Bureaucracy
  • 批准号:
    0751043
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $4.47万
  • 财政年份:
    2008
  • 负责人:
    Avinash Dixit
  • 依托单位:
Collaborative Research -- Theoretical Investigations of Some Empirical Puzzles Regarding Behavior in Relationships with Asymmetric Information
  • 批准号:
    0452494
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $10.24万
  • 财政年份:
    2005
  • 负责人:
    Avinash Dixit
  • 依托单位:
Modes of Economic Governance
  • 批准号:
    0134891
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $16.64万
  • 财政年份:
    2002
  • 负责人:
    Avinash Dixit
  • 依托单位:
Agency and Dynamics in Political Economy
  • 批准号:
    9817727
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $16.6万
  • 财政年份:
    1999
  • 负责人:
    Avinash Dixit
  • 依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
The Heterogenous Impact of Monetary Policy on Firms' Risk and Fundamentals
Financial Constraints in China and Their Policy Implications
  • 批准号:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    外国优秀青年学 者研究基金项目
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 批准年份:
    2024
  • 负责人:
    Jake Zhao
  • 依托单位: