Sequential Voting in Collegial Courts: An Experimental Design

合议庭在审议过程中进行顺序投票是不同类型法院系统中比较一致的现象。然而，顺序投票的方法因法院而异。美国最高法院在调档投票和案情原始投票中采用资历顺序投票制度，资历最高的法官先投票，依此类推，资历最低的法官先投票。美国各州法院使用多种顺序投票机制，从上述的资历制度到反向资历制度（任期最短的法官先投票，任期最长的法官最后投票），再到轮换或随机资历制度（投票顺序随机确定）。顺序投票过程会影响法官在对案件进行投票时面临的不确定性程度。法官在投票时面临的不确定性是相关的，因为这影响了法官战略性投票的能力。具体来说，它可能会影响法官加入多数联盟的决定。对法官来说，占多数有两个好处：个人层面的好处和集体的好处。个别而言，在某些司法制度中，占多数的法官有机会起草讨价还价时的初步意见。总的来说，绝对多数的形成是有吸引力的，因为当对法律问题达成共识时，法院判决的合法性就会提高。为了测试投票顺序的效果，研究人员提出了一系列的实验室实验。实验室实验还允许对相关参数进行控制，例如投票系统的类型、法官的风险规避、法院的规模、不确定性的程度以及正在考虑的问题的显著性。这项研究将提供证据，说明哪个法官更有可能在投票队列中考虑到他或她的位置，以及每个法院系统中应该发生的战略投票率。实验还应该提供一些关于每个制度的社会福利性质的有用结果。

Sequential voting among collegial courts during deliberations is a phenomenon that is fairly consistent among different types of court systems. However, the method of sequential voting varies widely from court to court. The U.S. Supreme Court uses a seniority sequential voting system during the certiorari vote and the original votes of merits, in which the most senior justice votes first, and so on to the least senior member. U. S. state courts use a multitude of sequential voting mechanisms which range from the seniority system described above, to a reverse seniority system (in which the least tenured justice votes first and so on to the most tenured justice voting last), to a rotation or random seniority system (in which the order of voting is determined randomly). Sequential voting processes affect the level of uncertainty judges confront when they cast their vote on a case. The amount of uncertainty that judges confront when they cast their vote is relevant because this influences a judge's ability to vote strategically. Specifically, it may influence a judge's decision to join the majority coalition. Being in the majority has two benefits for judges: an individual-level benefit and a collective benefit. Individually, in certain judicial systems, a judge who is in the majority has he opportunity to draft the initial opinion where bargaining occurs. Collectively, the formation of supermajorities is attractive since the legitimacy of the court's judgment is heightened when there is consensus about a legal issue. To test the effect of voting sequence, the researchers propose a series of laboratory experiments. Laboratory experiments also allow control for relevant parameters, such as the type of voting system, risk aversion of the judges, size of the court, the level of uncertainty, and the saliency of the issue under consideration. This research will provide evidence about which judge is more likely to vote strategically given his or her position in the voting queue, and the rate of strategic voting that should occur in each of the court systems. The experiments should also provide some useful results about the social welfare properties of each system.