Sequential Voting in Collegial Courts: An Experimental Design

合议庭在审议期间的顺序表决是一种在不同类型的法院系统中相当一致的现象。然而，顺序投票的方法因法院而异。美国联邦最高法院在进行法官资格投票和法官资格投票时采用资历顺序投票制，资历最深的法官优先投票，资历最浅的法官依次投票。联合S.州法院使用多种顺序投票机制，从上述资历制度到反向资历制度（任期最短的法官首先投票，依此类推，任期最长的法官最后投票），再到轮换或随机资历制度（投票顺序随机确定）。顺序投票程序影响法官在对案件投票时所面临的不确定性水平。法官在投票时面临的不确定性是相关的，因为这影响了法官战略性投票的能力。 具体来说，它可能会影响法官加入多数联盟的决定。 法官成为多数派有两个好处：个人利益和集体利益。就个人而言，在某些司法系统中，占多数的法官有机会在进行谈判时起草初步意见。总的来说，形成绝对多数是有吸引力的，因为当对一个法律的问题达成共识时，法院判决的合法性就会提高。为了测试投票顺序的效果，研究人员提出了一系列实验室实验。实验室实验还允许控制相关参数，如投票系统的类型，法官的风险规避，法院的规模，不确定性的程度，以及正在考虑的问题的显着性。这项研究将提供证据，说明哪个法官更有可能根据他或她在投票队列中的位置进行战略性投票，以及每个法院系统中应该发生的战略性投票率。这些实验还应该提供一些关于每个系统的社会福利性质的有用结果。

Sequential voting among collegial courts during deliberations is a phenomenon that is fairly consistent among different types of court systems. However, the method of sequential voting varies widely from court to court. The U.S. Supreme Court uses a seniority sequential voting system during the certiorari vote and the original votes of merits, in which the most senior justice votes first, and so on to the least senior member. U. S. state courts use a multitude of sequential voting mechanisms which range from the seniority system described above, to a reverse seniority system (in which the least tenured justice votes first and so on to the most tenured justice voting last), to a rotation or random seniority system (in which the order of voting is determined randomly). Sequential voting processes affect the level of uncertainty judges confront when they cast their vote on a case. The amount of uncertainty that judges confront when they cast their vote is relevant because this influences a judge's ability to vote strategically. Specifically, it may influence a judge's decision to join the majority coalition. Being in the majority has two benefits for judges: an individual-level benefit and a collective benefit. Individually, in certain judicial systems, a judge who is in the majority has he opportunity to draft the initial opinion where bargaining occurs. Collectively, the formation of supermajorities is attractive since the legitimacy of the court's judgment is heightened when there is consensus about a legal issue. To test the effect of voting sequence, the researchers propose a series of laboratory experiments. Laboratory experiments also allow control for relevant parameters, such as the type of voting system, risk aversion of the judges, size of the court, the level of uncertainty, and the saliency of the issue under consideration. This research will provide evidence about which judge is more likely to vote strategically given his or her position in the voting queue, and the rate of strategic voting that should occur in each of the court systems. The experiments should also provide some useful results about the social welfare properties of each system.