Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Bargaining, Uncertainty and the Shadow of the Future in North Atlantic Fisheries

长期以来，不确定性对行为的影响一直令政治学学科着迷。解决不确定性对谈判和合作的影响的政治理论巩固了对政权发展的理解，并为制定处理社会最紧迫问题的机构的努力提供了信息。然而，在对理论文献的考察中，出现了关于不确定性产生影响的因果机制的相互矛盾的主张。一些知名学者已经确定了不确定性对综合谈判和就永久规则达成协议应该产生的有益影响，而其他学者也提出了同样看似合理的论点，认为不确定性阻碍了这种谈判并阻碍了这种协议。作为测试关于不确定性和机构讨价还价之间关系的反补贴主张的一种手段，这篇博士论文研究支持重点放在海洋包围之后的北大西洋。随着一套新制度的建立，200英里专属经济区(EEZ)的形成为评估对讨价还价行为和相关结果的反补贴预期提供了独特的机会。该项目通过一种研究设计来审查机构讨价还价，该研究设计确定了一组丰富的可比较渔业案例中不确定性的差异。该项目审查了这种差异对一体化谈判与分配谈判的相对程度以及监管协议--通常采取产权安排形式的协议--期限的内容的影响。确定了三种理论上看似合理的因果机制，就不确定性对机构谈判的影响产生了一些相互矛盾的主张。该项目规定了这些相互竞争的机制的可观察到的影响，并调查了它们的运行条件。这个项目的结果将阐明我们对在不确定条件下，特别是在危机时期，如何协调相互竞争的讨价还价激励的理论理解。关于制度设计，这项研究提供了对谈判者在特定不确定条件下最好建议解决的问题顺序的见解。更好地理解不确定性和实际行为之间的关系，可以提高就寻求平衡公平、效率和可持续发展的当代环境与发展问题达成协议的可能性。

The impact of uncertainty on behavior has long captivated the political science discipline. Political theories addressing uncertainty's influence on bargaining and cooperation underpin the understanding of regime development and inform efforts to devise institutions that deal with societies most pressing problems. In surveying the theoretical literature, however, contradictory claims appear with respect to the causal mechanisms through which uncertainty supposedly exerts its influence. A number of prominent scholars have identified the salutary effects uncertainty should have on integrative bargaining and agreement on permanent rules while other scholars have offered equally plausible arguments suggesting that uncertainty inhibits such bargaining and impedes such agreements. As a means of testing countervailing claims regarding the relationship between uncertainty and institutional bargaining, this Doctoral Dissertation Research Support focuses on the North Atlantic in the wake of oceans enclosure. The formation of 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) provides a unique opportunity for evaluating countervailing expectations about bargaining behavior and associated outcomes as a set of new regimes are established. This project examines institutional bargaining through a research design that identifies variation in uncertainty across a rich set of comparable fisheries cases. The project examines the affect of this variation on the relative degree of integrative vs. distributive bargaining and the content of duration of regulatory agreements -agreements that usually take the form of property rights arrangements. Three theoretically plausible causal mechanisms are identified generating a number of contradictory propositions with respect to the influence of uncertainty on institutional bargaining. The project specifies theobservable implications of these competing mechanisms and investigate the conditions under which they operate. The results of this project will illuminate our theoretical understanding of how competing bargaining incentives are reconciled under uncertain conditions, particularly in times of crisis. With respect to institutional design, this research offers insights into the sequence of issues negotiators might be best advised to address under specific conditions of uncertainty. A better understanding of the relationship between uncertainty and actual behavior can improve the probability of forging agreement on contemporary problems of environment and development that seek to balance equity, efficiency and sustainability concerns.