Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Bargaining, Uncertainty and the Shadow of the Future in North Atlantic Fisheries

长期以来，不确定性对行为的影响一直吸引着政治学学科。解决不确定性对讨价还价和合作影响的政治理论巩固了对制度发展的理解，并为设计处理社会最紧迫问题的制度提供了信息。然而，在调查理论文献时，关于不确定性施加其影响的因果机制出现了相互矛盾的说法。一些著名学者已经确定了不确定性对综合议价和永久性规则协议的有益影响，而其他学者也提出了同样合理的论点，认为不确定性抑制了这种议价并阻碍了这种协议。作为测试关于不确定性和制度议价之间关系的反补贴主张的一种手段，本博士论文研究支持重点关注海洋圈地后的北大西洋。200英里专属经济区（EEZs）的形成提供了一个独特的机会，可以评估议价行为的反补贴预期以及随着一系列新制度的建立而产生的相关结果。本项目通过一项研究设计来检验制度讨价还价，该设计确定了大量可比渔业案例中不确定性的变化。该项目考察了这种变化对综合与分配谈判的相对程度的影响，以及监管协议- -通常采取产权安排形式的协议- -期限的内容。在不确定性对制度议价的影响方面，确定了三个理论上合理的因果机制，产生了一些相互矛盾的命题。该项目详细说明了这些竞争机制的可观察到的影响，并调查了它们运作的条件。该项目的结果将阐明我们对在不确定条件下，特别是在危机时期，竞争性讨价还价激励如何协调的理论理解。在制度设计方面，这项研究为谈判者在不确定的特定条件下最好解决的问题顺序提供了见解。更好地了解不确定性与实际行为之间的关系，可以提高就寻求平衡公平、效率和可持续性问题的当代环境与发展问题达成协议的可能性。

The impact of uncertainty on behavior has long captivated the political science discipline. Political theories addressing uncertainty's influence on bargaining and cooperation underpin the understanding of regime development and inform efforts to devise institutions that deal with societies most pressing problems. In surveying the theoretical literature, however, contradictory claims appear with respect to the causal mechanisms through which uncertainty supposedly exerts its influence. A number of prominent scholars have identified the salutary effects uncertainty should have on integrative bargaining and agreement on permanent rules while other scholars have offered equally plausible arguments suggesting that uncertainty inhibits such bargaining and impedes such agreements. As a means of testing countervailing claims regarding the relationship between uncertainty and institutional bargaining, this Doctoral Dissertation Research Support focuses on the North Atlantic in the wake of oceans enclosure. The formation of 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) provides a unique opportunity for evaluating countervailing expectations about bargaining behavior and associated outcomes as a set of new regimes are established. This project examines institutional bargaining through a research design that identifies variation in uncertainty across a rich set of comparable fisheries cases. The project examines the affect of this variation on the relative degree of integrative vs. distributive bargaining and the content of duration of regulatory agreements -agreements that usually take the form of property rights arrangements. Three theoretically plausible causal mechanisms are identified generating a number of contradictory propositions with respect to the influence of uncertainty on institutional bargaining. The project specifies theobservable implications of these competing mechanisms and investigate the conditions under which they operate. The results of this project will illuminate our theoretical understanding of how competing bargaining incentives are reconciled under uncertain conditions, particularly in times of crisis. With respect to institutional design, this research offers insights into the sequence of issues negotiators might be best advised to address under specific conditions of uncertainty. A better understanding of the relationship between uncertainty and actual behavior can improve the probability of forging agreement on contemporary problems of environment and development that seek to balance equity, efficiency and sustainability concerns.