Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Bargaining, Uncertainty and the Shadow of the Future in North Atlantic Fisheries

政治学博士论文研究：北大西洋渔业的讨价还价、不确定性和未来的阴影

• 批准号: 0136896
• 负责人: Robert Keohane
• 金额: $ 0.4万
• 依托单位: Duke University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-02-01 至 2003-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0136896&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

The impact of uncertainty on behavior has long captivated the political science discipline. Political theories addressing uncertainty's influence on bargaining and cooperation underpin the understanding of regime development and inform efforts to devise institutions that deal with societies most pressing problems. In surveying the theoretical literature, however, contradictory claims appear with respect to the causal mechanisms through which uncertainty supposedly exerts its influence. A number of prominent scholars have identified the salutary effects uncertainty should have on integrative bargaining and agreement on permanent rules while other scholars have offered equally plausible arguments suggesting that uncertainty inhibits such bargaining and impedes such agreements. As a means of testing countervailing claims regarding the relationship between uncertainty and institutional bargaining, this Doctoral Dissertation Research Support focuses on the North Atlantic in the wake of oceans enclosure. The formation of 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) provides a unique opportunity for evaluating countervailing expectations about bargaining behavior and associated outcomes as a set of new regimes are established. This project examines institutional bargaining through a research design that identifies variation in uncertainty across a rich set of comparable fisheries cases. The project examines the affect of this variation on the relative degree of integrative vs. distributive bargaining and the content of duration of regulatory agreements -agreements that usually take the form of property rights arrangements. Three theoretically plausible causal mechanisms are identified generating a number of contradictory propositions with respect to the influence of uncertainty on institutional bargaining. The project specifies theobservable implications of these competing mechanisms and investigate the conditions under which they operate. The results of this project will illuminate our theoretical understanding of how competing bargaining incentives are reconciled under uncertain conditions, particularly in times of crisis. With respect to institutional design, this research offers insights into the sequence of issues negotiators might be best advised to address under specific conditions of uncertainty. A better understanding of the relationship between uncertainty and actual behavior can improve the probability of forging agreement on contemporary problems of environment and development that seek to balance equity, efficiency and sustainability concerns.

长期以来，不确定性对行为的影响一直吸引着政治学学科。政治理论解决不确定性对谈判和合作的影响，巩固了对政权发展的理解，并为设计处理社会最紧迫问题的机构提供了信息。然而，在调查理论文献时，关于不确定性据推测发挥其影响的因果机制，出现了相互矛盾的说法。一些著名的学者已经确定了有益的影响，不确定性应该对一体化的谈判和协议的永久性规则，而其他学者也提供了同样合理的论点，认为不确定性抑制这种谈判和阻碍这种协议。作为一种手段，测试抵消索赔的不确定性和制度讨价还价之间的关系，这个博士论文研究支持的重点是北大西洋在海洋圈地之后。200海里专属经济区（EEZ）的形成提供了一个独特的机会，评估反补贴的讨价还价行为和相关的结果，作为一套新的制度建立的预期。该项目通过一项研究设计来审查制度性谈判，该研究设计确定了丰富的可比渔业案例中的不确定性变化。该项目研究了这种差异对一体化与分配性谈判的相对程度以及监管协议（通常采取产权安排形式的协议）的期限内容的影响。三个理论上似乎合理的因果机制，确定产生一些矛盾的命题方面的影响，不确定性的制度讨价还价。该项目具体说明了这些竞争机制的可观察影响，并调查了它们运作的条件。这个项目的结果将照亮我们的理论理解，如何竞争的讨价还价的激励是不确定的条件下，特别是在危机时期的协调。在制度设计方面，这项研究提供了对谈判者在特定不确定条件下最好解决的问题顺序的见解。更好地理解不确定性与实际行为之间的关系，可以提高就当代环境与发展问题达成协议的可能性，这些问题寻求平衡公平、效率和可持续性问题。