Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science;International Security and the Politics of Interdependence

本项目发展了多边军事干预中的合作理论。无论是临时发起的，还是在联合国、北大西洋公约组织、欧盟或非洲联盟的体制框架内发起的，多边干预都依赖于主权国家自愿提供部队。然而，对于国家来说，参与这样的努力在财政和政治方面都是昂贵的。因此，这个项目解决了这样一个问题：一个国家部署部队背后的激励因素是什么？该项目提出，大多数军事干预的参与者需要分为领导者和落后者。领导人被理解为发起具体行动的幕后推手，追求明确界定的政治、经济或规范利益。另一方面，落后者缺乏这样的兴趣，或者至少没有领导者那样强烈的兴趣。因此，落后国家需要额外的激励来推动其部队部署，而这种激励通常是由领导人提供的。然后，该项目发展了一个理论，关于领导者和落后者之间的相互依赖如何影响落后者加入安全联盟的可能性。调查员通过检查三个不同的安全行动的招募过程来检验这一理论：联合国在东帝汶的行动，欧盟在乍得和中非共和国的行动，以及美国领导的伊拉克行动。这一定性分析补充了已经完成的大n回归分析的结果，其中包括自冷战结束以来进行的所有132次多边军事行动。其结果表明，领导者和落后者之间的相互依赖程度与落后者为领导者选择的行动提供部队的概率之间存在统计学上显著的相关性。因此，这个项目的智力价值在于它能够对多边军事干预——可以说是建立世界秩序的最有力工具——提供新的认识。军事干预虽然经常被描述为由国际组织发起，但从来都不是国际规则或条例的产物，而始终是参与行为体集结的纯粹政治意愿的产物。这个项目在分析如何创造这种政治意愿方面开辟了新的领域。分析的经验基础包括定性案例研究和包含冷战结束以来所有安全行动的原始数据集。这个项目也有更广泛的影响。相互依存是当代全球政治的一个显著特征。有时相互依赖会带来负面的含义。这个项目表明了相互依存的积极影响。特别是国家间的相互依存可以促进安全领域的国际合作。

This project develops a theory of cooperation in multilateral military interventions. Whether launched ad hoc or in the institutional framework of the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union or African Union, multilateral interventions rely on voluntary troop contributions by sovereign states. For states, however, participating in such endeavors is costly in financial as well as political terms. This project thus addresses the question: what are the motivating factors behind an individual country's troop deployments?The project proposes that participants to most military interventions need to be divided into leaders and laggards. Leaders are understood as the drivers behind the launch of specific operations, pursuing sharply defined political, economic or normative interests. Laggards, on the other hand, lack such interests or at least do not share the same interest intensity as do leaders. The laggards thus need additional incentives to motivate their force deployments, and such incentives are most often provided by leaders. The project then develops a theory about how interdependence between leaders and laggards influences the probability that the laggards will join the security coalition.The investigator tests this theory by examining the recruitment process of three distinct security operations: the United Nations operation in East Timor, the European Union operation in Chad and the Central African Republic, and the US-led operation in Iraq. This qualitative analysis complements the results of the already completed large-N regression analysis, which includes all 132 multilateral military operations conducted since the end of the Cold War. Its results suggest that there is a statistically significant correlation between the degree of interdependence between leaders and laggards and the laggards' probability of contributing troops to an operation of the leader's choice. The intellectual merit of this project thus lies in its capacity to shed new light on multilateral military interventions, arguably the most forceful tool to create world order. Although often depicted as mounted by international organizations, military interventions never ensue from international rules or regulations but are always the product of pure political will mustered by participating actors. This project breaks new ground in analyzing how such political will can be created. The empirical basis for the analysis comprises both qualitative case studies and an original dataset encompassing all security operations since the end of the Cold War.This project has broader implications as well. Interdependence is a defining feature of contemporary global politics. At times interdependence carries negative connotations. This project suggests the positive impact of interdependence. In particular, interdependence between states can enhance international cooperation in the security realm.