Collaborative Research: A Strategic Approach to Local Economic Development

合作研究:地方经济发展的战略途径

基本信息

  • 批准号:
    0214174
  • 负责人:
  • 金额:
    $ 9.71万
  • 依托单位:
  • 依托单位国家:
    美国
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 财政年份:
    2002
  • 资助国家:
    美国
  • 起止时间:
    2002-09-01 至 2005-12-31
  • 项目状态:
    已结题

项目摘要

The existing urban politics literature has classified development policies into three types: location incentives that subsidize development; progressive development policies that provide incentives but with strings attached; and growth management restrictions. Unlike most of this extant work which has examined one or at most two of the policy types in isolation, the researchers treat growth policy as a continuum across these types, based on the distribution of the costs and benefits of development among pubic and private actors. The specific deals that cities negotiated with private actors can fall at any point on this continuum, based on the combination of policy instruments used, the concessions and extractions negotiated. Use of the bargaining perspective allows them to unite these separate approaches to city growth issues by focusing on the factors that increase a city's relative bargaining power -- enabling it to make extract benefits from firms or forcing it to provide concessions to attract growth. Applying the Nash bargaining model to development deals also can incorporate insights from previous development research within a more rigorous theoretical framework that leads to a very specific empirical specification. City competition for development is captured by the relative values of the city's and the firm's outside options -- the alternatives each would get if the negotiated deal fell through. City bargaining power will depend on its inherent attractiveness to different businesses, which determines the minimum value it should accept in a deal; its need to reduce economic or fiscal problems, which determines its time preference, and the risk aversion of the political actors negotiating the deal. Identifying the sources of the city's bargaining power will also lead to policy recommendations on how government institutions and general development policies can be structured to improve the city's ability to pursue both short term and long term development goals. The investigators also extend this approach to address repeated play of the bargaining game with different firms over time. This extension permits evaluation of the possibility that cities can develop a reputation as a 'tough' or 'soft' agent, equivalent in development policy to slow- or pro-growth areas. This bargaining approach is investigated through empirical analysis and theoretical modeling. Predictions of the model are tested with data collected from a national survey of development officials in all incorporated places over 10,000 within 12 selected metropolitan areas. The survey gathers information on the two most recent negotiated location incentives deals. This facilitates the measurement of the outcome of the bargaining model-the value of the negotiated agreements. Information on specific firms is collected from archival sources, and matched to bargaining outcomes in the data set. Additional information on city political, fiscal and economic characteristics are merged into the final data set. Fieldwork in the 12 metropolitan areas add details about the negotiation process in practice and data from city records. In addition, interviews with officials involved in formulating development policy and carrying out development negotiations provides the basis for case analyses of development negotiation.The anticipated products of this research represent significant theoretical and methodological advances in the urban politics field, as well as an applied framework for city officials to improve pursuit of their development goals. Given that formal modeling approaches to questions in the urban politics and public policy fields have been limited, the work resulting from this research has the potential to be groundbreaking in its extension of new methodological approaches to these fields.
现有的城市政治文献将发展政策分为三类:补贴发展的区位激励;提供激励但附带条件的渐进式发展政策;以及增长管理限制。 不像大多数现存的工作,研究了一个或最多两个孤立的政策类型,研究人员把增长政策作为一个连续体,在这些类型的基础上,在公共和私人行为者之间的发展成本和收益的分配。 城市与私人行为者谈判的具体交易可以在这一连续体的任何一点上,根据所使用的政策工具的组合,谈判的特许权和提取。 使用讨价还价的角度使他们能够通过关注增加城市相对讨价还价能力的因素来统一这些单独的方法来解决城市增长问题-使其能够从公司中获取利益或迫使其提供优惠以吸引增长。将纳什讨价还价模型应用于发展交易还可以将以前发展研究的见解纳入更严格的理论框架,从而得出非常具体的经验规范。 城市对发展的竞争是由城市和公司外部选择的相对价值所决定的--如果谈判达成的协议失败,每个人都会得到的选择。 伦敦金融城的议价能力将取决于它对不同企业的内在吸引力,这决定了它在交易中应该接受的最低价值;它对减少经济或财政问题的需求,这决定了它的时间偏好,以及谈判交易的政治参与者的风险规避。 确定城市讨价还价能力的来源还将导致就如何构建政府机构和一般发展政策提出政策建议,以提高城市实现短期和长期发展目标的能力。 研究人员还扩展了这种方法,以解决随着时间的推移与不同公司反复进行的讨价还价游戏。 这一延伸允许评估城市是否可能发展成为“坚韧”或“软性”的代理人,在发展政策上相当于缓慢增长或促进增长的地区。 本文通过实证分析和理论建模对这种讨价还价方式进行了研究。 该模型的预测进行了测试,收集的数据从全国调查的发展官员在12个选定的大都市地区内的所有合并的地方超过10,000。 该调查收集了最近两次谈判达成的地点激励交易的信息。 这有助于衡量谈判模型的结果--谈判达成的协议的价值。 具体公司的信息是从档案来源收集的,并与数据集中的谈判结果相匹配。 关于城市政治、财政和经济特征的其他信息被合并到最终数据集中。 在12个大都市地区的实地考察增加了有关实际谈判过程的细节和来自城市记录的数据。 此外,对参与制定发展政策和开展发展谈判的官员的访谈为发展谈判的案例分析提供了基础,本研究的预期成果代表了城市政治领域的重大理论和方法进步,也为城市官员改善其发展目标的追求提供了一个应用框架。 鉴于城市政治和公共政策领域问题的正式建模方法有限,这项研究所产生的工作有可能在将新的方法论方法扩展到这些领域方面具有开创性。

项目成果

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Richard Feiock其他文献

Evaluating the employment impact of recycling performance in Florida
  • DOI:
    10.1016/j.wasman.2019.10.025
  • 发表时间:
    2020-01-01
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
  • 作者:
    Yuan Liu;Sunjoo Park;Hongtao Yi;Richard Feiock
  • 通讯作者:
    Richard Feiock

Richard Feiock的其他文献

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{{ truncateString('Richard Feiock', 18)}}的其他基金

Collaborative Research: Assessing the impact of lead agency cross-functional authority on city sustainability outcomes
合作研究:评估牵头机构跨职能权威对城市可持续发展成果的影响
  • 批准号:
    2021035
  • 财政年份:
    2020
  • 资助金额:
    $ 9.71万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research: Integrated City Sustainability: Administrative Apparatus for Overcoming Collective Dilemmas of Agency Fragmentation
合作研究:综合城市可持续性:克服机构碎片化集体困境的行政机构
  • 批准号:
    1461460
  • 财政年份:
    2015
  • 资助金额:
    $ 9.71万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Informed Principals and Learning Agents: Modeling Outcomes from Federal Grants for Sustainable Energy
知情的校长和学习代理:对联邦可持续能源拨款的结果进行建模
  • 批准号:
    1127992
  • 财政年份:
    2011
  • 资助金额:
    $ 9.71万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Policy Tool Bundling: Predicting the Selection of Economic Development Policy Instruments Using a Multivariate Probit Analysis
政治学博士论文研究:政策工具捆绑:使用多元概率分析预测经济发展政策工具的选择
  • 批准号:
    0921538
  • 财政年份:
    2009
  • 资助金额:
    $ 9.71万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
RAPID study of economic stimulus on local government energy innovation and collaboration
经济刺激对地方政府能源创新与合作的快速研究
  • 批准号:
    0943427
  • 财政年份:
    2009
  • 资助金额:
    $ 9.71万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Collaborative Research on Institutions and Land-Use Politics
制度与​​土地使用政治的合作研究
  • 批准号:
    0350799
  • 财政年份:
    2004
  • 资助金额:
    $ 9.71万
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant

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合作研究:AGEP ACA:HSI R2 战略合作,以提高西班牙裔学生进入教授职位的水平
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