Doctoral Disseration Research in Political Science: A Theory and a Model of State-Dissident Interactions

本论文研究的是压制是鼓励还是抑制异见。目前的文献缺乏一个单一的、连贯的、理论的、经经验证实的关于异议和镇压之间互动关系的模型。首席调查员提出了一种理论，解释了镇压对异见的升级和威慑作用，以及异见对镇压的影响。首席调查员认为，政治生存动机驱使国家和持不同政见者领导人保留权力并控制各自的支持者。这种动机导致他们检查彼此的行为、他们自己之前的行为以及之前互动的结果，估计这些互动的成本，并以确保他们任期的方式做出反应。假设领导人从包含合作和敌对手段的战略集中进行选择，首席调查员提出了国家和持不同政见者领导人选择暴力行动和合作行动的条件。控制国内经济状况、国际经济力量、第三方干预和政权更迭的影响，首席调查员指定了一个方程系统，模拟国家和持不同政见者领导人在参与一系列顺序互动时彼此做出的选择。利用事件数据和时间序列计量经济学技术，在智利、巴西、墨西哥、尼日利亚、阿富汗和韩国等国对理论模型进行了实证检验。该设计既允许区域内比较，也允许跨区域比较。

This dissertation investigates whether repression encourages or deters dissent. The current literature lacks one single, coherent, theoretical, and empirically corroborated model of the interactive relationship between dissent and repression. The Principal Investigator posits a theory that accounts for the escalatory and deterrent effects of repression on dissent and dissent on repression. The Principal Investigator argues that political survival motives drive state and dissident leaders to retain power and control over their respective supporters. This motive leads them to examine one another's actions, their own previous actions, and the outcome of previous interactions, estimate the costs of those interactions, and react in ways that ensure their tenure. Assuming that leaders choose from a strategy set that contains both cooperative and hostile means, the Principal Investigator proposes the conditions under which state and dissident leaders choose to act violently and to act cooperatively. Controlling for the state of the domestic economy, international economic forces, third party intervention, and the effects of regime change, the Principal Investigator specifies a system of equations that models state and dissident leaders' choices in response to one another, while engaged in a sequential series of interactions. Using event data and time series econometric techniques, empirical tests of the theoretical model are performed in the countries of Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and South Korea. The design allows for both within-region comparison and across region comparisons.