Religious Radicals and Fertility: An Economic Approach

该项目研究宗教激进主义的经济学和人口统计学，特别是伊斯兰教。激进伊斯兰是一股正在崛起的地缘政治力量。像基督教再洗礼派和犹太极端正统派一样，激进伊斯兰教是相对较新的宗教创新。它兴起于20世纪中期，历史学家将其描述为对世俗的、市场驱动的西方文化侵入传统社会的反应。就像基督教和犹太教教派一样，它的增长对经济学家来说是一个悖论。随着市场的增加，时间的影子价值价格理论预测了宗教实践的时间效率形式的演变。然而，一个宗教派别不断发展，坚持越来越多的时间密集的实践版本，矛盾的是，它蓬勃发展。与激进的基督教和犹太教教派一样，激进伊斯兰教的显著增长在一定程度上要归功于高生育率，尤其是在主流穆斯林多数人口生育率下降的情况下。这项研究提出并探讨了四个论点的结果：首先，激进宗教团体的形成有一个从俱乐部理论衍生出来的经济解释，它使日益严格的实践和高（甚至上升）生育率合理化。其次，有强有力的证据表明，激进的宗教团体可以提高生育率。在过去的20年里，至少有三个群体经历了长期的生育率增长：伊朗人、巴勒斯坦人和极端正统派犹太人。在传统和世俗化群体生育率转变的背景下，激进宗教群体的高生育率可能会破坏穆斯林世界的政治稳定和经济发展。第三，我建议通过将宗教信仰指标与报告经济变量和生育率的家庭调查的微观数据联系起来，估计激进宗教团体的差异生育率的大小。这使得对激进宗教团体的补贴具有强烈的先天性这一假设的检验成为可能。以色列极端正统派犹太人、以色列的穆斯林兄弟会、印度尼西亚的穆斯林宗教社区学校和巴勒斯坦的穆斯林兄弟会四个案例说明了这些程序的可行性。在第一个案例中，报告了完成工作的结果，在第二个案例中给出了初步结果。最后，生育率是激进宗教团体影响行为的一种容易量化的方式，但不是唯一的方式。我还研究了塔利班和哈马斯等宗教派别在组织民兵和派遣自杀式炸弹袭击者方面的优势。这种优势可以解释为什么激进的宗教派别如此频繁地转向暴力行动。

This project studies the economics and demographics of religious radicalism, particularly in Islam. Radical Islam is an ascendant geopolitical force. Like the Christian Anabaptist sects and the Jewish Ultra-Orthodox, Radical Islam is a relatively recent religious innovation. It arose in the mid 20th century in what historians describe as a reaction to the incursion of secular, market driven, Western culture into traditional society. Like those Christian and Jewish sects its growth represents a paradox to economists. As markets increase the shadow value of time price theory predicts the evolution of time-efficient forms of religious practice. Yet a religious sect evolves which insists on an increasingly time-intensive version of practice, and paradoxically it flourishes. Like radical Christian and Jewish sects, radical Islam owes part of its remarkable growth to high fertility, especially in contrast to the fertility decline of the mainstream Muslim majority. This research makes and explores the consequences of four arguments: First, the formation of radical religious groups has an economic explanation derived from the theory of clubs, which rationalizse both the increased stringency of practice and high (or even rising) fertility. Second, there is strong evidence that radical religious groups can raise fertility rates. At least three groups have experienced protracted episodes of fertility increases over the past 20 years: Iranians, Palestinians and Ultra-Orthodox Jews. High fertility among the radical religious, against a background of fertility transition among traditional and secularizing groups could undermine political stability and economic development in the Muslim world. Third, I propose estimating the size of differential fertility rates of radical religious groups by linking indicators of religious affiliation to micro data from household surveys which report on economic variables and fertility. This allows a test of the hypothesis that subsidies to radical religious groups are strongly pronatalist. The feasibility of these procedures is illustrated in four cases, Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jews, the Muslim Brothers in Israel, Muslim religious community schools in Indonesia and the Muslim Brothers in Palestine. In the first case results from completed work are reported and in the next two preliminary results are given. Finally, fertility is an easily quantified way that radical religious groups affect behavior, but not the only way. I also examine the advantage of religious sects such as the Taliban and Hamas in operating militias and in dispatching suicide bombers. This advantage can explain why radical religious sects so often turn to violent action.