Absentee Ownership and Corporate Environmental Performance

缺席所有权和企业环境绩效

• 批准号: 0215366
• 负责人: Don Grant II
• 金额: $ 4万
• 依托单位: University of Arizona
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-09-01 至 2003-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0215366&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Absentee; Ownership; Corporate; Environmental; Performance

SES-0215366PI (s) Don Grant IIUniversity of Arizona The project addresses two questions concerning the environmental performance of absentee owned plants: (1) Do plants with out-of-state or foreign headquarters emit more toxins than locally owned plants?, and (2) Do plants with remote headquarters pollute more depending on the social capital of their host communities. Critics of globalization and capitalist expansion suggest that absentee owned plants have no long-term interest in local communities as places to live. Rather they are very willing to plunder their natural surroundings if it will maximize their parent firm's profits. Meanwhile literature on structural embeddedness suggest that this organizational model is too simplistic, that regardless of where a plant's headquarters is located, a plant's performance is conditioned by the local institutional culture in which it is situated. The research will test several hypothesis-(1) chemical plants with out-of-state or foreign headquarters have higher emission rates (i.e., release a larger percent of chemicals they use on-site to the environment), (2) chemical plants with out-of-state or foreign headquarters have higher emission rates when located in civically disengaged communities, and (3) chemical plants with out-of-state ore foreign headquarters have particularly high emission rates when located in communities that are both civically disengaged and comprised of poor minorities. To test these hypotheses, a data file consisting of roughly 2000 chemical plants will be used. The file includes information on each plant's toxic releases from the EPA's Toxics Release Inventory, its ownership status, and the social and institutional features of its surrounding community. A cross-section design will be used to determine the direct and conditional effects of absentee ownership on emission rates in 1990. To assess how these effects have changed a lagged panel design will be employed.Findings will provide new insights into what is rapidly becoming the modal type of business organization: absentee ownership. Prior research has demonstrated that absentee ownership has economic and social effects; this study will be the first to specify some of the conditions under which absentee ownership also has environmental consequences. Results could potentially guide regulators in deciding whether to monitor plants owned by foreign firms more closely, and the business community in its efforts at self-regulation.

该项目解决了两个关于缺席者拥有的工厂的环境性能的问题：（1）具有州外或外国总部的工厂是否比当地拥有的工厂排放更多的毒素？以及（2）总部位于偏远地区的工厂是否会产生更多的污染，这取决于其所在社区的社会资本。 全球化和资本主义扩张的批评者认为，缺席拥有的工厂没有长期利益的地方社区作为生活的地方。 相反，他们非常愿意掠夺他们的自然环境，如果这将使他们的母公司的利润最大化。 与此同时，结构嵌入性的文献表明，这种组织模式是过于简单化，无论工厂的总部设在哪里，工厂的业绩是由当地的制度文化，它位于。 该研究将测试几个假设-（1）总部位于州外或外国的化工厂的排放率更高（即，他们现场使用的化学品释放到环境中的比例更大），（2）当位于公民脱离社区时，州外或外国总部的化工厂具有更高的排放率，以及（3）当位于公民脱离社区和由贫穷少数民族组成的社区时，州外或外国总部的化工厂具有特别高的排放率。为了验证这些假设，将使用由大约2000个化工厂组成的数据文件。 该文件包括EPA有毒物质释放清单中每个工厂的有毒物质释放信息，其所有权状态以及周围社区的社会和机构特征。 一个横截面的设计将被用来确定1990年的排放率的缺席所有权的直接和有条件的影响。 为了评估这些影响是如何改变的滞后面板设计将employed.Findings将提供新的见解，什么是迅速成为商业组织的模式类型：缺席所有权。 先前的研究表明，缺席所有权的经济和社会影响，这项研究将是第一个指定的一些条件下，缺席所有权也有环境后果。 研究结果可能会指导监管机构决定是否更密切地监督外国公司拥有的工厂，并指导企业界进行自我监管。