Policy Networks and Federal Enforcement: Do Local Networks Enhance NPDES Permit Enforcement?

政策网络和联邦执法：本地网络是否增强 NPDES 许可执法？

• 批准号: 0215426
• 负责人: John Scholz
• 金额: $ 20.11万
• 依托单位: Florida State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-06-01 至 2005-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0215426&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Policy; Networks; Federal; Enforcement; Do

This research investigates the little-studied interaction between federal agencies and local policy networks concerned with the same policy arenas. The project extends Ostrom's (1990) framework to develop the hypothesis that dense, overlapping, locally-oriented networks of shareholders involved in "governing the commons" will increase both enforcement and compliance with' federal regulations. While Ostrom's analysis clarifies the potentially adverse impact of central regulatory policies on local institutions that "govern the commons", this project investigates the potentially beneficial impact that local networks may have on federal policies in the more complex federal system in America. Water resource management provides the critical research site for observing the interaction between two institutional approaches to the governance of water usage; the EPA's "first generation" federal permit system created by the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the local watershed management networks and institutions that have evolved during the last decade to resolve pollution and water usage issues not addressed by the federal permit system (Kraft and Vig 2000). In the complex institutional environment of the U.S. Federalist system, water policy networks may involve pollution dischargers, stakeholders affected by pollution, and in particular the elected and administrative officials from federal, state, and local institutions that have local jurisdiction over water management issues. Effective networks can provide cooperative advantages to its members comparable to those of the self-organized institutions studied by Ostrom (1990). We explore three implications of this perspective for the interaction between local networks and federal enforcement: *Local Sanction Hypothesis: Effective networks increase compliance.*Magnification Hypothesis: Effective networks increase the deterrence impact of enforcement actions on compliance. * Concentration Hypothesis: Effective networks increase inspection activities. To test these hypotheses, the project integrates two independent traditions that study opposite halves of the enforcement system: the democratic control of bureaucracy literature that analyzes political influence on regulatory enforcement actions, and the deterrence literature that analyzes the deterrence effects of enforcement actions on compliance. The first phase of research uses regression analysis based on available archival records of all permit holders to test the hypotheses, while the second phase develops direct measures of local networks for a sample of permit holders to provide a more intensive analysis: Phase One: The first phase analyzes quarterly enforcement and compliance data from the EP A's Permit Compliance System (PCS) for the full period for which data are available, from 1994 to present. The required supplementary data on permit holders and local policy networks will be appended from census and governmental databases. We apply Feinstein's detection-controlled estimation procedure (Feinstein 1989, 1990) to simultaneously estimate enforcement actions and compliance responses for all major permit holders active throughout this period. Empirical results from phase-one analysis are then used for developing the phase-two sample. Phase Two: The second phase has five specific goals: I) develop survey-based data on the local policy networks relevant to the permit enforcement and compliance system for a sample of permit holders, 2) calculate survey-based measures of network capabilities and analyze the link between these measures and the county-level factors from the previous analysis, 3) repeat phase one tests with the improved measures, 4) extend phase one tests to include the analysis of beliefs and attitudes related to compliance, and 5) develop confirmatory case studies in four selected communities. The project will produce journal articles in the fields of the political economy of institutions, bureaucratic controls, and enforcement and deterrence theory. Detailed efficiency analysis of enforcement will be directly relevant to EPA enforcement policies. Finally a book will integrate project findings with the broader research context of the design of governance institutions, with a focus on the advantages, limitations, and interactions between federal and local approaches to "governing the commons."

这项研究调查了涉及相同政策领域的联邦机构和地方政策网络之间的互动，这一点很少被研究。该项目扩展了奥斯特罗姆（1990）的框架，提出了这样的假设：参与“公共治理”的密集、重叠、面向本地的股东网络将增强联邦法规的执行和遵守。 虽然奥斯特罗姆的分析澄清了中央监管政策对“管理公地”的地方机构的潜在不利影响，但该项目调查了在美国更复杂的联邦体系中，地方网络可能对联邦政策产生的潜在有利影响。水资源管理为观察两种用水治理制度方法之间的相互作用提供了关键的研究场所； EPA 根据 1972 年《清洁水法》创建的“第一代”联邦许可证制度，以及在过去十年中不断发展的地方流域管理网络和机构，以解决联邦许可证制度未解决的污染和用水问题（Kraft 和 Vig 2000）。在美国联邦制的复杂制度环境中，水政策网络可能涉及污染排放者、受污染影响的利益相关者，特别是对水管理问题拥有地方管辖权的联邦、州和地方机构的民选官员和行政官员。有效的网络可以为其成员提供与奥斯特罗姆（1990）研究的自组织机构相当的合作优势。我们探讨了这一观点对地方网络与联邦执法之间互动的三个影响：*地方制裁假设：有效的网络提高了合规性。*放大假设：有效的网络增加了执法行动对合规性的威慑影响。 * 集中假说：有效的网络增加了检查活动。为了检验这些假设，该项目整合了两个独立的传统，研究执法系统的相反两半：官僚机构的民主控制文献，分析政治对监管执法行动的影响，以及威慑文献，分析执法行动对合规性的威慑作用。研究的第一阶段使用基于所有许可证持有者的可用档案记录的回归分析来检验假设，而第二阶段为许可证持有者样本开发本地网络的直接测量，以提供更深入的分析： 第一阶段：第一阶段分析来自 EPA 许可证合规系统 (PCS) 的季度执行和合规数据，涵盖从 1994 年至今的整个可用数据期间。所需的有关许可证持有者和地方政策网络的补充数据将从人口普查和政府数据库中添加。我们应用 Feinstein 的检测控制估计程序（Feinstein 1989、1990）来同时估计在此期间活跃的所有主要许可证持有者的执法行动和合规响应。然后，将第一阶段分析的经验结果用于开发第二阶段样本。第二阶段：第二阶段有五个具体目标：I) 为许可证持有者样本开发与许可证执行和合规系统相关的当地政策网络的基于调查的数据，2) 计算基于调查的网络能力衡量标准，并分析这些衡量标准与之前分析中的县级因素之间的联系，3) 使用改进的措施重复第一阶段测试，4) 扩展第一阶段测试，包括对与合规相关的信念和态度的分析，以及 5) 在四个选定的社区开展验证性案例研究。该项目将发表机构政治经济学、官僚控制以及执行和威慑理论等领域的期刊文章。详细的执法效率分析将与 EPA 的执法政策直接相关。最后，一本书将把项目研究结果与治理机构设计的更广泛的研究背景结合起来，重点关注联邦和地方“治理公地”方法的优势、局限性和相互作用。