Policy Networks and Federal Enforcement: Do Local Networks Enhance NPDES Permit Enforcement?

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This research investigates the little-studied interaction between federal agencies and local policy networks concerned with the same policy arenas. The project extends Ostrom's (1990) framework to develop the hypothesis that dense, overlapping, locally-oriented networks of shareholders involved in "governing the commons" will increase both enforcement and compliance with' federal regulations. While Ostrom's analysis clarifies the potentially adverse impact of central regulatory policies on local institutions that "govern the commons", this project investigates the potentially beneficial impact that local networks may have on federal policies in the more complex federal system in America. Water resource management provides the critical research site for observing the interaction between two institutional approaches to the governance of water usage; the EPA's "first generation" federal permit system created by the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the local watershed management networks and institutions that have evolved during the last decade to resolve pollution and water usage issues not addressed by the federal permit system (Kraft and Vig 2000). In the complex institutional environment of the U.S. Federalist system, water policy networks may involve pollution dischargers, stakeholders affected by pollution, and in particular the elected and administrative officials from federal, state, and local institutions that have local jurisdiction over water management issues. Effective networks can provide cooperative advantages to its members comparable to those of the self-organized institutions studied by Ostrom (1990). We explore three implications of this perspective for the interaction between local networks and federal enforcement: *Local Sanction Hypothesis: Effective networks increase compliance.*Magnification Hypothesis: Effective networks increase the deterrence impact of enforcement actions on compliance. * Concentration Hypothesis: Effective networks increase inspection activities. To test these hypotheses, the project integrates two independent traditions that study opposite halves of the enforcement system: the democratic control of bureaucracy literature that analyzes political influence on regulatory enforcement actions, and the deterrence literature that analyzes the deterrence effects of enforcement actions on compliance. The first phase of research uses regression analysis based on available archival records of all permit holders to test the hypotheses, while the second phase develops direct measures of local networks for a sample of permit holders to provide a more intensive analysis: Phase One: The first phase analyzes quarterly enforcement and compliance data from the EP A's Permit Compliance System (PCS) for the full period for which data are available, from 1994 to present. The required supplementary data on permit holders and local policy networks will be appended from census and governmental databases. We apply Feinstein's detection-controlled estimation procedure (Feinstein 1989, 1990) to simultaneously estimate enforcement actions and compliance responses for all major permit holders active throughout this period. Empirical results from phase-one analysis are then used for developing the phase-two sample. Phase Two: The second phase has five specific goals: I) develop survey-based data on the local policy networks relevant to the permit enforcement and compliance system for a sample of permit holders, 2) calculate survey-based measures of network capabilities and analyze the link between these measures and the county-level factors from the previous analysis, 3) repeat phase one tests with the improved measures, 4) extend phase one tests to include the analysis of beliefs and attitudes related to compliance, and 5) develop confirmatory case studies in four selected communities. The project will produce journal articles in the fields of the political economy of institutions, bureaucratic controls, and enforcement and deterrence theory. Detailed efficiency analysis of enforcement will be directly relevant to EPA enforcement policies. Finally a book will integrate project findings with the broader research context of the design of governance institutions, with a focus on the advantages, limitations, and interactions between federal and local approaches to "governing the commons."