Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Inviting Outsiders In: Learning and Legitimation in Agency Policymaking

政治学博士论文研究：邀请局外人参与：机构决策中的学习和合法化

• 批准号: 0241406
• 负责人: Richard Hall
• 金额: $ 1.18万
• 依托单位: Regents of the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2003-02-01 至 2004-11-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0241406&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

Private information is a hallmark of bureaucratic power. On the one hand, specialized knowledge and skills are essential for agencies to perform their tasks effectively. On the other, however, such specialized knowledge may insulate agencies from democratic influence. Not surprisingly, Congress has created advisory committees composed of outside experts as a check on agencies' informational power. A growing literature on political control of the bureaucracy has called attention to these ancillary institutions. Yet, government agencies themselves have created hundreds public advisory committees to participate in agency policy-making. And, agencies call upon Congressionally created committees even when they are not mandated to do so. What explains this behavior? Under what conditions do agencies risk compromising private information to seek public advice? Are they able to do so in ways that augment their knowledge and policy-making leverage? This dissertation takes up these puzzles. This dissertation argues that capable agency leaders structure public advisory committee deliberations in ways consistent with supporting agency reputation for expertise. Existingscholarship focuses either on committees' informational contributions or on their potential to confer legitimacy. The concept of reputation, this research argues, invites us to understand learning and legitimation as two facets of an overarching bureaucratic goal, not as a dichotomy. An agency reputation for expertise, this research contends, hinges both on demonstrated agency capabilities and on external perceptions of agency policies and process. Developing and testing a theory of agency reputation for expertise in the context of public advisory committees advances extant scholarship in the fields bureaucratic politics, organization theory, and institutional theories of inter-branch relations. This research also bears on applied public policy issues of national importance: drug approval and national education testing. The dissertation employs large- sample statistical analysis coupled with analytic narratives to demonstrate whether and when agency leaders in the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Education structure public advisory committee deliberations in ways consistent with supporting agency reputation for expertise. These two agencies were selected for their important internal and cross-agency variation, which allow both within-agency and cross-agency generalizations. The overarching dependent variable in this work is advisory committee use measured systematically by looking at three sources of policy influence: agenda setting, participation and timing. Independent variables measure policy conditions including uncertainty, conflict, visibility, agency capability, and committee characteristics in addition to political variables. The research is designed to test rival hypotheses advanced in current scholarship.Preliminary results from the FDA suggest that by strategically compromising private information and inviting outsiders in, agencies can mobilize a valuable political resource: a reputation for expertise. Public information does not replace private information as a hallmark of bureaucratic power: wise agencies are judicious in their agenda setting strategies. But, public advice stands alongside private information as a potential source of bureaucratic power.

私人信息是官僚权力的标志。一方面，专门知识和技能对于各机构有效履行其任务至关重要。然而，另一方面，这种专门知识可能会使机构免受民主影响。不足为奇的是，国会成立了由外部专家组成的咨询委员会，以检查机构的信息权力。越来越多的关于官僚机构政治控制的文献呼吁人们关注这些附属机构。然而，政府机构本身已经创建了数百个公共咨询委员会，以参与机构的政策制定。而且，各机构呼吁国会设立的委员会，即使他们没有被授权这样做。如何解释这种行为？在什么情况下，机构会冒着泄露私人信息寻求公共建议的风险？他们是否能够以增强自己的知识和决策影响力的方式做到这一点？本论文就是针对这些问题展开的。这篇论文认为，有能力的机构领导人以与支持机构的专业声誉一致的方式组织公共咨询委员会的审议。现有的学术研究要么关注委员会的信息贡献，要么关注它们赋予合法性的潜力。这项研究认为，声誉的概念让我们将学习和合法化理解为总体官僚目标的两个方面，而不是一分为二。这项研究认为，机构在专业知识方面的声誉既取决于机构所展示的能力，也取决于外部对机构政策和流程的看法。在公共咨询委员会的背景下开发和测试机构的专业知识声誉理论，促进了在官僚政治、组织理论和分支机构间关系的制度理论领域的现有学术研究。这项研究还涉及国家重要的应用公共政策问题：药品审批和国家教育测试。本文采用大样本统计分析和分析性叙述相结合的方法，论证了食品和药物管理局和教育部的机构领导人是否以及何时以与支持机构的专业声誉一致的方式安排公共咨询委员会的审议。这两个机构之所以被选中，是因为它们具有重要的内部和跨机构差异，可以进行机构内和跨机构的概括。这项工作中最重要的因变量是咨询委员会的使用，通过考察三个政策影响力的来源来系统地衡量：议程设定、参与和时机。除政治变量外，自变量还衡量政策条件，包括不确定性、冲突、可见性、机构能力和委员会特征。这项研究旨在测试当前学术界提出的与之竞争的假说。FDA的初步结果表明，通过战略性地泄露私人信息并邀请外部人士参与，机构可以调动一种宝贵的政治资源：专业知识的声誉。公共信息不会取代私人信息成为官僚权力的标志：明智的机构在制定议程战略时是明智的。但是，作为官僚权力的潜在来源，公共建议与私人信息并驾齐驱。