Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Inviting Outsiders In: Learning and Legitimation in Agency Policymaking

私人信息是官僚权力的标志。一方面，专门知识和技能对于各机构有效执行任务至关重要。然而，另一方面，这种专门知识可能会使机构免受民主影响。毫不奇怪，国会成立了由外部专家组成的咨询委员会，以检查机构的信息权力。越来越多的关于官僚政治控制的文献引起了人们对这些辅助机构的关注。然而，政府机构本身已经建立了数百个公共咨询委员会，参与机构的决策。而且，各机构呼吁国会设立的委员会，即使他们没有被授权这样做。如何解释这种行为？在什么情况下，机构冒着泄露私人信息的风险寻求公众建议？他们是否能够以增加知识和决策影响力的方式这样做？本论文就是要解决这些问题。 本论文认为，有能力的机构领导人的结构公共咨询委员会审议的方式与支持机构的专业声誉一致。学术研究的重点要么是委员会的信息贡献，要么是它们赋予合法性的潜力。声誉的概念，这项研究认为，邀请我们了解学习和合法化作为一个总体官僚目标的两个方面，而不是作为一个二分法。 本研究认为，一个机构在专业知识方面的声誉既取决于所展示的机构能力，也取决于外部对机构政策和程序的看法。发展和测试的背景下，公共咨询委员会的专业知识的机构声誉的理论推进现存的学术领域的官僚政治，组织理论，机构间关系的理论。这项研究还涉及国家重要性的应用公共政策问题：药物审批和国家教育测试。 本论文采用大样本统计分析，再加上分析性叙述，以证明是否以及何时机构领导人在食品和药物管理局和教育部结构的公共咨询委员会审议的方式与支持机构的专业声誉一致。之所以选择这两个机构，是因为这两个机构的内部和跨机构差异很大，可以在机构内和跨机构进行归纳。这项工作的首要因变量是咨询委员会的使用，通过观察三个政策影响来源：议程制定，参与和时间安排来系统地衡量。独立变量衡量政策条件，包括不确定性，冲突，能见度，代理能力，以及委员会的特点，除了政治变量。这项研究旨在检验当前学术界提出的对立假设。FDA的初步结果表明，通过战略性地损害私人信息并邀请外部人士参与，机构可以调动一种宝贵的政治资源：专业知识的声誉。 公共信息并不能取代私人信息，成为官僚权力的标志：明智的机构在制定议程的战略时是明智的。但是，公共建议与私人信息一起成为官僚权力的潜在来源。

Private information is a hallmark of bureaucratic power. On the one hand, specialized knowledge and skills are essential for agencies to perform their tasks effectively. On the other, however, such specialized knowledge may insulate agencies from democratic influence. Not surprisingly, Congress has created advisory committees composed of outside experts as a check on agencies' informational power. A growing literature on political control of the bureaucracy has called attention to these ancillary institutions. Yet, government agencies themselves have created hundreds public advisory committees to participate in agency policy-making. And, agencies call upon Congressionally created committees even when they are not mandated to do so. What explains this behavior? Under what conditions do agencies risk compromising private information to seek public advice? Are they able to do so in ways that augment their knowledge and policy-making leverage? This dissertation takes up these puzzles. This dissertation argues that capable agency leaders structure public advisory committee deliberations in ways consistent with supporting agency reputation for expertise. Existingscholarship focuses either on committees' informational contributions or on their potential to confer legitimacy. The concept of reputation, this research argues, invites us to understand learning and legitimation as two facets of an overarching bureaucratic goal, not as a dichotomy. An agency reputation for expertise, this research contends, hinges both on demonstrated agency capabilities and on external perceptions of agency policies and process. Developing and testing a theory of agency reputation for expertise in the context of public advisory committees advances extant scholarship in the fields bureaucratic politics, organization theory, and institutional theories of inter-branch relations. This research also bears on applied public policy issues of national importance: drug approval and national education testing. The dissertation employs large- sample statistical analysis coupled with analytic narratives to demonstrate whether and when agency leaders in the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Education structure public advisory committee deliberations in ways consistent with supporting agency reputation for expertise. These two agencies were selected for their important internal and cross-agency variation, which allow both within-agency and cross-agency generalizations. The overarching dependent variable in this work is advisory committee use measured systematically by looking at three sources of policy influence: agenda setting, participation and timing. Independent variables measure policy conditions including uncertainty, conflict, visibility, agency capability, and committee characteristics in addition to political variables. The research is designed to test rival hypotheses advanced in current scholarship.Preliminary results from the FDA suggest that by strategically compromising private information and inviting outsiders in, agencies can mobilize a valuable political resource: a reputation for expertise. Public information does not replace private information as a hallmark of bureaucratic power: wise agencies are judicious in their agenda setting strategies. But, public advice stands alongside private information as a potential source of bureaucratic power.