Organized Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congress

有组织的利益和国会中偏见的动员

• 批准号: 9310247
• 负责人: Richard Hall
• 金额: $ 12.5万
• 依托单位: Regents of the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1993
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1993-08-01 至 1997-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9310247&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Organized; Interests; Mobilization; Bias; Congress

9310247 Hall Critics of American political institutions have long lamented the infuence of organized "factions" in national policy making. The proliferation of Washington lobbyists and the growth of political action committees have intensified the charge that Congress is the province of "special" interests in general and private business interests in particular. Federal agencies and commissions, likewise, are often said to be "captives" of the industries they were established to regulate, and various accounts suggest that Congressional actors conspire in such arrangements. An important counterweight to this view is the notion that the public interest groups play an important and healthy role in the politics of American pluralism. Such organizations vary considerably in the purposes to which they aspire, but a significant number of them seek to influence public policy, especially on issues where important public goods are at stake. While a few of these have formidable PACs, such groups tend to rely far more heavily on lobbying and informational efforts than they do campaign contributions to achieve their legislative purposes. What counterweight, if any, do the efforts of such organizations provide? More generally, what influence do the advocacy efforts of public interest groups have relative to the more numerous, more moneyed, more studied, and more maligned private groups or business associations? The investigators examine this question by assessing the role of public and private interest groups on a diverse set of issues where actors from the two sectors compete in congressional policy making and, indirectly, in agency rule-making. They first elaborate a theory of legislative mobilization which lays out the conditions under which one might expect both the lobbying and campaign contribution efforts of each (or both) to pay off. Second, they undertake a broad empirical study, including samples of cases from the energy, environment, human resources, a nd foreign policy domains. The study will employ interview and archival data, and the analysis will be multi-method. This study should enhance substantially our understanding of public advocacy groups and private interests in Congressional law-making and Congressional intervention in agency rule-making. ***

9310247 Hall 美国政治制度的批评者长期以来一直哀叹有组织的“派系”对国家政策制定的影响。 华盛顿游说者的激增和政治行动委员会的壮大，加剧了人们对国会是一般利益、特别是私人商业利益“特殊”利益管辖范围的指控。 同样，联邦机构和委员会通常被认为是其设立目的是监管的行业的“俘虏”，各种记录表明国会行为者在这种安排中合谋。 对此观点的一个重要反驳是公共利益团体在美国多元化政治中发挥着重要而健康的作用。 这些组织的目标差异很大，但其中很大一部分都寻求影响公共政策，特别是在涉及重要公共利益的问题上。 虽然其中一些拥有强大的政治行动委员会，但这些团体往往更多地依赖游说和信息努力，而不是竞选捐款来实现其立法目的。 这些组织的努力可以提供什么平衡作用（如果有的话）？ 更一般地说，相对于数量更多、资金更多、研究更多、受到更多诽谤的私人团体或商业协会而言，公共利益团体的倡导努力有何影响？ 调查人员通过评估公共和私人利益集团在一系列不同问题上的作用来研究这个问题，在这些问题上，这两个部门的参与者在国会政策制定以及间接机构规则制定中展开竞争。 他们首先阐述了一种立法动员理论，该理论列出了人们可以期望每个人（或两者）的游说和竞选捐款努力获得回报的条件。 其次，他们进行了广泛的实证研究，包括来自能源、环境、人力资源和外交政策领域的案例样本。 研究将采用访谈和档案数据，并采用多种方法进行分析。 这项研究应该大大增强我们对国会立法中的公共倡导团体和私人利益以及国会对机构规则制定的干预的理解。 ***