Collaborative Research: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Oversight

这个项目解决了民主制度比较研究中的一个核心问题：由意识形态目标经常相互冲突的多个政党组成的联合政府如何制定政策？令人惊讶的是，相对较少的研究以系统的跨国方式考察了这个问题。相反，大多数关于多党政府的研究都集中在联盟的形成和终止上，而在很大程度上忽视了这些事件之间的政策制定过程。在这个项目中，主要研究人员通过检查两个欧洲议会民主国家的立法来解决这个问题。具体来说，调查人员建议收集有关德国和荷兰立法程序的委员会和议会阶段的主要数据。项目中的理论模型关注的是联合政府若想成功执政就必须解决的一个中心委托代理问题。由于规划和实施公共政策需要专业知识，议会民主国家的政府必须将重要的决策权下放给对相关问题领域有控制权的个别部长。特别是，内阁部长在起草其管辖范围内的政府立法方面享有相当大的自主权。对于联合政府来说，这种授权带来的风险是，部长们会利用他们的自主权，在政策上偏袒自己的政党，而没有充分考虑联合政府伙伴的利益。这样做的动机在联盟成员之间存在巨大分歧的问题上尤为强烈。这里提出的论点是，议会监督提供了一个关键的制度机制，使联合政党能够处理这一问题。虽然很难从内阁内部监督部长，但联盟成员可以利用立法程序审查和修改敌对部长提出的立法。研究人员认为，这种机制在联盟内部分裂的情况下尤为重要。如果正确的话，这一论点挑战了人们的普遍看法，即西欧的议会基本上是无关紧要的机构。立法机构可以作为联盟内部冲突管理工具发挥关键作用，使具有不同偏好的政党能够共同执政。对这一理论的实证评估需要在立法过程中处理政府法案的详细数据。这种评价尤其需要关于联合政党在多大程度上利用立法程序来审查和修正个别部长起草的政策建议的资料。在各自所在机构的支持下，两位主要研究人员已经收集了1982年至1994年间荷兰和德国推出的近300项政府法案的相关数据。现有的数据集提供了关于联合政党对这些法案所处理问题的意识形态立场的信息，以及这些法案在立法过程中遇到的延迟时间。对数据的初步分析得出了与该理论一致的结果。本提案所要求的财政支持使主要研究人员能够大量扩展该数据集，并对该理论进行更直接的测试。扩大后的数据集将包括有关议会监督行使的信息，这些信息是通过联合政党在立法程序的委员会和议会阶段对政府法案的修改来衡量的。本课题对从事比较立法研究的学者具有理论和实证意义。最重要的是，该项目挑战了议会制度中立法机构不重要的普遍假设。通过提出议会主要作为管理联盟内部冲突的机制的重要性，该研究鼓励在理解立法机构的作用方面进行新的理论和实证努力。此外，该项目还提供跨国立法数据，其中包括两个主要欧洲国家政府法案的详细资料。目前，学术界还没有关于政府法案和立法过程的可比数据集。

This project addresses a central question in the comparative study of democratic institutions: How do coalition governments, which are composed of multiple parties with often conflicting ideological goals, manage to make policy? Surprisingly, relatively few studies have examined this issue in a systematic cross-national fashion. Instead, most research on multiparty government has focused on the formation and termination of coalitions, largely neglecting the policymaking process between these events. In this project, the principal investigators address this question by examining lawmaking in two European parliamentary democracies. Specifically, the investigators propose to collect primary data on the committee and floor stages of the legislative process in Germany and the Netherlands. The theoretical model in the project focuses on a central principal-agent problem that coalition cabinets must solve if they are to govern successfully. Because expertise is needed to plan and implement public policy, governments in parliamentary democracies must delegate important policymaking powers to individual ministers who have control over relevant issue areas. In particular, cabinet ministers enjoy considerable autonomy in drafting government legislation within their jurisdiction. For coalition governments, such delegation creates the risk that ministers will use their autonomy to bias policy in favor of their own parties without adequately taking into account the interests of their coalition partners. The incentive to do so grows particularly strong on issues that greatly divide coalition members. The argument proposed here is that parliamentary oversight provides a key institutional mechanism that allows coalition parties to deal with this problem. While it is difficult to police ministers from within the cabinet, coalition members can make use of the legislative process to scrutinize and amend legislation introduced by hostile ministers. The researchers contend that this mechanism is particularly important where the coalition is internally divided. If correct, this argument challenges the common perception that parliaments in Western Europe are largely irrelevant institutions. Legislatures may play a crucial role as an intra-coalition conflict management tool that allows parties with divergent preferences to govern jointly. An empirical evaluation of this theory requires detailed data on the treatment of government bills in the legislative process. In particular, such an evaluation requires information on the extent to which coalition parties make use of the legislative process to scrutinize and amend policy proposals drafted by individual ministers. With support from their home institutions, the principal investigators have already collected relevant data on nearly three hundred government bills introduced in the Netherlands and Germany between 1982 and 1994. The existing dataset provides information on the ideological stance of coalition parties on the issues addressed by these bills as well as the length of delay these bills encounter in the legislative process. A preliminary analysis of the data has yielded results that are consistent with the theory. The financial support requested in this proposal enables the principal investigators to expand this dataset substantially and conduct a more direct test of the theory. The expanded dataset will consist of information on the exercise of parliamentary oversight as measured by changes made to government bills by coalition parties during the committee and floor stages of the legislative process.The proposed project has theoretical and empirical significance for scholars engaged in comparative legislative research. Most importantly, the project challenges the common assumption that legislatures in parliamentary systems are unimportant institutions. By suggesting that parliaments are significant primarily as mechanisms for managing intra-coalition conflict, the study encourages renewed theoretical and empirical efforts in understanding the role of legislatures. In addition, the project makes available cross-national legislative data consisting of detailed information on government bills in two major European countries. Currently, no comparable dataset on government bills and the legislative process is available to the scholarly community.