Collaborative Research: Theory, Experiments, and Empirical Methodology of Coalition Bargaining: An Integrated Approach

本项目将整合现有的关于联盟议价的理论、实验和实证工作。pi计划在议价行为的实验和实证工作之间建立方法论和实质性的互动。他们还希望将立法议价的理论、实验和实证工作扩展到更广泛的政策问题上。这一领域以前的工作主要集中在个人或群体为分配固定数量的商品或资源而争论的分配情况。显然，在现实世界中，立法机构和公司委员会在非分配问题上讨价还价的程度，至少与他们在分配固定数量的可转移资源上讨价还价的程度一样多。此外，群体决策过程涉及议价规则和投票规则之间不同程度的相互作用，因此分析群体决策的理论和实验都应该反映这种制度的相互作用。本项目旨在朝着这些方向迈出若干步骤。pi将开发新的理论，并使用实验室实验来测试美国学生和加拿大立法者参与的理论。其中感兴趣的问题是对逐项讨价还价与同时讨价还价的原因和后果的关注。第二个重要的问题是，不同的议价规则是否会产生不同的效率后果。最后，他们将考虑讨价还价和投票规则对公共产品提供与猪肉桶项目的相对可能性的影响。这个项目本质上是跨学科的，因为讨价还价在任何对群体决策感兴趣的学科中都很重要。例如，在美国政治中，有大量关于委员会结构、政党忠诚、公共产品条款与分配政治、原木滚动以及具有异质利益的参与者之间的多维谈判的文献。本项目的研究结果有可能导致我们如何看待分析所有这些主题的重大变化。1

This project will work to integrate the existing theoretical, experimental and empirical work on coalitional bargaining. The PIs plan to create a methodological and substantive interaction between experimental and empirical work on bargaining behavior. They also want to extend theoretical, experimental, and empirical work on legislative bargaining to a broader range of policy issues. Previous work in this area has focued primarily on distributive situations in which individuals or groups argue over the division of a fixed amount of a good or resourse. Clearly, in the real world legislative and corporate committees bargain over non-distributional issues at least as much as they bargain over the division of a fixed amount of transferable resources. Moreover, group decision making processes involve variousdegrees of interaction between bargaining rules and voting rules, and hence both theories and experiments analyzing group decision making should reflect this interplay of institutions.This project aims to make a number of steps in these directions. The PIs will develop new theories and use laboratory experiments to test those theories with American students participants as well as Canadian legislators. Among the questions of interest are concerns about the causes and consequences of issue-by-issue bargaining versus simultaneous bargaining. A second important question is whether different bargaining rules will have different efficiency consequences. Finally, they will consider the effects of both bargaining and voting rules on the relative likelihood of public good provision versus pork barrel projects.The project is intrinsically interdisciplinary, since bargaining is important in any disciplineinterested in group decision making. For example, in American politics there is an enormous literature on committee structures, party loyalty, public good provisions versus distributive politics, log-rolling, and multi-dimensional negotiations among players with heterogeneous interests. The research results of the present project have the potential to result in substantial changes in how we look at analyze all of these topics. 1