Collaborative Research: Theory, Experiments, and Empirical Methodology of Coalition Bargaining: An Integrated Approach

本研究将整合现有的理论、实验与实证研究。 PI计划在讨价还价行为的实验和实证工作之间建立方法论和实质性的互动。 他们还希望将立法谈判的理论、实验和经验工作扩展到更广泛的政策问题。 这一领域以前的工作主要集中在分配的情况下，个人或团体争论的一个固定数量的货物或资源的分配。 显然，在真实的世界中，立法委员会和公司委员会就非分配问题进行谈判的次数至少与他们就固定数量的可转移资源的分配进行谈判的次数一样多。此外，群体决策过程涉及不同程度的相互作用之间的谈判规则和投票规则，因此，理论和实验分析群体决策应反映这种相互作用的制度。 PI将开发新的理论，并使用实验室实验来测试这些理论与美国学生参与者以及加拿大立法者。 在感兴趣的问题中，有一个问题是关注逐个问题谈判与同时谈判的原因和后果。第二个重要问题是，不同的谈判规则是否会产生不同的效率后果。最后，他们将考虑讨价还价和投票规则对公共产品供应与猪肉桶项目的相对可能性的影响。该项目本质上是跨学科的，因为讨价还价在任何对群体决策感兴趣的学科中都很重要。 例如，在美国政治中，有大量关于委员会结构、政党忠诚、公共利益条款与分配政治、滚动记录以及具有不同利益的参与者之间的多维谈判的文献。本项目的研究结果有可能导致我们如何看待分析所有这些主题的实质性变化。1

This project will work to integrate the existing theoretical, experimental and empirical work on coalitional bargaining. The PIs plan to create a methodological and substantive interaction between experimental and empirical work on bargaining behavior. They also want to extend theoretical, experimental, and empirical work on legislative bargaining to a broader range of policy issues. Previous work in this area has focued primarily on distributive situations in which individuals or groups argue over the division of a fixed amount of a good or resourse. Clearly, in the real world legislative and corporate committees bargain over non-distributional issues at least as much as they bargain over the division of a fixed amount of transferable resources. Moreover, group decision making processes involve variousdegrees of interaction between bargaining rules and voting rules, and hence both theories and experiments analyzing group decision making should reflect this interplay of institutions.This project aims to make a number of steps in these directions. The PIs will develop new theories and use laboratory experiments to test those theories with American students participants as well as Canadian legislators. Among the questions of interest are concerns about the causes and consequences of issue-by-issue bargaining versus simultaneous bargaining. A second important question is whether different bargaining rules will have different efficiency consequences. Finally, they will consider the effects of both bargaining and voting rules on the relative likelihood of public good provision versus pork barrel projects.The project is intrinsically interdisciplinary, since bargaining is important in any disciplineinterested in group decision making. For example, in American politics there is an enormous literature on committee structures, party loyalty, public good provisions versus distributive politics, log-rolling, and multi-dimensional negotiations among players with heterogeneous interests. The research results of the present project have the potential to result in substantial changes in how we look at analyze all of these topics. 1