Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Intra-Party Bargaining, Electoral Rules, and Distributive Politics in Parliamentary Democracies

该项目寻求资金，以解释在议会民主国家的分配政策的两种类型的变化。第一个问题涉及使更广泛的公民群体受益的公共产品型政策与针对社会狭窄阶层的特殊性、分肥型政策之间的总支出平衡。如何解释在议会民主制度下，公共产品和特殊计划之间的总支出平衡的跨国差异？第二种类型的变化是分配方案如何在选区之间分配，这是大多数民主国家政治代表的主要基础。在分配计划的地理分配模式中，是否存在任何跨国差异？如果是这样的话，是什么造成了这些差异？在公共产品和特殊性计划之间的平衡，在文献中流行的帐户集中在选举规则的差异作为一个关键的解释变量。 然而，尽管选举规则的差异可能是最重要的因素之一，但它应该是塑造立法者动机的众多因素中的唯一因素。只关注选举规则的差异可能会忽略它们激励机制的重要变化。在分配方案的跨选区分配方面，现有文献缺乏对跨选区分配模式的跨国差异的具体预测。为了克服这些局限性，本项目提出了一个理论帐户集中在迄今为止被忽视的方面的故事，党的领导人和后座议员的执政党（IES）在议会民主的立法者之间的党内讨价还价。在公共产品和分配方案之间的总量平衡上，该理论预测，如果执政党现任立法者的选举命运与其政党的命运更紧密（更不紧密），则公共产品（特殊方案）的预算分配会增加。本文的主要创新之一是估计了不同选举制度下执政党现任者选举命运的凝聚力，并将其作为一个关键的解释变量，用大约20个先进工业民主国家的时间序列横截面数据来检验假设。在分配方案的跨地区分配方面，同一理论预测，在没有党内选举竞争的地区选举制度下，边缘地区获得更多的分配方案，而在有党内竞争的选举制度下，有权力/资深立法委员的地区获得更多的分配方案。本研究以日本为例，对这一假设进行了验证。日本的选举制度经历了从有党内竞争到无党内竞争的转变。通过这些理论和实证研究，本研究有助于更好地理解议会民主制下的分配政治。议会民主制是先进工业社会的主要民主形式，也是年轻民主国家的普遍选择。

This project seeks funding to explain two types of variation in distributive policies in the parliamentary democracies. The first concerns the balance in the aggregate spending between the public goods type policies that benefit a broader citizen base, and the particularistic, pork-barrel type policies that target narrow segments of the society. What explains the cross-country variation in the aggregate spending balance between the public goods and the particularistic programs under parliamentary democracies? The second type of variation is how distributive programs are allocated across electoral districts, the primary bases of political representation in most democracies. Are any cross-country differences expected in the pattern of geographical allocation of distributive programs? If so, what accounts for these differences? On the balance between public goods and particularistic programs, popular accounts in the literature focus on the difference in electoral rules as a key explanatory variable. However, while the difference in electoral rules may be among the most important factors, it should be yet the only one of many factors that shape incentives of the legislators. The exclusive focus on the difference in electoral rules might have missed important variations in their incentives. On the allocation of distributive programs across electoral districts, the existing literature lacks in the specific predictions of the cross-country difference in the pattern of allocation across districts. To overcome these limitations, this project proposes a theoretical account focusing on so far a neglected aspect of the story, intra-party bargaining between party leaders and backbench legislators of the governing party(ies) in parliamentary democracies. On the aggregate balance between public goods and distributive programs, this theory predicts that the allocation of budget to public goods (particularistic programs) increases if the electoral fate of incumbent legislators of the governing party(ies) is more (less) cohesive with the fate of their party as a whole. One of the major innovations of this paper is the estimation of the cohesion of the electoral fate of incumbents from government parties across different electoral systems and the use of it as a key explanatory variable to test the hypothesis with the time-series-cross-section data of about twenty advanced industrial democracies. On the allocation of distributive programs across districts, the same theory predicts that marginal districts receive more distributive programs under the electoral systems without intra-party electoral competition at district level while districts withpowerful/senior legislators receive more distributive programs under the electoral systems with intra-party competition. This hypothesis is tested with a data from Japan which has experienced the change of electoral systems from those with intra-party competition to those without.Through these theoretical and empirical investigations, this project contributes to a betterunderstanding of distributive politics under the parliamentary democracy, a predominant form of democracy among advanced industrial societies and a popular option among young democracies.