Party Competition under the German mixed electoral system

德国混合选举制度下的政党竞争

• 批准号: 251954613
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Thomas Bräuninger
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 财政年份: 2013
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2012-12-31 至 2017-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/251954613?language=en
• 关键词: Party; Competition; under; German; mixed

In this project we investigate the centripetal and centrifugal effects on party competition which can be traced back to the mixed electoral system for German Bundestag elections (proportional system linked with plurality system). First, an adequate spatial model will be selected from the rich pool of formal models of party competition and modified so that it fits the German situation with more than one policy dimension. Second, the federal elections have to be identified for which the necessary survey data are available for secondary analyses so that policy spaces can be constructed. The most important position issues of an election campaign have to be mapped to this space, including both the policy preferences of voters and the perceived positions of parties. In addition, party valences have to be taken into account, that is the popularity of parties insofar as it is independent from the policy standpoints of a party. Third, the hypotheses derived from the model will be tested, as for instance the obvious one that plurality election in single member constituencies has centripetal effects, whereas national proportional systems boost centrifugal tendencies of party competition. The hypothesis test in this third part will compare the party equilibrium configuration which will be computed under the assumption of two separate tiers of the electoral system. Fourth, a model of party competition in mixed electoral systems has to consider interactions or contamination between the plurality and proportional section of the electoral system both at the level of voters and of parties. Such a refined model will be developed. The results of this project will also help to evaluate mixed electoral systems from a normative viewpoint.

在这个项目中，我们研究了向心力和离心力对政党竞争的影响，这可以追溯到德国联邦议院选举的混合选举制度（比例制与多元化制度相结合）。首先，将从丰富的政党竞争正式模型库中选择一个适当的空间模型，并对其进行修改，使其在多个政策维度上适合德国的情况。第二，必须确定联邦选举，为二次分析提供必要的调查数据，以便构建政策空间。竞选活动中最重要的立场问题必须映射到这个空间，包括选民的政策偏好和政党的感知立场。此外，还必须考虑到政党的民望，即政党的民望，因为它独立于政党的政策立场。第三，从模型中推导出的假设将被测试，例如一个明显的单一成员选区的多数选举具有向心效应，而国家比例制度则会促进政党竞争的离心倾向。第三部分的假设检验将比较在两级选举制度假设下计算的政党均衡配置。第四，混合选举制度中的政党竞争模式必须考虑到选举制度中的多数和比例部分在选民和政党一级的相互作用或污染。将开发这样一个完善的模型。这一项目的结果还将有助于从规范的角度评估混合选举制度。