Collaborative Research: Decision-Making on Behalf of Others

协作研究：代表他人决策

• 批准号: 0350467
• 负责人: John Alford
• 金额: $ 9.71万
• 依托单位: William Marsh Rice University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-04-01 至 2006-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0350467&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Decision; Making; Behalf

A surprising number of the important decisions in modern society are undertaken by one person on behalf of other people. CEOs make decisions on behalf of employees in the firm; pastors on behalf of their congregations; generals on behalf of their troops; teachers on behalf of their students; gang leaders on behalf of their followers; parents on behalf of their family; members of corporate boards on behalf of shareholders; lawyers on behalf of their clients; and perhaps most obviously, elected representatives on behalf of the constituents they represent. Though students of decision-making have an impressive understanding of decisions made by those acting on their own behalf, an analysis has yet to be undertaken of the precise manner in which decisions taken on behalf of others differ from those occurring in a traditional dyadic context. In this research project, the investigators employ a series of experiments to isolate and thereby to ascertain the manner in which decisions are different when they are made on someone else's behalf. In an illustrative experiment, a subject is given $20 and told to divide it with a second player in any fashion. From existing research utilizing single-shot dictator and ultimatum games it is known that subjects typically give nearly half to their anonymous partner. But not known is the extent to which this generosity is curtailed (or enhanced) when subjects are acting on behalf of others. If the structure of the experiment is modified so that a subject acts on behalf of a group of five people (including the subject) and must decide how to allocate $100 (5 x $20) between his/her own group and a second (receiving) group, with all members within a group receiving the same amount, decisions are likely to be different. Identifying the precise nature of the difference in behavior between these two common and important decision arrangements is the central goal of this project. The intellectual merit of the project is that it provides a clear empirical test of the conditions under which leading theoretical models of decision-making apply. For example, the purest form of the rational choice model, drawn from microeconomics, hypothesizes that decision-makers will always attempt to maximize their short-term tangible gains, an expectation that often turns out to be false when people are acting on behalf of themselves. But a second theory, drawn from social and evolutionary psychology and utilized in the current project, emphasizes people's concern for the way others perceive them and therefore leads to the expectation that, somewhat ironically, decision-makers will be more protective of the resources of others than they are of their own. As such, the research holds considerable promise of determining the precise conditions under which leading models of decision-making apply. The research has a broader and more practical impact by helping citizens, reformers, and decision-makers themselves to understand the psychological pressures acting on decision-makers in various real-life contexts. Assuming the results of the experiments are as anticipated, if maximization of short-term gains is the desired goal, giving authority to representatives becomes the most fruitful approach. If, however, the desire is for decision-makers to share and to engage in altruistic punishment, the sensible thing to do is to let people make decisions for themselves.

一个人代表他人做出了令人惊讶的现代社会重要决定。 首席执行官代表公司的员工做出决定；牧师代表他们的会众；将军代表他们的部队；老师代表学生；帮派领导人代表他们的追随者；父母代表家人；代表股东的公司董事会成员；律师代表客户；也许最明显的是，当选代表代表他们所代表的选民。 尽管决策的学生对代表自己行事的人做出了令人印象深刻的理解，但尚未对代表他人做出的决定与在传统二元背景下发生的决定有所不同的确切方式进行分析。 在该研究项目中，调查人员采用了一系列实验来隔离，从而确定决策在代表他人做出时有所不同的方式。 在一个说明性的实验中，给出了20美元的主题，并被告知以任何方式将其与第二个玩家分开。 从现有的研究利用单枪独裁者和最后通atum游戏的研究中，受试者通常将近一半的匿名合作伙伴捐赠给匿名合作伙伴。 但尚不清楚的是，当受试者代表他人行事时，这种慷慨的程度会在多大程度上受到限制（或增强）。 如果对实验的结构进行了修改，以便主题代表五人组成的小组（包括主题），并且必须决定如何在其自己的组和第二个（接收）组之间分配100美元（5 x $ 20），而一组中的所有成员都在接受相同金额的所有成员，则决策可能是不同的。 确定这两个共同和重要的决策安排之间行为差异的确切性质是该项目的核心目标。该项目的智力优点在于，它对领先的决策模型适用的条件提供了明确的经验检验。 例如，从微观经济学中得出的理性选择模型的最纯粹形式表明，决策者将始终试图最大程度地提高其短期切实的明显收益，而当人们代表自己行事时，这种期望通常是错误的。 但是，第二种理论是从社会和进化心理学中得出的，并在当前的项目中使用，强调人们对别人感知他们的看法的关注，因此导致人们期望，有些讽刺的是，决策者将比他们自己更保护他人的资源。 因此，该研究具有确定决策模型的确切条件的巨大希望。 这项研究通过帮助公民，改革者和决策者自己了解在各种现实生活中对决策者行事的心理压力，从而产生更广泛，更实际的影响。 假设实验的结果是预期的，那么如果短期收益是理想的目标，那么赋予代表权的权力成为最富有成果的方法。 但是，如果希望决策者分享和进行无私的惩罚，那么明智的做法就是让人们自己做出决定。