Collaborative Research: Decision-Making on Behalf of Others

协作研究：代表他人决策

• 批准号: 0350467
• 负责人: John Alford
• 金额: $ 9.71万
• 依托单位: William Marsh Rice University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-04-01 至 2006-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0350467&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Decision; Making; Behalf

A surprising number of the important decisions in modern society are undertaken by one person on behalf of other people. CEOs make decisions on behalf of employees in the firm; pastors on behalf of their congregations; generals on behalf of their troops; teachers on behalf of their students; gang leaders on behalf of their followers; parents on behalf of their family; members of corporate boards on behalf of shareholders; lawyers on behalf of their clients; and perhaps most obviously, elected representatives on behalf of the constituents they represent. Though students of decision-making have an impressive understanding of decisions made by those acting on their own behalf, an analysis has yet to be undertaken of the precise manner in which decisions taken on behalf of others differ from those occurring in a traditional dyadic context. In this research project, the investigators employ a series of experiments to isolate and thereby to ascertain the manner in which decisions are different when they are made on someone else's behalf. In an illustrative experiment, a subject is given $20 and told to divide it with a second player in any fashion. From existing research utilizing single-shot dictator and ultimatum games it is known that subjects typically give nearly half to their anonymous partner. But not known is the extent to which this generosity is curtailed (or enhanced) when subjects are acting on behalf of others. If the structure of the experiment is modified so that a subject acts on behalf of a group of five people (including the subject) and must decide how to allocate $100 (5 x $20) between his/her own group and a second (receiving) group, with all members within a group receiving the same amount, decisions are likely to be different. Identifying the precise nature of the difference in behavior between these two common and important decision arrangements is the central goal of this project. The intellectual merit of the project is that it provides a clear empirical test of the conditions under which leading theoretical models of decision-making apply. For example, the purest form of the rational choice model, drawn from microeconomics, hypothesizes that decision-makers will always attempt to maximize their short-term tangible gains, an expectation that often turns out to be false when people are acting on behalf of themselves. But a second theory, drawn from social and evolutionary psychology and utilized in the current project, emphasizes people's concern for the way others perceive them and therefore leads to the expectation that, somewhat ironically, decision-makers will be more protective of the resources of others than they are of their own. As such, the research holds considerable promise of determining the precise conditions under which leading models of decision-making apply. The research has a broader and more practical impact by helping citizens, reformers, and decision-makers themselves to understand the psychological pressures acting on decision-makers in various real-life contexts. Assuming the results of the experiments are as anticipated, if maximization of short-term gains is the desired goal, giving authority to representatives becomes the most fruitful approach. If, however, the desire is for decision-makers to share and to engage in altruistic punishment, the sensible thing to do is to let people make decisions for themselves.

现代社会中有数量惊人的重要决策是由一个人代表其他人做出的。 首席执行官代表公司员工做出决策；代表其会众的牧师；将军代表其部队；教师代表学生；帮派头目代表其追随者；父母代表家人；代表股东的公司董事会成员；代表客户的律师；也许最明显的是，代表他们所代表的选民选出的代表。 尽管学习决策的学生对代表自己做出的决策有着深刻的理解，但尚未对代表他人做出的决策与传统二元环境中做出的决策的不同之处进行准确的分析。 在这个研究项目中，研究人员采用了一系列实验来进行隔离，从而确定代表他人做出决策时的不同方式。 在一个说明性的实验中，受试者被给予 20 美元，并被告知以任何方式与第二个玩家分享。 从利用单发独裁者和最后通牒游戏的现有研究可知，受试者通常将近一半的钱捐给他们的匿名伙伴。 但尚不清楚当受试者代表他人行事时，这种慷慨会在多大程度上减少（或增强）。 如果修改实验结构，让受试者代表五人小组（包括受试者）行事，并且必须决定如何在他/她自己的小组和第二（接收）小组之间分配 100 美元（5 x 20 美元），并且小组内的所有成员都收到相同的金额，则决策可能会有所不同。 确定这两种常见且重要的决策安排之间行为差异的确切性质是该项目的中心目标。该项目的智力优点在于，它对领先的决策理论模型的应用条件提供了清晰的实证检验。 例如，源自微观经济学的理性选择模型的最纯粹形式假设决策者总是试图最大化其短期有形收益，但当人们代表自己行事时，这种期望常常被证明是错误的。 但第二个理论是从社会和进化心理学中得出的，并在当前的项目中使用，它强调人们关心他人如何看待他们，因此导致了这样的预期：有点讽刺的是，决策者会更加保护他人的资源，而不是自己的资源。 因此，这项研究有望确定领先决策模型应用的精确条件。 该研究通过帮助公民、改革者和决策者本身了解各种现实生活背景下决策者所承受的心理压力，产生了更广泛、更实际的影响。 假设实验结果符合预期，如果短期收益最大化是期望的目标，那么赋予代表权力就成为最有成效的做法。 然而，如果决策者希望分享并参与利他惩罚，那么明智的做法就是让人们自己做决定。