Collaborative Research: Decision-Making on Behalf of Others

协作研究：代表他人决策

• 批准号: 0350467
• 负责人: John Alford
• 金额: $ 9.71万
• 依托单位: William Marsh Rice University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-04-01 至 2006-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0350467&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Decision; Making; Behalf

A surprising number of the important decisions in modern society are undertaken by one person on behalf of other people. CEOs make decisions on behalf of employees in the firm; pastors on behalf of their congregations; generals on behalf of their troops; teachers on behalf of their students; gang leaders on behalf of their followers; parents on behalf of their family; members of corporate boards on behalf of shareholders; lawyers on behalf of their clients; and perhaps most obviously, elected representatives on behalf of the constituents they represent. Though students of decision-making have an impressive understanding of decisions made by those acting on their own behalf, an analysis has yet to be undertaken of the precise manner in which decisions taken on behalf of others differ from those occurring in a traditional dyadic context. In this research project, the investigators employ a series of experiments to isolate and thereby to ascertain the manner in which decisions are different when they are made on someone else's behalf. In an illustrative experiment, a subject is given $20 and told to divide it with a second player in any fashion. From existing research utilizing single-shot dictator and ultimatum games it is known that subjects typically give nearly half to their anonymous partner. But not known is the extent to which this generosity is curtailed (or enhanced) when subjects are acting on behalf of others. If the structure of the experiment is modified so that a subject acts on behalf of a group of five people (including the subject) and must decide how to allocate $100 (5 x $20) between his/her own group and a second (receiving) group, with all members within a group receiving the same amount, decisions are likely to be different. Identifying the precise nature of the difference in behavior between these two common and important decision arrangements is the central goal of this project. The intellectual merit of the project is that it provides a clear empirical test of the conditions under which leading theoretical models of decision-making apply. For example, the purest form of the rational choice model, drawn from microeconomics, hypothesizes that decision-makers will always attempt to maximize their short-term tangible gains, an expectation that often turns out to be false when people are acting on behalf of themselves. But a second theory, drawn from social and evolutionary psychology and utilized in the current project, emphasizes people's concern for the way others perceive them and therefore leads to the expectation that, somewhat ironically, decision-makers will be more protective of the resources of others than they are of their own. As such, the research holds considerable promise of determining the precise conditions under which leading models of decision-making apply. The research has a broader and more practical impact by helping citizens, reformers, and decision-makers themselves to understand the psychological pressures acting on decision-makers in various real-life contexts. Assuming the results of the experiments are as anticipated, if maximization of short-term gains is the desired goal, giving authority to representatives becomes the most fruitful approach. If, however, the desire is for decision-makers to share and to engage in altruistic punishment, the sensible thing to do is to let people make decisions for themselves.

在现代社会中，许多重要的决定都是由一个人代表其他人做出的。首席执行官代表公司员工做决策；牧师代表他们的会众；将军代表他们的部队；老师代表学生；黑帮头目代表其追随者；父母代表他们的家庭；代表股东的公司董事会成员；代表当事人的律师；也许最明显的是，当选代表代表他们所代表的选民。虽然决策学的学生对那些代表自己行事的人所做的决定有深刻的理解，但还没有对代表他人做出的决定与传统的二元环境中发生的决定的确切方式进行分析。在这个研究项目中，调查人员采用了一系列的实验来分离，从而确定当他们代表别人做出决定时，他们的决定是不同的。在一个说明性实验中，给一个实验对象20美元，并让他与另一个参与者以任何方式分钱。从现有的利用一次性独裁者和最后通牒游戏的研究中，我们知道受试者通常会把近一半的钱给他们的匿名搭档。但不知道的是，当受试者代表他人行事时，这种慷慨在多大程度上被削弱（或增强）。如果对实验结构进行修改，让受试者代表五人组（包括受试者）行动，并且必须决定如何在他/她自己的组和第二组（接收组）之间分配100美元（5 x 20美元），而组内所有成员都收到相同的金额，那么决定可能会不同。确定这两种常见且重要的决策安排之间的行为差异的确切性质是本项目的中心目标。该项目的智力价值在于，它提供了一个明确的经验检验，证明了领先的决策理论模型在哪些条件下适用。例如，从微观经济学中得出的理性选择模型的最纯粹形式，假设决策者总是试图最大化他们的短期有形收益，当人们代表自己行事时，这种期望往往被证明是错误的。但是，从社会和进化心理学中提取并在当前项目中使用的第二种理论强调了人们对他人看待他们的方式的关注，因此导致了这样一种期望，有点讽刺的是，决策者将更多地保护他人的资源而不是自己的资源。因此，该研究在确定主要决策模型适用的精确条件方面具有相当大的前景。该研究通过帮助公民、改革者和决策者自己了解在各种现实环境中作用于决策者的心理压力，具有更广泛和更实际的影响。假设实验的结果如预期的那样，如果短期收益最大化是期望的目标，那么赋予代表权力就是最有效的方法。然而，如果决策者的愿望是分享和参与利他的惩罚，明智的做法是让人们自己做决定。