Privacy and Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets

竞争市场中的隐私和信息获取近年来，信息技术的几乎所有方面都取得了巨大的进步，包括：存储、处理和传输。 在1988年到2000年之间，1G硬盘存储的成本从11,500美元降到了1美元左右。 在1989年到2000年间，标准PC主板上的晶体管数量增加了42倍。 在1990年至1998年期间，因特网上的节点数目从313，000个增加到29，670，000个。 信息技术的这种创新已经彻底改变了许多行业。它们重塑了现代经济，深刻影响了社会。 它们为新的商品和服务带来了新市场，同时也引起了对公共政策问题的新的关切。 本项目的核心问题是信息技术革命对个人隐私的影响，过去15年信息技术的巨大进步既产生了社会效益，也产生了社会成本。 好处来自更有效地分配货物和服务以及工作分配。 例如，保险单，债务合同和公寓租赁可以定制，以更好地适应潜在客户的特点。 同样，就业和大学入学机会可以更好地与申请人的技能和能力相匹配。 然而，有两种成本与增加信息获取有关。 首先，显然存在涉及数据收集、存储和处理的直接资源成本。 其次，在个人隐私方面存在成本。 具体来说，虽然消费者和/或潜在的员工通常愿意透露一些个人信息，以确保更有利的合同条款，公司往往不具备有效的信息收集的激励措施时，筛选他们的申请人。 特别是，当企业的数据收集努力是不可观察的（因此是不可收缩的），边际社会利益和边际私人利益的信息获取之间的分歧出现。 在获取信息相当于寻找有关申请人的“坏消息”的环境中，边际私人利益通常更大，促使公司拒绝太多的申请人。 相比之下，在获取信息相当于寻找“好消息”的环境中，筛选的边际私人效益低于边际社会效益，而且获得批准的申请人太少。 因此，公司有动机过于努力地寻找关于他们申请人的坏消息，而不够努力地寻找好消息。本项目将调查在各种市场环境中获取信息的私人利益和社会利益之间的这种根本分歧所产生的经济后果。 将分析隐私权的分配、价格和准入歧视以及交易关系的效率等问题。

Privacy and Information Acquisition in Competitive MarketsRecent years have witnessed dramatic advances in virtually all aspects of information technology including: storage, processing, and transmission. Between 1988 and 2000, the cost of a gigabyte of hard disk storage fell from about $11,500 to around a dollar. Between 1989 and 2000, the number of transistors on a standard PC mother board increased by a factor of 42. Between 1990 and 1998, the number of nodes on the Internet increased from 313,000 to 29,670,000. Such innovations in information technology have revolutionized many industries. They have reshaped modern economies and profoundly impacted society. They have given rise to new markets for new goods and services while at the same time spawning new concerns regarding questions of public policy. The question at the heart of this project concerns the impact of the revolution in information technology on personal privacy.The dramatic advances in information technology occurring over the past 15 years have generated both social benefits and costs. The benefits derive from a more efficient allocation of goods and services and job assignments. For example, insurance policies, debt contracts, and apartment leases can be tailored to better fit the characteristics of prospective customers. Likewise, employment and college-enrollment offers can be better matched with the skills and aptitudes of applicants. There are, however, two costs associated with increased information acquisition. First, there is obviously a direct resource cost involving the collection, storage, and processing of data. Second, there is a cost in terms of personal privacy. Specifically, while consumers and/or prospective employees are typically willing to divulge some personal information in order to secure more favorable contract terms, firms often do not possess incentives for efficient information collection when screening their applicants. In particular, when firms' data-collection efforts are unobservable (and therefore not contractible), a divergence between the marginal social benefit and marginal private benefit of information acquisition arises. In environments where information acquisition corresponds to searching for `bad news' about applicants, the marginal private benefit is typically larger, inducing firms to reject too many applicants. By contrast, in environments where information acquisition corresponds to searching for `good news,' the marginal private benefit to screening is lower than the marginal social benefit, and too few applicants are approved. Hence, firms have incentives to search too hard for bad news about their applicants and not hard enough for good news.This project will investigate the economic consequences deriving from this fundamental divergence between the private and social benefits of information acquisition in a variety of market settings. Issues such as the assignment of privacy rights, price and access discrimination, and the efficiency of trading relationships will be analyzed.