Consumer Profiles, Consumer Privacy, and the Information Marketplace

消费者概况、消费者隐私和信息市场

• 批准号: 0136817
• 负责人: Curtis Taylor
• 金额: $ 16.34万
• 依托单位: Duke University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-06-01 至 2004-11-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0136817&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Consumer; Profiles; Privacy; Information; Marketplace

In a recent survey, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found that 99% of on-line companies collect personal information from the individuals visiting their web sights. In September 2000, Amazon.com conducted dynamic pricing experiments in which DVD movies were sold to different customers at different prices (up to a 40% difference) based on their purchasing histories. Besides dynamic pricing, firms use consumer profile data to target ads and make product recommendations. Indeed, customized ads that use consumer profile data sell for up to ten times the price of untargeted advertisements. There are many Internet marketing firms such as Double Click and I-Behavior that collect and sell customer information to electronic retailers. In addition to purchasing histories, these databases typically contain such items as an individual's income, size of family, lifestyle interests, and motor vehicle ownership. Consumers are becoming increasingly aware that their electronic purchases and other activities are being monitored and cataloged.The purpose of this project is to investigate these privacy issues in the context of a series of game-theoretic models. Specifically, some of the key questions to be addressed include the following: What is the economic impact of a closed privacy regime (in which consumers own the information) versus an open privacy regime (in which firms own it)? Which -- if any -- consumers are likely to benefit from an open privacy regime and which are likely to be hurt by it? When -- if ever -- would firms prefer to insure the privacy of their customers and how might they accomplish this? What is the impact on efficiency and industrial organization of access to consumer profile data? Specifically, will such data become an integral input to the profitability of firms, and if so, is differential access to information likely to generate market power and anti-competitive behavior?

在最近的一项调查中，联邦贸易委员会 (FTC) 发现 99% 的在线公司从访问其网站的个人那里收集个人信息。 2000年9月，亚马逊网站进行了动态定价实验，根据不同顾客的购买历史，以不同的价格（最多相差40%）将DVD电影出售给不同的顾客。除了动态定价之外，公司还使用消费者档案数据来定位广告并提出产品推荐。 事实上，使用消费者档案数据的定制广告的售价高达非针对性广告价格的十倍。 有许多网络营销公司（例如 Double Click 和 I-Behavior）收集客户信息并将其出售给电子零售商。除了购买历史之外，这些数据库通常还包含个人收入、家庭规模、生活方式兴趣和机动车辆拥有量等项目。消费者越来越意识到他们的电子购买和其他活动正在受到监控和编目。该项目的目的是在一系列博弈论模型的背景下调查这些隐私问题。 具体来说，需要解决的一些关键问题包括：封闭隐私制度（消费者拥有信息）与开放隐私制度（公司拥有信息）的经济影响是什么？ 哪些消费者（如果有的话）可能会从开放隐私制度中受益，哪些消费者可能会受到伤害？公司什么时候（如果有的话）愿意确保客户的隐私？他们如何实现这一目标？ 访问消费者档案数据对效率和产业组织有何影响？ 具体来说，这些数据是否会成为企业盈利能力不可或缺的一部分？如果是这样，信息获取的差别是否可能会产生市场力量和反竞争行为？