Option Value and Bargaining Power
Option Value and Bargaining Power
批准号:
9422830
负责人:
Curtis Taylor
金额:
$5.08万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1995
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1995-04-01 至 1997-09-30
中文摘要
小行星9422830 在经济学中,很少有概念能像这样直观地认为,在市场多头一侧的交易者从交易中获得的收益很少。 在经典的一次性交易博弈中,相同的买方对同一种不可分割的同质商品都有单位需求,而相同的卖方对同一种商品都有一个单位的销售,如果买方的数量超过卖方,那么买方从交易中获得的任何收益都会被买方更高的出价所削弱,否则买方就会被排挤在外。 按照同样的逻辑,如果卖家数量超过买家,那么卖家将继续降低报价,直到卖家从交易中获得的所有收益都被消除。 但是,这个经典的结果是脆弱的,因为当从卖方多于买方变为买方多于卖方时,均衡突然发生了变化,而且市场制度只在买方和卖方数量相等的非常特殊的情况下才影响贸易收益的分配。 本研究的贡献将是将经典的一次性交易博弈扩展到新交易者随机到达的无限时域环境。 这一概括不仅使背景更加现实,而且以一种直观和吸引人的方式软化了脆弱的“全有或全无”的均衡结果。 初步研究结果表明,均衡贸易条件取决于现货市场条件和市场人口。 当代理人大量折扣时,现货市场的不平衡程度在确定均衡交易条件方面起着核心作用,而当代理人有耐心时,市场人口统计数据是至关重要的。 几个定价机构被认为是,和增量价值的一方的市场后的价格被确定。 在一个简单的动态调整过程中,可以计算出市场“修正”的预期持续时间。
英文摘要
9422830 Taylor Few concepts in economics are as intuitive as the idea that traders on the long side of a market receive little of the gains from trade. In the classic one-shot trading game in which identical buyers each with unit demands for an indivisible homogenous good face identical sellers each with one unit of the good for sale, if buyers outnumber sellers then any outcome that confers gains from trade to a buyer will be undercut by higher bids from the buyers who would otherwise be frozen out. By the same logic if sellers outnumber buyers, then sellers will keep making lower offers until all gains from trade for the sellers have been eliminated. But this classic result is brittle because the equilibrium abruptly changes when moving from more sellers than buyers to more buyers than sellers and market institutions affect the distribution of the gains from trade only in the very special case in which the number of buyers and sellers is equal. The contribution of this research will be to extend the classic one-shot trading game to an infinite horizon environment with stochastic arrival of new traders. This generalization not only lends realism to the setting but it softens the brittle "all-or-nothing" equilibrium outcome in an intuitive and appealing way. Preliminary findings indicate that the equilibrium terms of trade depend both on spot market conditions and market demographics. When agents discount heavily, the degree of imbalance in the spot-market plays the central role in determining the equilibrium terms of trade, and when agents are patient, market demographics are paramount. Several pricing institutions are considered, and the incremental value to the side of the market which posts prices is identified. Under a simple dynamic adjustment process, the expected duration of a market "correction" can be calculated.
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