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Option Value and Bargaining Power

Option Value and Bargaining Power
期权价值和议价能力
批准号:
9422830
负责人:
Curtis Taylor
金额:
$5.08万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1995
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1995-04-01 至 1997-09-30

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中文摘要
翻译
9422830泰勒经济学中没有几个概念像做多市场的交易者从交易中获得的收益很少这样直观。在经典的一次性交易游戏中,相同的买家面对同样的卖家,每个买家都有不可分割的同质商品的单位需求,每个卖家都有一件商品待售,如果买家的数量超过卖家,那么任何从交易中获得收益的结果都将被买家更高的出价所削弱,否则买家就会被排除在外。按照同样的逻辑,如果卖家的数量超过买家,那么卖家将继续提出更低的报价,直到卖家从交易中获得的所有收益都被抵消。但这一经典结果是脆弱的,因为当均衡从卖家多于买家转向买家多于卖家时,均衡会突然改变,而市场机构只有在买家和卖家数量相等的非常特殊的情况下才会影响交易收益的分配。本研究的贡献在于将经典的一次交易博弈推广到具有随机到达的新交易者的无限时间环境中。这一概括不仅为场景增添了现实主义色彩,还以一种直观而吸引人的方式软化了脆弱的“要么全有‘”的均衡结果。初步研究结果表明,均衡贸易条件既取决于现货市场条件,也取决于市场人口结构。当代理人大幅折扣时,现货市场的不平衡程度在决定均衡贸易条件方面起着核心作用,而当代理人耐心时,市场人口结构是最重要的。考虑了几个定价机构,确定了发布价格的市场一侧的增量价值。在一个简单的动态调整过程下,可以计算出市场“回调”的预期持续时间。
英文摘要
9422830 Taylor Few concepts in economics are as intuitive as the idea that traders on the long side of a market receive little of the gains from trade. In the classic one-shot trading game in which identical buyers each with unit demands for an indivisible homogenous good face identical sellers each with one unit of the good for sale, if buyers outnumber sellers then any outcome that confers gains from trade to a buyer will be undercut by higher bids from the buyers who would otherwise be frozen out. By the same logic if sellers outnumber buyers, then sellers will keep making lower offers until all gains from trade for the sellers have been eliminated. But this classic result is brittle because the equilibrium abruptly changes when moving from more sellers than buyers to more buyers than sellers and market institutions affect the distribution of the gains from trade only in the very special case in which the number of buyers and sellers is equal. The contribution of this research will be to extend the classic one-shot trading game to an infinite horizon environment with stochastic arrival of new traders. This generalization not only lends realism to the setting but it softens the brittle "all-or-nothing" equilibrium outcome in an intuitive and appealing way. Preliminary findings indicate that the equilibrium terms of trade depend both on spot market conditions and market demographics. When agents discount heavily, the degree of imbalance in the spot-market plays the central role in determining the equilibrium terms of trade, and when agents are patient, market demographics are paramount. Several pricing institutions are considered, and the incremental value to the side of the market which posts prices is identified. Under a simple dynamic adjustment process, the expected duration of a market "correction" can be calculated.
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  • 批准号:
    1132187
  • 项目类别:
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  • 资助金额:
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  • 财政年份:
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GOALI: Mechanically Biased Self-Assembly of 2-D and 3-D Quantum Structures Using a Novel Nanostamping Process
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    0600511
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  • 资助金额:
    $15.0万
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    2006
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Privacy and Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets
  • 批准号:
    0417737
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  • 资助金额:
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  • 批准号:
    71903144
  • 项目类别:
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  • 资助金额:
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  • 批准年份:
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  • 负责人:
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