Do Presidents' Veto Threats Matter?

总统的否决威胁重要吗？

• 批准号: 0420124
• 负责人: Samuel Kernell
• 金额: $ 24.35万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-08-01 至 2007-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0420124&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Do; Presidents; Veto; Threats; Matter

The veto is a key instrument of presidential success in dealing with an opposition-controlled Congress. Not only does it allow the president to prevent the opposition party from passing its legislative program, the veto can be enlisted as a stage in a bargaining game to force Congress to accommodate the president's preferences. Recent game theoretic research has identified conditions in which veto-based bargaining can be extended into the realm of presidential rhetoric specifically, veto threats. Veto threats can be effective instruments when the president's preferences are uncertain, he is known to value his reputation, and has publicized his threat to the extent that backing down would harm his prestige and his party's electoral prospects. In sum, current research has found that veto threats can under appropriate conditions matter. This research asks a more empirical question, do presidents' veto threats generally matter?After developing an empirical model that has presidents deciding to send a variable costly, this research test the effectiveness of the more than 2,000 veto threats enlisted since 1981 on the policy content and failure rate of legislation and the roll call behavior of partisan legislators. The research assesses a potentially important tool of presidency agenda setting in divided government. It also creates and provides for the dissemination of two major datasets of veto threats. The first consists of scanned images of 2500 pages of Statements of Administration Policy in which the president threatened to veto a bill under consideration in Congress. The second data set represents all coded threats and their covariates.

否决权是总统在与反对派控制的国会打交道时取得成功的关键手段。它不仅允许总统阻止反对党通过其立法计划，否决权还可以作为讨价还价游戏的一个阶段，迫使国会适应总统的偏好。最近的博弈论研究已经确定了基于否决权的讨价还价可以扩展到总统言论领域的条件，特别是否决权威胁。当总统的偏好不确定时，否决权威胁可能是有效的工具，众所周知，他重视自己的声誉，并且已经公开了他的威胁，以至于退缩会损害他的威望和他的政党的选举前景。总之，目前的研究发现，否决权威胁在适当条件下可以发挥作用。这项研究提出了一个更实证的问题，总统的否决威胁通常重要吗？在开发了一个经验模型，有总统决定发送一个变量昂贵的，本研究测试的有效性超过2,000否决权的威胁，自1981年以来的政策内容和失败率的立法和党派立法者的点名行为。这项研究评估了一个潜在的重要工具，总统议程设置在分裂的政府。 它还建立并规定传播两个关于否决权威胁的主要数据集。第一份是2500页的《政府政策声明》的扫描图像，其中总统威胁要否决国会正在审议的一项法案。第二个数据集代表所有编码的威胁及其协变量。