Contracts and Markets: Toward a General Equilibrium Theory of Firms

契约是现代企业理论的核心。以前的研究集中在团队生产中的监督作用，需要产生的合同（不可观察或无法核实）的努力是不可能的。 这些大量的文献为契约的作用和公司的性质提供了大量的见解。不幸的是，这些文献中的大多数都认为我们希望内生地确定的许多东西是外生的：形成的公司集合，这些公司的契约和组织结构，这些公司面临的投入和产出价格，这些公司成员的特征，以及代理人在公司内部采取特定行动或甚至参与公司的激励措施。本文提出的工作目标是开发和应用一个模型，该模型整合了阿尔奇安·德姆塞茨和格罗斯曼哈特精神中的企业理论、霍姆斯特罗姆精神中的契约理论以及阿罗·德布鲁和麦肯齐精神中的一般均衡理论，实现了一个模型，在该模型中，所有这些东西都是作为解决方案的一部分内生地确定的，而不是作为数据的一部分外生地给定的。预期模型的一个重要特征是，在平衡状态下，不协调和自我实现的预言是可能的。特别是，均衡不一定是帕累托最优的，甚至可能是帕累托排序的。该模型在理解生产、贸易和生产性资产管理的制度方面有许多应用。该模型说明了现有制度的范围如何对社会福利产生重大影响。由于现有体制的范围反映了法律的结构（特别是在法律上可强制执行的合同安排），该模式的一个特别含义是，不活跃或发展不良的法律的制度可能会产生效率低下的体制安排。相反，法律的制度的改进扩大了现有制度的范围，这可能会大大提高社会福利。因此，政府政策有潜在的重要作用，模型有可能为这种政策提供信息。这一点在法律的制度薄弱的欠发达国家尤其重要。这项研究的结果将发表在主要的经济学和政策杂志上。

Contracting is at the heart of much of the modern theory of the firm. Previous research has focused on the role of supervision in team production, the need for which arises from the impossibility of contracting for (unobservable or unverifiable) effort. This large literature has provided enormous insight into the role of contracting and the nature of the firm. Unfortunately, most of this literature takes as given exogenously many things we would like to be determined endogenously: the set of firms that form, the contractual and organizational structure of those firms, the prices faced by those firms for inputs and outputs, the characteristics of members of those firms, and the incentives for agents to take particular actions within a firm or even to participate in a firm at all. The goal of the work proposed here is to develop and apply a model that integrates firm theory in the spirit of Alchian & Demsetz and Grossman & Hart, contract theory in the spirit of Holmstrom, and general equilibrium theory in the spirit of Arrow & Debreu and McKenzie, achieving a model in which all of these things are determined endogenously as part of the solution, rather than given exogenously as part of the data. An important feature of the intended model is that mis-coordination and self-fulfilling prophecies are possible at equilibrium. In particular, equilibria need not be Pareto optimal, and may even be Pareto ranked.The model has many applications to the understanding of institutions for production, for trade, and for the management of productive assets. The model illustrates how the range of available institutions can have a substantial effect on social welfare. Because the range of available institutions reflects the legal structure (in particular, the kinds of contractual arrangements that are legally enforceable), a particular implication of the model is that inactive or poorly developed legal systems may give rise to ineffcient institutional arrangements. Conversely, improvements in the legal system that enhance the range of available institutions may greatly enhance social welfare. Thus there is a potentially important role for government policy, and themodel has the potential to inform such policy. This is especially significant in under-developed countries, which frequently have weak legal systems.Results from this research will be published in leading journals of economics and policy..