Topics in Economic Theory

经济理论专题

• 批准号: 9012853
• 负责人: William Zame
• 金额: $ 6.38万
• 依托单位: SUNY College at Buffalo
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1990
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1990-08-15 至 1992-03-01
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9012853&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Topics; Economic; Theory

This project consists of three parts: (1) the study of perfect competition in the context of large assignment models; (2) the development of a general equilibrium model of bankruptcy and collateral with applications to financial markets; and (3) the development of an extended notion of equilibrium in extensive form games with continuous action spaces. This research contributes a powerful new theory of competition, general insights into the impact of bankruptcy on financial markets and new insights into ways of solving a class of bargaining problems found frequently in economics. The work on characterizing competition in large assignment problems is especially exciting because it could lead to a new way of conceptualizing competition that would capture as special cases such widely used criteria as non manipulability of prices and the appropriation of agents' marginal contributions. The assignment model has a rich history as a laboratory for the development of important new theories such as linear programming and core theory. Past work by the investigator and his collaborators suggests that their study of the uniqueness of equilibrium prices in large assignment models could provide another new, powerful analytical tool for economic theory.

本课题由三部分组成：（1）完善的研究 在大型分配模型的背景下的竞争;（2） 建立破产的一般均衡模型， （三）有担保的金融机构; 发展一种广泛形式的扩展均衡概念 连续动作空间的游戏 这项研究有助于a 强大的新的竞争理论，一般的见解， 破产对金融市场的影响以及对 解决一类讨价还价问题的方法，经常发现， 经济学 大型指派问题中竞争的刻画 尤其令人兴奋，因为它可能会导致一种新的方式， 将竞争概念化， 诸如价格不可操纵性和 代理人边际贡献的分配。 转让 模型作为发展的实验室有着丰富的历史， 重要的新理论，如线性规划和核心理论。 研究人员及其合作者过去的工作表明， 他们对均衡价格唯一性的研究 分配模型可以提供另一种新的，强大的分析 经济理论的工具。