Collaborative Research: CT-T: Adaptive Security and Separation in Reconfigurable Hardware

合作研究：CT-T：可重构硬件中的自适应安全和分离

• 批准号: 0524771
• 负责人: Timothy Sherwood
• 金额: $ 60.39万
• 依托单位: University of California-Santa Barbara
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-08-01 至 2009-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0524771&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; CT; Adaptive; Security

NSF 0524771CT-T: Collaborative Research: Adaptive Security and Separation in Reconfigurable HardwarePI: Timothy Sherwood, University of California-Santa Barbara, Cynthia Irvine, Naval Postgraduate SchoolFrom Bluetooth transceivers to the NASA Mars Rover, reconfigurable circuits have become one of the mainstays of embedded design. Combining the high computational performance of specialized circuits with the re-programmability of software, these devices are quickly becoming ubiquitous. Unfortunately, if unprotected, this reconfigurability could be exploited to disrupt critical operations, snoop on supposedly secure channels, or even to physically melt a device. However, a new approach to controlling changes to the hardware logic promises to overcome these problems. In addition, the innate malleability of this hardware presents the opportunity for hardware enforcement of adaptive security policies. For example, in an emergency, trusted individuals may need to override the nominal security policy. Thus, the reconfigurable component may provide a highly trusted mechanism for secure functionality in changing environments.This research aims to close a gaping security hole in our nation's information infrastructure by enhancing the logical structure and internal management of reconfigurable hardware to enforce a dynamic information protection policy. Specifically, this research will: (1) discover hardware synthesis and static validation methods that will ensure that only secure and non-destructive configurations can be loaded, (2) develop new reconfigurable structures capable of securely mediating run-time access to shared resources through the use of hardware-compiled formal access policy languages, and (3) establish a firm foundation for trustworthy dynamic policy enforcement through ontological analysis, formal modeling and the development of management mechanisms integrating the results of the first two activities.

NSF 0524771CT-T：合作研究：可重构硬件中的自适应安全性和分离。pi: Timothy Sherwood，加州大学圣巴巴拉分校，Cynthia Irvine，海军研究生院。从蓝牙收发器到NASA火星探测器，可重构电路已经成为嵌入式设计的主要内容之一。结合专用电路的高计算性能和软件的可重新编程性，这些设备很快变得无处不在。不幸的是，如果不加以保护，这种可重构性可能会被利用来破坏关键操作，窥探所谓的安全通道，甚至在物理上熔化设备。然而，一种控制硬件逻辑变化的新方法有望克服这些问题。此外，这种硬件的固有延展性为硬件实施自适应安全策略提供了机会。例如，在紧急情况下，受信任的个人可能需要覆盖名义安全策略。因此，可重构组件可以为不断变化的环境中的安全功能提供高度可信的机制。本研究旨在通过加强可重构硬件的逻辑结构和内部管理，以执行动态的信息保护策略，来弥补我国信息基础设施的安全漏洞。具体而言，本研究将：(1)发现硬件综合和静态验证方法，以确保只加载安全和非破坏性配置；(2)开发新的可重构结构，通过使用硬件编译的正式访问策略语言，能够安全地协调对共享资源的运行时访问；(3)通过本体论分析，为可信的动态策略执行建立坚实的基础。正式的建模和管理机制的开发，整合了前两个活动的结果。