TWC: Breakthrough: Inspection Resistance in Cyber-Physical Systems

随着计算设备继续嵌入到越来越多的物理设备中，它们现在可以了解有关我们生活的最机密信息。安全地将秘密保存在内存中的能力是绝大多数安全系统的核心，但是存储和擦除这些秘密对于可以不受限制地物理访问这些设备和底层硬件的攻击者来说是一个难题。根据内存技术的不同，存储1而不是0的行为可能会产生物理副作用，即使在断电后也是如此。通过开发一种新的体系结构，可测量地增加物理分析的难度，该项目使系统即使在系统的物理控制被割让给对手时也可以被信任。初步结果表明，创建一个有效的计划，内存保护是可能的，即使对手能够检查存储位的值只有5%的概率误差，系统将能够防止对手从学习任何信息的原始未编码位与99.999999999%的概率。从长远来看，这项研究将有助于创造网络物理系统工程师开发普遍可信系统所需的技能和工具，并简化我们都依赖于我们的安全和生计的那些使命关键系统的开发。

As computing devices continue to be embedded in more and more physical devices, they are now privy to the most confidential information about our lives. The ability to safely keep a secret in memory is central to the vast majority of security systems, but storing and erasing these secrets is a difficult problem in the face of an attacker who can obtain unrestricted physical access to these devices and the underlying hardware. Depending on the memory technology, the very act of storing a 1 instead of a 0 can have physical side effects measurable even after the power has been cut. Through the development of a new class of architectures that measurably increase the difficulty of physical analysis this project is enabling systems that can be trusted even when physical control of the system is ceded to an adversary. Initial results indicate that the creation of an efficient scheme for memory protection is possible under which, even if an adversary is able to inspect the value of a stored bit with a probabilistic error of only 5%, the system will be able to prevent that adversary from learning any information about the original un-coded bits with 99.9999999999% probability. Over the long term this research will help to create the skills and tools that cyber-physical system engineers will need to develop pervasive trustworthy systems, and to ease the development of those mission critical systems that we all depend on for our safety and livelihood.