TWC: Breakthrough: Inspection Resistance in Cyber-Physical Systems

TWC：突破：网络物理系统中的检查阻力

• 批准号: 1239567
• 负责人: Timothy Sherwood
• 金额: $ 71.74万
• 依托单位: University of California-Santa Barbara
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2012-10-01 至 2017-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1239567&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TWC; Breakthrough; Inspection; Resistance; Cyber

As computing devices continue to be embedded in more and more physical devices, they are now privy to the most confidential information about our lives. The ability to safely keep a secret in memory is central to the vast majority of security systems, but storing and erasing these secrets is a difficult problem in the face of an attacker who can obtain unrestricted physical access to these devices and the underlying hardware. Depending on the memory technology, the very act of storing a 1 instead of a 0 can have physical side effects measurable even after the power has been cut. Through the development of a new class of architectures that measurably increase the difficulty of physical analysis this project is enabling systems that can be trusted even when physical control of the system is ceded to an adversary. Initial results indicate that the creation of an efficient scheme for memory protection is possible under which, even if an adversary is able to inspect the value of a stored bit with a probabilistic error of only 5%, the system will be able to prevent that adversary from learning any information about the original un-coded bits with 99.9999999999% probability. Over the long term this research will help to create the skills and tools that cyber-physical system engineers will need to develop pervasive trustworthy systems, and to ease the development of those mission critical systems that we all depend on for our safety and livelihood.

随着计算设备继续嵌入到越来越多的物理设备中，它们现在可以获得关于我们生活的最机密信息。在内存中安全地保存秘密的能力是绝大多数安全系统的核心，但面对能够不受限制地物理访问这些设备和底层硬件的攻击者，存储和擦除这些秘密是一个困难的问题。根据内存技术的不同，存储1而不是0的行为可能会产生物理副作用，即使在断电后也是可以测量的。通过开发可显著增加物理分析难度的新型体系结构，该项目使即使在系统的物理控制权被割让给对手的情况下也可以信任的系统。初步结果表明，创建一种用于存储器保护的有效方案是可能的，在该方案下，即使对手能够以仅5%的概率误差来检查存储比特的值，系统也将能够以99.9999999999的概率阻止该对手学习关于原始未编码比特的任何信息。从长远来看，这项研究将有助于创造网络物理系统工程师开发无处不在的可信系统所需的技能和工具，并简化那些我们都依赖于安全和生计的关键任务系统的开发。