TWC: Breakthrough: Inspection Resistance in Cyber-Physical Systems

TWC：突破：网络物理系统中的检查阻力

• 批准号: 1239567
• 负责人: Timothy Sherwood
• 金额: $ 71.74万
• 依托单位: University of California-Santa Barbara
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2012-10-01 至 2017-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1239567&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TWC; Breakthrough; Inspection; Resistance; Cyber

As computing devices continue to be embedded in more and more physical devices, they are now privy to the most confidential information about our lives. The ability to safely keep a secret in memory is central to the vast majority of security systems, but storing and erasing these secrets is a difficult problem in the face of an attacker who can obtain unrestricted physical access to these devices and the underlying hardware. Depending on the memory technology, the very act of storing a 1 instead of a 0 can have physical side effects measurable even after the power has been cut. Through the development of a new class of architectures that measurably increase the difficulty of physical analysis this project is enabling systems that can be trusted even when physical control of the system is ceded to an adversary. Initial results indicate that the creation of an efficient scheme for memory protection is possible under which, even if an adversary is able to inspect the value of a stored bit with a probabilistic error of only 5%, the system will be able to prevent that adversary from learning any information about the original un-coded bits with 99.9999999999% probability. Over the long term this research will help to create the skills and tools that cyber-physical system engineers will need to develop pervasive trustworthy systems, and to ease the development of those mission critical systems that we all depend on for our safety and livelihood.

随着计算设备继续嵌入到越来越多的物理设备中，它们现在掌握了有关我们生活的最机密信息。在内存中安全保存秘密的能力是绝大多数安全系统的核心，但对于能够不受限制地物理访问这些设备和底层硬件的攻击者来说，存储和擦除这些秘密是一个难题。根据存储技术的不同，存储 1 而不是 0 的行为可能会产生可测量的物理副作用，即使在断电后也是如此。通过开发新型架构，显着增加物理分析的难度，该项目使系统即使在系统的物理控制权被交给对手时也可以信任。初步结果表明，创建一种有效的内存保护方案是可能的，在该方案下，即使对手能够以只有 5% 的概率误差检查存储位的值，系统也能够以 99.9999999999% 的概率阻止对手了解有关原始未编码位的任何信息。从长远来看，这项研究将有助于创造网络物理系统工程师开发普遍可信系统所需的技能和工具，并简化我们所有人的安全和生计所依赖的关键任务系统的开发。