Occupational Risk and Rights-Based Fisheries Policy: Studying Changes in the Deadliest Catch

在2005年前，阿拉斯加螃蟹渔业有一个总允许渔获量限制，一旦达到所有捕蟹船的总渔获量限制，渔业就会在这个季节关闭。这一管理策略促使渔船在休渔前“抢蟹”，以最大限度地提高渔获量。这场比赛可能导致船长和船员从事危险行为，比如在恶劣天气下捕鱼。2005年，随着渔业在白令海和阿留申群岛螃蟹合理化计划下变得“合理化”，阿拉斯加的螃蟹渔业经历了彻底的政策转变。该计划通过资源配额权将渔业内允许的总渔获量在收割机、加工者和沿海社区之间进行分配。美国国家海洋渔业局辩称，这一变化将减少阿拉斯加螃蟹渔业的“螃蟹竞赛”，并增加渔民的安全。利用政策变化作为工具，该项目将量化螃蟹渔业职业风险减轻的程度。此外，调查人员还将利用天气、海况和一名船长决定“出海”的数据，来估算捕蟹业船员的“统计寿命价值”。研究结果将提高我们对职业风险的理解，并指导未来与该渔业和其他美国渔业相关的政策决策。统计寿命的估计值将为渔业的后续政策决定或涉及个人死亡或受伤概率与社会福利变化之间权衡的任何政策提供信息。

Prior to 2005, Alaskan Crab fisheries had a total allowable catch limit, and fisheries closed for the season once an aggregate catch limit for all crabbing vessels was reached. This management strategy created incentives for fishing vessels to "race for crabs" to maximize their catch before the fishery closed. This race may have caused captains and crew to engage in risky behavior, such as fishing in bad weather. In 2005 the Alaskan Crab fisheries underwent a radical policy shift as the fishery became "rationalized" under the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Rationalization Program. The program divided the total allowable catch within the fishery among the harvesters, processors, and coastal communities through resource quota rights. The National Marine Fisheries Service argued that this change would reduce the "race for crab" and increase the safety of fishermen in the Alaskan Crab fisheries. Using the policy change as an instrument, this project will quantify the extent to which occupational risk has been mitigated in the crab fisheries. Additionally, the investigators will use data on weather, sea conditions and a captain's decision to "put to sea" to estimate the "value of a statistical life" for crews in the crabbing industry. The results will improve our understanding of occupational risk and guide future policy decisions related to this and other U.S. fisheries. The estimated value of a statistical life will inform subsequent policy decisions in the fishing industry or any policy that involves trade-offs between the probability of individual death or injury and changes in societal welfare.