Doctoral Dissertation Research: Gavels Defying Guns: The Judicial Control of State Power in Post-Authoritarian Polities

[摘要]本文的学术价值在于，它采用多方法、基于数据的方法来研究一个具有重大理论和政策意义的难题：“木槌何时反抗枪支？”法官何时使政府的行为无效？在这样做的过程中，它可以为民主和威权主义理论以及与政策相关的知识做出重大贡献。法官能够或应该能够反抗统治者，这是促进民主和法治努力的基本假设之一。然而，统治者可以拒绝执行司法裁决，削减法院的管辖权，减少分配给法院的预算，并弹劾地方法官，使其屈服于自己的意志。在新的民主国家或重新建立的民主国家，这些威胁尤其引人注目，因为在这些国家，法官不享有体制保障或民众支持，而在较发达的国家，法官受到保护。我们对法官何时以及如何反抗统治者的理解尚不完善。本提案建立了一个理论框架，该框架使用上下文、态度和法律变量来解释法官何时以及为何试图限制政府权力的行使，并将该框架应用于菲律宾和南非的最高法院。对这些法院在威权主义和向民主过渡期间的决策进行统计分析，将辅以实地研究和对菲律宾和南非法官的访谈，以建立一种以文化为基础的精简的司法控制模式。这项研究的更广泛的影响是显而易见的，它可以促进更好地理解法院和法官在民主化和建立法治中的作用，它可以为决策者促进更民主和合法政府的努力做出潜在贡献。完成这一课题的研究，也将为从独裁主义中恢复过来的民主化国家出身并了解其斗争的学者们奠定基础。

Primary Investigators: C. Neal Tate and Rodelio ManacsaTitle: Doctoral Dissertation Research: Gavels Defying Guns: The Judicial Control of State Power in Post-Authoritarian Polities0720099AbstractThe intellectual merit of this proposal emerges from its multimethod, data-based approach to investigating a puzzle of great theoretical and policy significance: When do gavels defy guns? When do judges invalidate actions of government? In doing so, it can make a major contribution to theories of democracy and authoritarianism and to policy-relevant knowledge. That judges are or should be able to defy rulers is one of the foundational assumptions of efforts to promote democracy and the rule of law. Yet rulers can refuse to implement judicial rulings, cut the court's jurisdiction, reduce the budget allotted to the court, and impeach the magistrates to bend the gavel to their will. These threats are particularly compelling in new or re-established democracies where judges do not enjoy the institutional safeguards or the popular support that protect their counterparts in more developed polities. Our understanding of when and how judges do defy rulers is underdeveloped. This proposal develop a theoretical framework that uses contextual, attitudinal, and legal variables to account for when and why judges try to limit the exercise of governmental power, applying the framework to the Supreme Courts of the Philippines and South Africa. Statistical analyses of the decision making of these courts during periods of authoritarianism and transitions to democracy will be supplemented by field research and interviews with Philippine and South African judges to construct a culturally grounded and parsimonious model of judicial control. The broader impact of this study is evident in the contribution it can make to promoting a better intellectual understanding of the role of courts and judges in democratization and establishing the rule of law the potential contribution it can make to efforts by policy makers to promote more democratic and lawful governments. Completing the research proposed will also build the infrastructure of scholars who come from and understand the struggles of democratizing nations recovering from authoritarianism.