Doctoral Dissertation Research: Gavels Defying Guns: The Judicial Control of State Power in Post-Authoritarian Polities

主要研究者：C。Neal Tate and Rodelio Manacsa Title：Doctoral Dissertation Research：Gavels Defying Guns：The Judicial Control of State Power in Post-Authoritarian Polities 0720099摘要这一建议的学术价值来自于其多方法，基于数据的方法来调查一个具有重大理论和政策意义的难题：何时木槌藐视枪支？法官什么时候宣布政府行为无效？在这样做的过程中，它可以对民主和威权主义理论以及与政策相关的知识做出重大贡献。 法官能够或应该能够反抗统治者，这是促进民主和法治努力的基本假设之一。然而，统治者可以拒绝执行司法裁决，削减法院的管辖权，减少分配给法院的预算，并弹劾地方法官，使其弯曲木槌。这些威胁在新的民主国家或重建的民主国家中尤其突出，因为在这些国家，法官不享有较发达国家中保护法官的体制保障或民众支持。我们对法官何时以及如何违抗统治者的理解还不够充分。这一建议制定了一个理论框架，使用上下文，态度和法律的变量来解释法官何时以及为什么试图限制政府权力的行使，并将该框架应用于菲律宾和南非的最高法院。这些法院在独裁时期和过渡到民主的决策的统计分析将辅以实地研究和采访菲律宾和南非的法官，以构建一个基于文化和节俭的司法控制模式。 这项研究的更广泛的影响是显而易见的，它可以促进更好地理解法院和法官在民主化和建立法治方面的作用，它可以促进决策者努力促进更民主和更合法的政府。完成拟议的研究还将为来自并了解从威权主义中恢复的民主化国家的斗争的学者建立基础设施。

Primary Investigators: C. Neal Tate and Rodelio ManacsaTitle: Doctoral Dissertation Research: Gavels Defying Guns: The Judicial Control of State Power in Post-Authoritarian Polities0720099AbstractThe intellectual merit of this proposal emerges from its multimethod, data-based approach to investigating a puzzle of great theoretical and policy significance: When do gavels defy guns? When do judges invalidate actions of government? In doing so, it can make a major contribution to theories of democracy and authoritarianism and to policy-relevant knowledge. That judges are or should be able to defy rulers is one of the foundational assumptions of efforts to promote democracy and the rule of law. Yet rulers can refuse to implement judicial rulings, cut the court's jurisdiction, reduce the budget allotted to the court, and impeach the magistrates to bend the gavel to their will. These threats are particularly compelling in new or re-established democracies where judges do not enjoy the institutional safeguards or the popular support that protect their counterparts in more developed polities. Our understanding of when and how judges do defy rulers is underdeveloped. This proposal develop a theoretical framework that uses contextual, attitudinal, and legal variables to account for when and why judges try to limit the exercise of governmental power, applying the framework to the Supreme Courts of the Philippines and South Africa. Statistical analyses of the decision making of these courts during periods of authoritarianism and transitions to democracy will be supplemented by field research and interviews with Philippine and South African judges to construct a culturally grounded and parsimonious model of judicial control. The broader impact of this study is evident in the contribution it can make to promoting a better intellectual understanding of the role of courts and judges in democratization and establishing the rule of law the potential contribution it can make to efforts by policy makers to promote more democratic and lawful governments. Completing the research proposed will also build the infrastructure of scholars who come from and understand the struggles of democratizing nations recovering from authoritarianism.