Collaborative Research: Cooperation and Competition in Coalitions: Corporate Lobbying as a Two Stage Rent-Seeking Game

合作研究：联盟中的合作与竞争：企业游说作为两阶段寻租游戏

• 批准号: 0752245
• 负责人: Scott Ainsworth
• 金额: $ 15.92万
• 依托单位: University of Georgia
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-02-01 至 2012-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0752245&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Cooperation; Competition; Coalitions

Coalition formation, maintenance, and dissolution are fundamental elements of politics. One the most puzzling questions in the study of lobbying strategies is why firms join coalitions on issues where hundreds of interests lobby. Why would a corporation devoted to maximizing profits spend substantial resources lobbying in very large coalitions where their impact appears to be negligible? Why do these coalitions form? How is their membership determined? What causes their dissolution? Answering these questions will provide substantial insight into public policymaking and the impact of organized interests on that process. Two observations guide our efforts with this research. First, policymaking in the United States occurs in stages. Our second observation is that the interests and coalitions of interests that pursue policy goals in Washington are keenly aware of the multi-stage policy process, and they vary their lobbying strategies to fit the changing institutional characteristics of that policy process. For instance, coalitions of lobbying interests at one stage in the policymaking process may splinter at other stages in the process. The patterns of lobbying contacts at one stage may vary considerably from the lobbying patterns at another stage. In addition, the strategic concerns of coalition members at the early stages of the policymaking process may be affected by what they anticipate to occur at later stages in the process. The most difficult task that interests face is getting the attention of decision-makers. Thousands of legislative proposals are submitted in each session of a Congress. Of those, only about 500 receive serious consideration. Fewer yet are passed along to the president. Large coalitions often dominate this agenda-setting stage of the policy process. During this first stage of the policymaking process, lobbyists must sell an idea, a vision. Each lobbying coalition casts issues in terms that suggest that its position will benefit the public interest?while also attempting to structure the issues to favor its members. This stage of the policy process reflects the pluralist and neopluralist views of politics, which argue that politics typically involve numerous competing interests. During later stages of the policy process, the broad policy goals are fine-tuned with an eye toward policy implementation. Whenever implementation is at issue, lobbyists focus on narrow goals. That is, proposals that begin as broad measures concerned with collective goods often end up as distributive policies that provide narrow, private benefits. The different nature of the good, more private and less collective, leads to changes in the lobbying coalitions. Those coalitions that dominated at an earlier policymaking stage often disperse in later stages. Indeed, allies during the early stages sometimes become competitors during later stages. The lobbying patterns that we observe are partly a function of the policymaking stage we observe.The implications for this research are far reaching. Coalitions are a common human construct. We see coalitions everywhere. Coalitions are regularly formed by special interests pursuing legislative goals; states pursuing changes in federal policy often form coalitions; and nations pursuing international goals often form coalitions. The models of coalition building that we develop are general enough to be applicable to any situation where collective goals are pursued at early stages and private goods are pursued at later stages. The coalition that secured the collective good may disperse as its members compete over the spoils. Of course, our primary focus will be on the coalition building efforts of corporations as they pursue policies in Washington.

联盟的形成、维持和解散是政治的基本要素。在游说策略的研究中，最令人困惑的问题之一是，为什么公司会在数百个利益集团游说的问题上加入联盟。为什么一家致力于利润最大化的公司要花费大量资源在影响力看似微不足道的大联盟中进行游说呢？为什么会形成这些联盟？他们的成员资格是如何确定的？是什么导致了它们的溶解？回答这些问题将对公共政策制定和有组织利益对这一过程的影响提供实质性的见解。有两个观察结果指导我们进行这项研究。首先，美国的政策制定是分阶段进行的。我们的第二个观察是，在华盛顿追求政策目标的利益集团和利益联盟敏锐地意识到多阶段的政策过程，他们改变自己的游说策略，以适应政策过程中不断变化的制度特征。例如，在政策制定过程的某个阶段，游说利益联盟可能在该过程的其他阶段分裂。一个阶段的游说接触模式可能与另一个阶段的游说模式大不相同。此外，联盟成员在决策过程的早期阶段的战略关注可能会受到他们对决策过程后期发生的事情的预期的影响。利益集团面临的最困难的任务是引起决策者的注意。国会每次会期都会提交数以千计的立法提案。其中，只有大约500个得到认真考虑。而转交给总统的则更少。大联盟经常主导政策过程的议程设定阶段。在政策制定过程的第一阶段，游说者必须推销一种想法，一种愿景。每一个游说联盟所提出的问题都表明它的立场将有利于公众利益？同时也试图构建有利于其成员的问题。这一阶段的政策过程反映了多元主义和新多元主义的政治观点，它们认为政治通常涉及许多相互竞争的利益。在政策过程的后期阶段，对广泛的政策目标进行微调，着眼于政策的实施。每当实施问题出现时，游说者就会把注意力集中在狭隘的目标上。也就是说，一开始作为涉及集体利益的广泛措施的提案，往往最终成为提供狭隘的私人利益的分配政策。善的不同性质，更多的是私人的，更少的是集体的，导致了游说联盟的变化。那些在早期决策阶段占主导地位的联盟往往在后期分散。事实上，早期阶段的盟友有时会在后期成为竞争对手。我们观察到的游说模式部分是我们观察到的政策制定阶段的函数。这项研究的意义是深远的。联盟是一种常见的人类构造。我们到处都能看到联盟。联盟通常由追求立法目标的特殊利益集团组成；追求改变联邦政策的各州经常结成联盟；追求国际目标的国家经常结成联盟。我们开发的联盟建立模式是通用的，足以适用于任何情况，即在早期阶段追求集体目标，在后期阶段追求私人利益。确保集体利益的联盟可能会随着其成员争夺战利品而解散。当然，我们的主要重点将放在企业在华盛顿推行政策时建立联盟的努力上。