Collaborative Research: Cooperation and Competition in Coalitions: Corporate Lobbying as a Two Stage Rent-Seeking Game

联盟的形成、维持和解散是政治的基本要素。 在游说策略研究中，最令人困惑的问题之一是，为什么企业会在数百个利益集团游说的问题上加入联盟。为什么一家致力于利润最大化的公司会花费大量资源在影响力似乎微不足道的大型联盟中进行游说？ 为什么会形成这些联盟？如何确定其成员资格？是什么导致了它们的解体？ 探讨这些问题将使人们对公共决策以及有组织的利益集团对这一进程的影响有深入的了解。两个观察指导我们的努力与这项研究。 首先，美国的政策制定是分阶段进行的。 我们的第二个观察结果是，在华盛顿追求政策目标的利益集团和利益联盟敏锐地意识到政策过程的多阶段性，他们改变了自己的游说策略，以适应政策过程不断变化的制度特征。 例如，在决策过程的某一阶段，游说利益集团的联盟可能在决策过程的其他阶段分裂。 一个阶段的游说接触模式可能与另一个阶段的游说模式有很大不同。 此外，联盟成员在决策过程早期阶段的战略关切可能会受到他们预期在决策过程后期阶段发生的情况的影响。 利益集团面临的最困难的任务是引起决策者的注意。 国会每届会议都要提交数以千计的立法提案。 其中，只有约500人得到认真考虑。 而沿着交给总统的就更少了。 大型联盟往往主导着政策进程的这一决策阶段。 在政策制定过程的第一阶段，游说者必须推销一个想法，一个愿景。 每一个游说联盟都提出了一些问题，表明其立场将有利于公众利益？同时也试图构建有利于其成员的问题。 政策过程的这一阶段反映了多元主义和新多元主义的政治观点，认为政治通常涉及众多相互竞争的利益。 在政策进程的后期阶段，对广泛的政策目标进行微调，着眼于政策的执行。 每当执行问题出现时，游说者都会专注于狭隘的目标。 也就是说，开始时作为涉及集体利益的广泛措施的建议，往往最终成为提供狭隘的私人利益的分配政策。 善的不同性质，更多的是私人的，更少的是集体的，导致游说联盟的变化。 那些在决策初期占主导地位的联盟往往在决策后期就解散了。 事实上，早期的盟友有时会在后期成为竞争对手。 我们观察到的游说模式部分是我们观察到的政策制定阶段的函数，对这项研究的影响是深远的。 联盟是人类共同的构造。 到处都是联盟。 联盟通常由追求立法目标的特殊利益集团组成;追求联邦政策变化的州经常组成联盟;追求国际目标的国家经常组成联盟。 我们发展的联盟建设模式是普遍的，足以适用于任何情况下，集体目标的追求在早期阶段和私人物品的追求在后期阶段。 确保集体利益的联盟可能会随着其成员对战利品的争夺而解散。 当然，我们的主要重点将是企业在华盛顿推行政策时建立联盟的努力。

Coalition formation, maintenance, and dissolution are fundamental elements of politics. One the most puzzling questions in the study of lobbying strategies is why firms join coalitions on issues where hundreds of interests lobby. Why would a corporation devoted to maximizing profits spend substantial resources lobbying in very large coalitions where their impact appears to be negligible? Why do these coalitions form? How is their membership determined? What causes their dissolution? Answering these questions will provide substantial insight into public policymaking and the impact of organized interests on that process. Two observations guide our efforts with this research. First, policymaking in the United States occurs in stages. Our second observation is that the interests and coalitions of interests that pursue policy goals in Washington are keenly aware of the multi-stage policy process, and they vary their lobbying strategies to fit the changing institutional characteristics of that policy process. For instance, coalitions of lobbying interests at one stage in the policymaking process may splinter at other stages in the process. The patterns of lobbying contacts at one stage may vary considerably from the lobbying patterns at another stage. In addition, the strategic concerns of coalition members at the early stages of the policymaking process may be affected by what they anticipate to occur at later stages in the process. The most difficult task that interests face is getting the attention of decision-makers. Thousands of legislative proposals are submitted in each session of a Congress. Of those, only about 500 receive serious consideration. Fewer yet are passed along to the president. Large coalitions often dominate this agenda-setting stage of the policy process. During this first stage of the policymaking process, lobbyists must sell an idea, a vision. Each lobbying coalition casts issues in terms that suggest that its position will benefit the public interest?while also attempting to structure the issues to favor its members. This stage of the policy process reflects the pluralist and neopluralist views of politics, which argue that politics typically involve numerous competing interests. During later stages of the policy process, the broad policy goals are fine-tuned with an eye toward policy implementation. Whenever implementation is at issue, lobbyists focus on narrow goals. That is, proposals that begin as broad measures concerned with collective goods often end up as distributive policies that provide narrow, private benefits. The different nature of the good, more private and less collective, leads to changes in the lobbying coalitions. Those coalitions that dominated at an earlier policymaking stage often disperse in later stages. Indeed, allies during the early stages sometimes become competitors during later stages. The lobbying patterns that we observe are partly a function of the policymaking stage we observe.The implications for this research are far reaching. Coalitions are a common human construct. We see coalitions everywhere. Coalitions are regularly formed by special interests pursuing legislative goals; states pursuing changes in federal policy often form coalitions; and nations pursuing international goals often form coalitions. The models of coalition building that we develop are general enough to be applicable to any situation where collective goals are pursued at early stages and private goods are pursued at later stages. The coalition that secured the collective good may disperse as its members compete over the spoils. Of course, our primary focus will be on the coalition building efforts of corporations as they pursue policies in Washington.