Team Decision Making with Social Preferences: Theory and Experiments

具有社会偏好的团队决策：理论与实验

• 批准号: 0752556
• 负责人: Tamar Kugler
• 金额: $ 13.88万
• 依托单位: University of Arizona
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-07-01 至 2012-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0752556&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Team; Decision; Making; Social; Preferences

This award funds research in how teams make decisions that affect non-team members. In particular, the results demonstrate how individual and team decision making differ. In economics decision-makers are usually modeled as individuals, even though many real-life business and private decisions are actually made by small teams that have to come up with a joint decision after some deliberation. Understanding the impact of team decision making is therefore important for applying economic models to real world situations.Such an impact seems especially plausible and relevant in decisions that allow for different forms of social preferences. Over the last decades, multiple experiments have demonstrated that a considerable proportion of individuals do not behave in a purely selfish way even towards complete strangers. However, there is considerable heterogeneity regarding non-selfish preferences such as altruism, inequity aversion and reciprocity in the population, with people exhibiting a range of preferences from purely selfish behavior to entirely altruistic behavior.This project is intended to bridge these two strands of research, namely team decision-making and social preferences. More specifically, the research studies the aggregation of social preferences within teams. The project is the first to systematically analyze the aggregation of social preferences within teams and the consequences of this aggregation on final outcomes of team decision-making in contrast to individual decision-making.The research uses economic laboratory experiments in which individuals and teams are exposed to simplified decision-making settings (games) and are paid according to the outcomes of those simple interactive games. Three decision-making settings, that have been extensively studied with individual decision makers, will be expanded to a team decision-making setting, thus investigating interactions among several teams and mixed interactions between individuals and teams. These games are the dictator game, the ultimatum game and a public goods game. In additions, two different formal mechanisms for making decisions within a team will be examined: a majority voting rule and a unanimity decision rule.In order to model the aggregation of social preferences within teams the project will combine existing models of social preferences with models of bargaining, where teams are bound to decide with unanimity. The aggregation process in this case is viewed as a bargaining process within a team over the amount of revealed social preferences.The proposed setup captures important aspects of many economic decisions, ranging from everyday decisions in families to strategic decisions of company boards, central bank boards, expert committees, governments, juries and many more. The research program potentially increases the external validity of existing theoretical and experimental results that adopt a representative individual assumption when studying small team decisions. It integrates research from social psychology, management and economics. Finally, it is potentially useful in giving guidance for the choice of whether to install an individual decision-maker or a small team for a specific decision-making problem in a company or an organization.

该奖项资助研究团队如何做出影响非团队成员的决策。 特别是，结果表明个人和团队决策有何不同。 在经济学中，决策者通常被建模为个人，尽管许多现实生活中的商业和私人决策实际上是由小团队做出的，这些团队必须经过一番深思熟虑后才能做出联合决策。 因此，了解团队决策的影响对于将经济模型应用于现实世界情况非常重要。这种影响在考虑到不同形式的社会偏好的决策中似乎尤其合理且相关。在过去的几十年里，多项实验表明，相当一部分人即使对待完全陌生的人也不会表现出纯粹自私的行为。然而，人群中的利他主义、厌恶不平等和互惠等非自私偏好存在相当大的异质性，人们表现出从纯粹自私行为到完全利他行为的一系列偏好。该项目旨在弥合这两个研究领域，即团队决策和社会偏好。更具体地说，该研究研究团队内社会偏好的聚合。该项目是第一个系统分析团队内社会偏好聚合以及这种聚合对团队决策最终结果（与个人决策相比）的影响的项目。该研究使用经济实验室实验，让个人和团队接触简化的决策环境（游戏），并根据这些简单的互动游戏的结果获得报酬。已经对个人决策者进行了广泛研究的三种决策设置将扩展到团队决策设置，从而研究多个团队之间的交互以及个人与团队之间的混合交互。这些博弈是独裁者博弈、最后通牒博弈和公共物品博弈。此外，还将研究团队内决策的两种不同的正式机制：多数投票规则和一致决策规则。为了对团队内社会偏好的聚合进行建模，该项目将结合现有的社会偏好模型和讨价还价模型，其中团队必须一致决定。在这种情况下，聚合过程被视为团队内部就所揭示的社会偏好数量进行讨价还价的过程。拟议的设置涵盖了许多经济决策的重要方面，从家庭的日常决策到公司董事会、中央银行董事会、专家委员会、政府、陪审团等的战略决策。该研究计划可能会提高现有理论和实验结果的外部有效性，这些结果在研究小团队决策时采用代表性的个人假设。它整合了社会心理学、管理学和经济学的研究。最后，它对于为公司或组织中的特定决策问题选择是否安装个人决策者或小团队提供指导可能很有用。