Collaborative Research: Auctions and Resale Markets

合作研究：拍卖和转售市场

• 批准号: 0752928
• 负责人: Isa Hafalir
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Carnegie-Mellon University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-03-15 至 2011-02-28
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0752928&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Auctions; Resale; Markets

Auctions have been widely used in recent years as a way to effectively privatize social assets. Some prominent examples of such assets are oil and gas rights, timber rights and rights to use the electromagnetic spectrum. The practical use of auctions has, in turn, led to substantial developments in the theoretical and empirical analysis of auctions. In most real-world auctions bidders anticipate the resale possibilities, either among themselves or to a larger market. The presence of resale markets affects both bidding behavior and the performance of auctions. With a few exceptions, however, the bulk of the theoretical and empirical work on auctions to date has neglected the issue of resale markets. This project explores two major questions. First, given that resale possibilities exist, how do different auction formats perform in terms of revenue and economic efficiency? In particular, is one format preferable to another in the presence of resale? Second, how do resale possibilities affect bidding behavior in auctions and how do these possibilities affect the performance of a given auction format, both in terms of efficiency and in terms of the revenue? For instance, is resale advantageous to a seller, say a government, or should resale be discouraged or even banned?Preliminary research on the first question shows that if a single object is being sold and resale is possible, then first-price sealed-bid auctions are superior in terms of revenue to open ascending auctions. This theoretical finding holds in situations in which bidders are asymmetric, an environment in which, absent resale, no general ranking of the two formats is available. From a methodological perspective, therefore, resale considerations make the analysis of asymmetric auctions---an area where general results are few---more tractable. The main objective of the first part of the project is to explore the extent to which this finding extends to other environments---more bidders, multiple objects and different information structures.The second part of the project asks, in effect, whether resale restrictions---which, for instance, have been imposed by the FCC and other bodies---are beneficial from either a revenue or efficiency perspective. Preliminary research, again for asymmetric first-price auctions, suggests that resale actually increases revenues. Whether or not it increases social surplus, however, seems to depend on the degree of asymmetry. The main objective of this part of the project is to study the generality and robustness of these findings.

近年来，拍卖被广泛用作有效私有化社会资产的一种方式。 这类资产的一些突出例子是石油和天然气权利、木材权利和电磁频谱使用权。 拍卖的实际应用反过来又导致拍卖的理论和实证分析的重大发展。 在大多数现实世界的拍卖中，投标人预期转售的可能性，要么在他们之间，要么到一个更大的市场。转售市场的存在影响投标行为和拍卖的性能。然而，除了少数例外，迄今为止关于拍卖的大部分理论和实证工作都忽略了转售市场的问题。这个项目探讨了两个主要问题。首先，考虑到转售的可能性存在，不同的拍卖形式在收入和经济效率方面表现如何？ 特别是，在存在转售的情况下，一种格式是否优于另一种格式？ 第二，转售的可能性如何影响拍卖中的出价行为，以及这些可能性如何影响给定拍卖形式的性能，无论是在效率方面还是在收入方面？ 例如，转售是否对卖方有利，比如说政府，或者转售是否应该被劝阻甚至禁止？对第一个问题的初步研究表明，如果一个单一的对象被出售和转售是可能的，那么第一价格密封投标拍卖是优越的收入方面开放上升拍卖上级。这一理论的发现，在投标人是不对称的情况下，一个环境中，没有转售，没有一般的排名的两种格式是可用的。因此，从方法论的角度来看，转售的考虑使得对非对称拍卖的分析-一个一般结果很少的领域-更容易处理。该项目第一部分的主要目标是探索这一发现在多大程度上延伸到其他环境----更多的投标人、多个对象和不同的信息结构。该项目的第二部分实际上询问转售限制----例如，FCC和其他机构施加的转售限制----从收入或效率的角度来看是否有益。同样是针对不对称一价拍卖的初步研究表明，转售实际上增加了收入。然而，它是否会增加社会剩余，似乎取决于不对称的程度。 项目这一部分的主要目标是研究这些调查结果的普遍性和可靠性。