School Choice with Control and Bayesian School Choice

控制择校和贝叶斯择校

• 批准号: 1326584
• 负责人: Isa Hafalir
• 金额: $ 18.3万
• 依托单位: Carnegie-Mellon University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2013
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2013-08-15 至 2016-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1326584&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Choice; Control; Bayesian

This award funds research in the economic theory of matching mechanisms. The goal is to develop new methods that can be employed to solve existing problems.The so called "school choice problem" has recently been tackled by a number of economic theorists. The problem is motivated by decisions made by a number of public school districts in the US to adopt new systems for assigning students to schools. Traditionally, a 'boundary system' sets geographic boundaries and all students inside the boundary attend the same school. In a choice system, families have the opportunity to submit a list of preferred school assignments to a central clearinghouse. That clearinghouse then matches students to schools; the set of rules that the clearinghouse uses to go from preference lists to assignments is called a matching mechanism. The PIs are developing new mechanisms that can be used in two different real world situations. First, they develop a mechanism that can be used when assignments must take into account not just family preferences but also district-wide diversity goals. Second, they develop a mechanism for cases where families do not just list their preferred schools from most preferred to least preferred, but are also able to state just how much they want their most preferred school.There are two technical components to the research. The PIs propose a general approach to diversity concerns that admits a number of specific policies as special cases. The PIs construct choice rules that take the diversity objectives into account and study when these choice rules satisfy substitutes, irrelevance of rejected students and the law of aggregate demand; all of which are crucial for the deferred acceptance algorithm to produce a stable matching have desirable properties. The second component incorporates incomplete cardinal information in the school choice problem by considering students with private valuations for schools. Students can have different ordinal rankings of schools while some schools can be more popular than others. In this setting, the research demonstrates that the Boston mechanism does not always result in a higher social welfare than the deferred acceptance algorithm. The project also includes research to uncover the general structure of these mechanisms and to analyze the Bayesian assignment game, another category of school choice problem.

该奖项资助匹配机制的经济理论研究。目标是开发可以用来解决现有问题的新方法。所谓的“择校问题”最近被一些经济理论家解决了。这个问题是由美国一些公立学区决定采用新系统来分配学生到学校引起的。传统上，“边界系统”设定了地理边界，边界内的所有学生都上同一所学校。在选择系统中，家庭有机会向中央信息中心提交一份首选学校作业清单。然后，这个信息中心将学生与学校进行匹配；票据交换所用来从偏好列表到分配的一套规则被称为匹配机制。pi正在开发可用于两种不同现实情况的新机制。首先，他们开发了一种机制，当分配不仅要考虑家庭偏好，还要考虑整个地区的多样性目标时，就可以使用这种机制。其次，他们开发了一种机制，在这种情况下，家庭不仅可以从最受欢迎到最不受欢迎地列出他们喜欢的学校，而且还可以说明他们有多想要他们最喜欢的学校。这项研究有两个技术组成部分。ppi提出了一种解决多样性问题的一般方法，承认一些具体政策是特例。pi构建了考虑多样性目标的选择规则，并研究这些选择规则何时满足替代品、被拒绝学生的不相关性和总需求规律；所有这些都是延迟接受算法产生稳定匹配的关键。第二个组成部分通过考虑学生对学校的私人估值，在学校选择问题中纳入了不完整的基本信息。学生可以对学校有不同的顺序排名，而有些学校可能比其他学校更受欢迎。在这种情况下，研究表明波士顿机制并不总是比延迟接受算法产生更高的社会福利。该项目还包括研究揭示这些机制的一般结构，并分析贝叶斯分配博弈，这是另一类学校选择问题。