School Choice with Control and Bayesian School Choice
School Choice with Control and Bayesian School Choice
批准号:
1326584
负责人:
Isa Hafalir
金额:
$18.3万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2013
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2013-08-15 至 2016-07-31
中文摘要
该奖项资助匹配机制的经济理论研究。 其目标是开发新的方法,可以用来解决现有的问题。所谓的“学校选择问题”最近已经解决了一些经济理论家。 这个问题的起因是美国一些公立学区决定采用新的学生分配制度。 传统上,“边界系统”设定了地理边界,边界内的所有学生都在同一所学校上学。 在选择系统中,家庭有机会向中央信息交换所提交一份首选学校作业清单。 然后,信息交换中心将学生与学校进行匹配;信息交换中心用于从偏好列表到作业的一组规则被称为匹配机制。 PI正在开发可用于两种不同的真实的世界情况的新机制。 首先,他们开发了一种机制,可以在分配任务时使用,不仅要考虑家庭的偏好,还要考虑整个地区的多样性目标。 第二,他们开发了一种机制,这种机制不仅适用于家庭从最喜欢的学校到最不喜欢的学校,而且还适用于家庭对最喜欢的学校的渴望程度。这项研究有两个技术组成部分。 PI提出了一个通用的方法来解决多样性问题,承认一些特殊情况下的具体政策。 PI构建的选择规则,考虑到多样性的目标,并研究这些选择规则满足替代品,不相关的拒绝学生和总需求的法律,所有这些都是至关重要的延迟接受算法产生一个稳定的匹配具有理想的属性。 第二个组成部分采用不完全基数信息的择校问题,考虑学生的私人评价的学校。 学生可以有不同的顺序排名的学校,而一些学校可以比其他更受欢迎。 在这种情况下,研究表明,波士顿机制并不总是比延迟接受算法产生更高的社会福利。 该项目还包括研究,以揭示这些机制的一般结构,并分析贝叶斯分配游戏,另一类学校选择问题。
英文摘要
This award funds research in the economic theory of matching mechanisms. The goal is to develop new methods that can be employed to solve existing problems.The so called "school choice problem" has recently been tackled by a number of economic theorists. The problem is motivated by decisions made by a number of public school districts in the US to adopt new systems for assigning students to schools. Traditionally, a 'boundary system' sets geographic boundaries and all students inside the boundary attend the same school. In a choice system, families have the opportunity to submit a list of preferred school assignments to a central clearinghouse. That clearinghouse then matches students to schools; the set of rules that the clearinghouse uses to go from preference lists to assignments is called a matching mechanism. The PIs are developing new mechanisms that can be used in two different real world situations. First, they develop a mechanism that can be used when assignments must take into account not just family preferences but also district-wide diversity goals. Second, they develop a mechanism for cases where families do not just list their preferred schools from most preferred to least preferred, but are also able to state just how much they want their most preferred school.There are two technical components to the research. The PIs propose a general approach to diversity concerns that admits a number of specific policies as special cases. The PIs construct choice rules that take the diversity objectives into account and study when these choice rules satisfy substitutes, irrelevance of rejected students and the law of aggregate demand; all of which are crucial for the deferred acceptance algorithm to produce a stable matching have desirable properties. The second component incorporates incomplete cardinal information in the school choice problem by considering students with private valuations for schools. Students can have different ordinal rankings of schools while some schools can be more popular than others. In this setting, the research demonstrates that the Boston mechanism does not always result in a higher social welfare than the deferred acceptance algorithm. The project also includes research to uncover the general structure of these mechanisms and to analyze the Bayesian assignment game, another category of school choice problem.
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会议论文
Collaborative Research: Auctions and Resale Markets
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批准号:0752928
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$0.0万
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财政年份:2008
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负责人:Isa Hafalir
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依托单位:
国内基金
海外基金
Cortical control of internal state in the insular cortex-claustrum region
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批准号:--
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项目类别:--
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资助金额:25万元
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批准年份:2020
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负责人:Robert Konrad Naumann
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依托单位: