Corporate Taxation and Corporate Governance

公司税务和公司治理

• 批准号: 190055647
• 负责人: Dr. Michael Stimmelmayr
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Department of Management, Technology, and Economics
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Fellowships
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2009-12-31 至 2010-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/190055647?language=en
• 关键词: Corporate; Taxation; Governance

Public finance economists have intensively discussed the economic effects of taxation but they have almost completely ignored the possibility of agency problems in their analyses. Vice versa, agency problems associated with corporate governance have been predominantly analysed by business and financial economists, who mostly abstract from taxes. Consequently, the link between taxation and corporate governance has been widely neglected until recently even though there seem to be several important and well profound linkages between taxation and corporate governance. The understanding of the interplay between tax incentives and managerial behaviour has also particularly important implications for actual tax policy as managerial resource dissipation harms firm productivity in various ways and therewith economic growth. The aim of the research project is to shed light on different mechanism explaining the impact of corporate and capital income taxes on the severeness of the principal agent problem, i.e. the misalignment of interests, between shareholders (principal) and managers (agents) and to provide a sound theoretical underpinning for the different modes of interaction between taxation and corporate governance problems. Since the interaction between taxation and corporate governance is manifold and appears via various different direct or indirect mechanisms, this topic offers a wide range of interesting and highly relevant research questions. The two specific problems are considered within the research project. 1. The influence of deductibility provisions for the cost of finance on managerial incentives in multinational enterprises. 2. The impact of the double taxation of corporate profits on optimal managerial contracting (unconditional wage payments vs. incentive pay) to curb managerial opportunism.

公共财政经济学家已经深入讨论了税收的经济效应，但他们几乎完全忽略了在他们的分析中代理问题的可能性。反之亦然，与公司治理有关的代理问题主要由商业和金融经济学家分析，他们大多从税收中抽象出来。因此，税收和公司治理之间的联系一直被广泛忽视，直到最近，尽管税收和公司治理之间似乎有几个重要和深刻的联系。理解税收激励和管理行为之间的相互作用对实际税收政策也有特别重要的影响，因为管理资源耗散以各种方式损害企业生产力，从而损害经济增长。本研究项目的目的是阐明解释公司和资本所得税对委托代理问题的影响的不同机制，即股东（委托人）和经理（代理人）之间的利益失调，并为税收和公司治理问题之间的不同互动模式提供坚实的理论基础。由于税收和公司治理之间的相互作用是多方面的，并通过各种不同的直接或间接机制出现，这个主题提供了广泛的有趣和高度相关的研究问题。这两个具体问题在研究项目中得到了考虑。1.融资成本可扣除性条款对跨国企业管理者激励的影响。2.企业利润双重征税对最优管理契约（无条件工资支付与激励性工资）的影响，以抑制管理机会主义。