Package Auctions

套餐拍卖

• 批准号: 0851674
• 负责人: John Kagel
• 金额: $ 12.99万
• 依托单位: Ohio State University Research Foundation -DO NOT USE
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-10-01 至 2013-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0851674&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Package; Auctions

This research project explores the performance of different package auction designs in different environments. Past research shows that package auction mechanisms can be effective in settings where market clearing prices do not exist and standard auctions are expected to perform poorly. This project extends the PI's research with his collaborator Paul Milgrom of Stanford University in several directions by conducting laboratory experiments combined with simulation methods to test the game theoretic models. The team explores whether different bidding languages lead to different and better results. They measure the impact of constraints, like budget constraints, that are faced by institutional bidders.This project has broader impact because the results will help auction designers to identify the pros and cons of different auction formats in different environments. Individuals, firms, or governments who seek to use auctions will have more comprhensive knowledge when choosing the specific methods used to conduct their auctions.

本研究探讨不同包装拍卖设计在不同环境下的表现。过去的研究表明，一揽子拍卖机制在不存在市场清算价格和标准拍卖预计表现不佳的情况下可以有效。这个项目通过实验室实验结合模拟方法来检验博弈论模型，在几个方向上扩展了PI和他的合作者斯坦福大学的保罗·米尔格罗姆的研究。该团队探索了不同的竞标语言是否会带来不同和更好的结果。它们衡量了机构竞拍者面临的约束的影响，如预算限制。该项目具有更广泛的影响，因为结果将帮助拍卖设计者确定不同拍卖形式在不同环境中的利弊。寻求使用拍卖的个人、公司或政府在选择用于进行拍卖的具体方法时将拥有更全面的知识。