Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Selling Shares to Many Budget Constrained Bidders

经济学博士论文研究：向许多预算有限的投标人出售股票

• 批准号: 1919450
• 负责人: John Kagel
• 金额: $ 1.2万
• 依托单位: Ohio State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2019-07-01 至 2023-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1919450&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Economics; Selling

This doctoral dissertation research improvement grant will fund a study of the efficiency and revenue effects of share auctions. Share auctions are also sometimes called voucher auctions. In this kind of auction, every bidder pays what she bids and receives a fraction of the item equal to her bid divided by the sum of all bids. These auctions have been used to privatize publicly owned assets and have also been used for cryptocurrency crowd sales. The project will use lab experiments to compare the results of share auctions to the results of first price auctions. The results will help us understand whether or not share auction methods could be a practical alternative for use in business and by governments who seek to raise revenues.The coPI has developed a theoretical model that predicts that the share auction is dominated by second price auctions, first price auctions, and all pay auctions if bidders are not budget constrained or face only a weak constrain. With a strong budget constraint, the theory predicts that share auctions can achieve higher efficiency and revenue than that second or first price auctions, although all pay auctions still give better results. The lab experiments will test whether these predictions hold. The results will give us new understanding of bidding behavior and economic performance when share auction methods are used. The project also adds to our understanding of auctions with budget constrained bidders.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

这个博士论文研究改进补助金将资助股票拍卖的效率和收入影响的研究。股票拍卖有时也被称为凭单拍卖。在这种拍卖中，每个出价者支付她的出价，并获得等于她的出价除以所有出价之和的一小部分。这些拍卖已被用于私有化公有资产，也被用于加密货币的人群销售。该项目将使用实验室实验来比较股票拍卖的结果与第一价格拍卖的结果。结果将帮助我们了解股票拍卖方法是否可能是一个实际的替代方案，用于在企业和政府谁寻求提高收入。coPI已经开发了一个理论模型，预测股票拍卖是占主导地位的第二价格拍卖，第一价格拍卖，和所有支付拍卖，如果投标人没有预算约束或面临只有一个弱约束。在强预算约束条件下，该理论预测份额拍卖比第二价格拍卖或第一价格拍卖能获得更高的效率和收益，尽管所有的支付拍卖仍能获得更好的结果。实验室实验将测试这些预测是否成立。本文的研究结果将使我们对股票拍卖方式下的竞价行为和经济绩效有新的认识。该项目还增加了我们对预算有限的投标人拍卖的理解。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。