NSCC/SA: Fighting and Bargaining over Political Power in Weak States

NSCC/SA：弱国政治权力的斗争和讨价还价

• 批准号: 0904333
• 负责人: Robert Powell
• 金额: $ 22.9万
• 依托单位: University of California-Berkeley
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-15 至 2012-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0904333&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: NSCC; SA; Fighting; Bargaining; over

In weak states, the central government, if there is one, lacks an effective monopoly over the use of force. Opposing factions bargain over political power and economic resources in the shadow of the threat of force. Any faction dissatisfied with a negotiated outcome can resort to force to try to impose a more favorable outcome. Some agreements negotiated in the shadow of power - be they truces, treaties, power-sharing agreements, or constitutions - hold while others do not. This project examines why some agreements hold and others do not and explores the the implications of this analysis for state formation and consolidation. This project shows that persistent fighting may result from the interaction of two features of the consolidation process. First, consolidation typically creates a commitment problem as the faction in control of the government cannot commit itself to not exploiting the stronger bargaining position it will have once the state consolidates. Second, fighting often impedes or forestalls the consolidation process and associated shifts in the distribution of power. The research links the observed pattern of fighting to the way the distribution of power shifts during the consolidation process. Factions cut deals and avoid fighting when the underlying distribution of power is stable or shifting slowly. Rapid shifts lead to fighting.This award was funded through the Social and Behavioral Dimensions of National Security, Conflict, and Cooperation competition, a joint venture between NSF and the Department of Defense.

在弱国，中央政府（如果有的话）缺乏对武力使用的有效垄断。对立派别在武力威胁的阴影下就政治权力和经济资源讨价还价。任何对谈判结果不满的派别都可以诉诸武力，试图强加一个更有利的结果。在权力的阴影下谈判达成的一些协议--无论是停战、条约、权力分享协议还是宪法--仍然有效，而另一些则无效。这个项目研究为什么有些协议成立，而另一些则不成立，并探讨这种分析对国家形成和巩固的影响。这一项目表明，巩固进程的两个特点相互作用，可能导致持续的战斗。首先，合并通常会产生一个承诺问题，因为控制政府的派系不能承诺不利用一旦国家合并后它将拥有的更强大的谈判地位。第二，战斗往往阻碍或预先阻止巩固进程和相关的权力分配变化。这项研究将观察到的战斗模式与巩固过程中权力分配的变化方式联系起来。当潜在的权力分配稳定或缓慢变化时，派系会达成协议，避免争斗。该奖项由NSF和国防部联合举办的“国家安全、冲突与合作的社会和行为层面”竞赛资助。