Nuclear Deterrence Theory and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation as a Game of Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information

这个项目的目的是分析战略方面的问题， 核威慑和有限报复的博弈论 框架. 将特别强调审查下列因素的影响： 不完整的信息。 现有的大多数关于威慑理论的正式著作 专注于某种形式的核边缘政策 在核 边缘政策危机，一个国家试图保护其利益， 操纵危机以无限的、 全面的，核交换。 危机是一场冒险的竞赛 每个国家都试图说服对手， 太高了，它应该回落。 然而，还有另一个 不以边缘政策为基础的威慑方法， 操纵无限核攻击的风险 在这 一个国家试图通过施加一个 有限的惩罚，以使威胁造成 在未来更可信的损害。 在危机期间，一个国家 试图使未来惩罚的威胁足够可信 它的对手会让步 第二种方法，基于有限的 报复，在正式文献中很少受到关注。 这个项目的主要目标是扩展形式化分析， 威慑理论对有限报复战略的研究。 这项研究很重要，因为它将对这个问题有所启发 有限的核选择与 危机就会升级为战争 是否增加 有限的选择使核战争更加“危险”，从而减少 通过增加战争的可能性来稳定危机？ 或者说， 多种选择增强了国家报复措施的可信度 威胁，加强威慑，从而增加危机 稳定性？

The purpose of this project is to analyze the strategic aspects of nuclear deterrence and limited retaliation within a game-theoretic framework. Special emphasis will be given to examining the effects of incomplete information. Most existing formal work on deterrence theory focuses on some form of nuclear brinkmanship. In a nuclear brinkmanship crisis, a state attempts to protect its interests by manipulating the risk that the crisis will end in an unlimited, all-out, nuclear exchange. The crisis is a competition in taking risks in which each state tries to convince its adversary that the risk is too high and that it should back down. There is, however, another approach to deterrence that is not based on brinkmanship and manipulating the risk of an unlimited nuclear attack. In this approach, a state attempts to protect its interests by inflicting a limited amount of punishment in order to make the threat to inflict more damage in the future credible. During a crisis, then, a state tries to make the threat of future punishment sufficiently credible that its adversary backs down. This second approach, based on limited retaliation, has received little attention in the formal literature. The primary goal of this project is to extend the formal analysis of deterrence theory to the study of the strategy of limited retaliation. This research is important because it will shed some light on the issue of the relation between limited nuclear options and the likelihood that a crisis will escalate into a war. Does increasing the number of limited options make a nuclear war more "thinkable" and, thus, reduce crisis stability by making war more likely? Or, does increasing the number of options enhance the credibility of a state's retaliatory threats, strengthen deterrence and, therefore, increase crisis stability?