States and Strategies in Anarchy

无政府状态下的国家和策略

• 批准号: 9709316
• 负责人: Robert Powell
• 金额: $ 5.51万
• 依托单位: University of California-Berkeley
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1997
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1997-07-15 至 1998-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9709316&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: States; Strategies; Anarchy

This research develops formal, game theoretic models pertaining to international systems. The research focuses on the problem of how states decide to join or avoid alliances. The models suggest four types of findings. First, international systems show tremendous stability in a bipolar context when the distribution of power reflects the distribution of territory held by the alliances. Second, when other alliances are introduced then the concept of a `balance of power` becomes exceedingly complex and new forms of modeling the process are needed. Third, the behavior of a nation is very sensitive to the distribution of power where there are three or more alliances in the international system. Finally, because of the complex dynamic between states, the natural propensity of states is to jump on the bandwagon or hide out when there is an international crisis. This latter finding is especially affected the amount of information nations have about the actions of others. All these findings point to the need for a broader understanding of the complex relations among states where there is no bipolar balance of power.

这项研究开发了正式的，博弈论模型有关的国际体系。 研究的重点是国家如何决定加入或避免联盟的问题。 这些模型提出了四种类型的发现。 第一，在两极背景下，当权力的分配反映了联盟所拥有的领土的分配时，国际体系显示出巨大的稳定性。 第二，当其他联盟被引入时，“力量平衡”的概念变得极其复杂，需要新的形式来模拟这一过程。 第三，在国际体系中有三个或更多联盟的国家，其行为对权力分配非常敏感。 最后，由于国家之间复杂的动态关系，当发生国际危机时，国家的自然倾向是随大流或躲藏起来。 后一项发现尤其受到国家对其他国家行动的信息量的影响。 所有这些研究结果都表明，需要更广泛地理解不存在两极力量平衡的国家之间的复杂关系。