States and Strategies in Anarchy

这项研究开发了与国际体系有关的正式博弈论模型。 该研究的重点是国家如何决定加入或避免联盟的问题。 这些模型提出了四种类型的发现。 首先，当权力分配反映了联盟所持领土的分配时，国际体系在两极背景下表现出巨大的稳定性。 其次，当引入其他联盟时，“权力平衡”的概念就变得极其复杂，需要新的过程建模形式。 第三，当国际体系中存在三个或三个以上联盟时，一个国家的行为对权力分配非常敏感。 最后，由于国家之间的复杂动态，当出现国际危机时，国家自然倾向于跟风或躲起来。 后一个发现尤其受到各国对其他国家行为的信息量的影响。 所有这些发现都表明，需要更广泛地了解不存在两极均势的国家之间的复杂关系。

This research develops formal, game theoretic models pertaining to international systems. The research focuses on the problem of how states decide to join or avoid alliances. The models suggest four types of findings. First, international systems show tremendous stability in a bipolar context when the distribution of power reflects the distribution of territory held by the alliances. Second, when other alliances are introduced then the concept of a `balance of power` becomes exceedingly complex and new forms of modeling the process are needed. Third, the behavior of a nation is very sensitive to the distribution of power where there are three or more alliances in the international system. Finally, because of the complex dynamic between states, the natural propensity of states is to jump on the bandwagon or hide out when there is an international crisis. This latter finding is especially affected the amount of information nations have about the actions of others. All these findings point to the need for a broader understanding of the complex relations among states where there is no bipolar balance of power.