States and Strategies in Anarchy

本研究发展了与国际系统相关的正式的博弈论模型。研究的重点是国家如何决定加入或避免联盟的问题。这些模型提出了四种类型的发现。首先，在权力分配反映联盟所拥有的领土分配的两极背景下，国际体系表现出极大的稳定性。其次，当引入其他联盟时，“力量平衡”的概念就会变得极其复杂，需要新的建模方式。第三，当国际体系中存在三个或更多联盟时，一个国家的行为对权力分配非常敏感。最后，由于国家之间复杂的动态关系，当出现国际危机时，国家的自然倾向是随波逐流或躲起来。后一项发现尤其会影响一个国家对其他国家行为的信息量。所有这些发现都表明，需要更广泛地理解不存在两极力量平衡的国家之间的复杂关系。

This research develops formal, game theoretic models pertaining to international systems. The research focuses on the problem of how states decide to join or avoid alliances. The models suggest four types of findings. First, international systems show tremendous stability in a bipolar context when the distribution of power reflects the distribution of territory held by the alliances. Second, when other alliances are introduced then the concept of a `balance of power` becomes exceedingly complex and new forms of modeling the process are needed. Third, the behavior of a nation is very sensitive to the distribution of power where there are three or more alliances in the international system. Finally, because of the complex dynamic between states, the natural propensity of states is to jump on the bandwagon or hide out when there is an international crisis. This latter finding is especially affected the amount of information nations have about the actions of others. All these findings point to the need for a broader understanding of the complex relations among states where there is no bipolar balance of power.