Bargaining and Power in Ongoing Relationships

在国际关系领域内，安全研究和国际政治经济学这两个子领域在很大程度上仍然相互孤立。 该项目开发了一种更连贯和更普遍的方式来看待无政府状态下的政治谈判-无论是通常与安全研究或国际政治经济（或国内政治）相关的问题。 为了实现这一目标，研究人员制作了一系列论文，研究放松关键假设的影响，这些假设目前定义了安全研究建模的最新技术水平。国际关系理论中最近正式工作的局限性在于，它通常将权力的行使建模为一劳永逸的决定。 从形式上讲，这些分析中使用的博弈通常在任何参与者试图通过战争或更广泛地说，通过强加和解来行使权力时结束。一个相关但迄今未被强调的局限性是，经济学和国际关系理论中的许多讨价还价博弈也在其中一个参与者接受提议时结束。 因此，即使讨价还价者愿意，也不能违背一项提议或协议，因为博弈树不允许这样做。从某种意义上说，这些博弈违反了无政府状态的假设，因为它们隐含地允许讨价还价者承诺履行其提议。本研究从两个方面研究了放松这些限制的影响。 首先，讨价还价者能够违背他们的提议。 碰巧的是，这一从国际关系理论中产生的新假设为现代讨价还价理论中的一个核心难题提供了一个自然的答案。 在20世纪80年代后期，谈判理论家们认为，不完全信息的存在可以解释为什么谈判会有延迟，即，为什么讨价还价者往往需要很长时间才能达成协议。 但是，这些期望在标准模型中被证明是不正确的。 即使信息不全，也没有耽搁。 令人惊讶的是，延迟似乎是不完整信息的直接后果，一旦玩家也可以反悔。第二，这个项目放松了使用权力是游戏结束策略的假设。 这个问题的一个方面将权力的行使建模为一系列更明确的相互作用的决定。 这里的重点是这一过程的预期结果如何塑造在权力行使开始之前发生的讨价还价。第二个方面关注的事实是，权力的行使很少会消除行动者。 战略互动往往在权力的明确行使结束后继续进行。 而且，一旦以这种方式看待权力的使用，一个共同的战略问题就出现在安全事务、国际政治经济和国内政治的许多问题之下。 本研究对这一问题进行了描述，并分析了讨价还价与权力之间的关系。

Within the field of international relations, the subfields of security studies and international political economy remain largely isolated from each other. This project develops a more coherent and general way of looking at political bargaining in anarchy - be it over issues typically associated with security studies or international political economy (or domestic politics). To achieve this end, the investigator produces a series of papers that study the effects of relaxing key assumptions that currently define the state-of-the-art in the modeling of security studies.The limitations of the much recent formal work in international relations theory is that it generally models the exercise of power as a once-and-for-all decision. Formally, the games used in these analyses usually end as soon as any player attempts to exercise power by going to war or, more broadly, by imposing a settlement.A related, but heretofore unemphasized limitation is that many bargaining games in both economics and international relation's theory also end as soon as one of the players accepts an offer. Thus no bargainer can renege on an offer or an agreement even if it would like to, because the game tree does not allow for it. In a sense then, these games violate the assumption of anarchy in that they implicitly allow a bargainer to commit itself to honoring its offers.This research studies the effects of relaxing these limitations in two ways. First, the bargainers are able to renege on their offers. As it happens, this new assumption, which grows out of international relations theory, provides a natural answer to a central puzzle in modern bargaining theory. In the late 1980s, bargaining theorists expected that the presence of incomplete information would explain why there is delay in bargaining, i.e., why bargainers often take a long time to reach an agreement. But, these expectations proved incorrect in the standard models. Even with incomplete information, there was no delay. Surprisingly, delay does seem to be a direct consequence of incomplete information once the players can also renege.Second, this project relaxes the assumption that the use of power is a game-ending strategy. One facet of this problem models the exercise of power as a more explicit series of interacting decisions. The focus here is on how the expected outcomes of this process shapes the bargaining that occurs before the exercise of power begins.A second facet focuses on the fact that the exercise of power rarely eliminates actors. Strategic interaction often continues after the explicit exercise of power has ended. And, once the use of power is viewed in this way, a common strategic problem appears t underlie many problems in security affairs, international political economy, and domestic politics. This research characterizes this problem and analyzes the relation between bargaining and power in it.