Bargaining in the Shadow of Power

权力阴影下的讨价还价

• 批准号: 9422278
• 负责人: Robert Powell
• 金额: $ 3.92万
• 依托单位: University of California-Berkeley
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1995
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1995-07-01 至 1997-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9422278&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Bargaining; Shadow; Power

9422278 Powell Bargaining is ubiquitous. But the settings in which it takes place vary immensely, and these different settings shape the questions researchers ask about bargaining. Economists, for example, have generally focused on situations of voluntary exchange. A seller, for instance, cannot compel a buyer to pay more than the buyer believes the object for sale is worth; the seller and buyer must agree on a price. This focus on voluntary exchange leads naturally to a set of questions and concerns that have received an enormous amount of attention since Rubinstein's (1982) seminal paper renewed interest in noncooperative bargaining theory: Does bargaining lead to Pareto eflicient outcomes? Under what circumstances does Coase's theorem hold? What accounts for delay in reaching agreement? This project will use game-theoretic models of bargaining to examine the effects of the shadow of power on bargaining. Preliminary work has developed one model and employed it to study the relation between stability and the distribution of power in the context of international relations theory. The distribution of power is fixed in the that model. With support from the NSF, the model will be extended by letting the distribution of power vary over time. The work will investigate, first, how a time-varying distribution of power influences the timing and terms of agreements and, second, the factors affecting the "stickiness" of institutions and agreements. This study should advance and deepen our understanding of important questions in not only international relations but in political science more generally. ***

小行星9422278 讨价还价无处不在。但是，谈判发生的环境差异很大，这些不同的环境塑造了研究人员提出的关于谈判的问题。例如，经济学家通常关注自愿交换的情况。例如，卖方不能强迫买方支付高于买方认为的销售物品的价值;卖方和买方必须商定价格。这种对自愿交换的关注自然导致了一系列问题和关注，这些问题和关注自Rubinstein（1982）的开创性论文重新引起了对非合作谈判理论的兴趣以来受到了极大的关注：谈判是否导致帕累托有效结果？科斯定理在什么情况下成立？ 是什么原因导致迟迟未能达成协议？ 本计画将利用博弈论的议价模式，探讨权力阴影对议价的影响。 初步工作已发展出一种模式，并将其用于研究国际关系理论中稳定与权力分配之间的关系。在该模型中，功率分配是固定的。在NSF的支持下，该模型将通过让电力分布随时间变化而扩展。这项工作将调查，第一，如何随时间变化的权力分配影响的时间和协议的条款，第二，影响机构和协议的“粘性”的因素。这项研究不仅应促进和加深我们对国际关系中的重要问题的理解，而且应更广泛地促进和加深我们对政治学中的重要问题的理解。 ***