Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the 'Trading with the Enemy Act'

强制许可 - 来自“与敌人贸易法”的证据

• 批准号: 0921849
• 负责人: Petra Moser
• 金额: $ 30.42万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-01 至 2013-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0921849&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Compulsory; Licensing; Evidence; Trading; Enemy

Compulsory licensing has been advanced as a policy tool to deliver life-saving drugs to millions of patients in developing countries and in the United States. Under this policy, which is permissible under the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, governments grant domestic firms the right to produce inventions that are patented by foreign nationals, without the consent of patent owners. Compulsory licensing offers obvious short-term benefits as it grants quick access to medicines and other essential innovations. The policy?s long run effects, however, are unclear. On the one hand, compulsory licensing may reduce incentives to invest in R&D as it weakens the property rights of original inventors. On the other hand, compulsory licensing may promote invention as it enables a new set of firms to gain experience with production, which in turn creates opportunities for learning by doing and strengthens incentives to invest in scientific training and other skills that are necessary for invention. This project uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I to measure the long-run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention in the licensing country. Specifically, we compare changes in patents by domestic inventors across U.S. chemical inventions that were differentially affected by compulsory licensing under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) of World War I. Preliminary tests on a subset of chemical patents suggest that compulsory licensing has a large positive effect on domestic invention. Preliminary tests also suggest that the full effects of compulsory licensing set in only after about 10 years, even though some effects appear after about 5 years. Thus, due to their long-run nature, the full effects of compulsory licensing may be missed in analysis of contemporary data.

强制许可已被作为一种政策工具推进，以向发展中国家和美国的数百万患者提供救命药物。根据《与贸易有关的知识产权协议》(TRIPS)允许的这一政策，各国政府授予国内公司在没有专利权人同意的情况下生产由外国公民获得专利的发明的权利。强制许可提供了明显的短期好处，因为它允许快速获得药品和其他基本创新。政策？S，然而，长期效果尚不清楚。一方面，强制许可可能会削弱原始发明者的财产权，从而降低对研发的投资动机。另一方面，强制许可可以促进发明，因为它使一批新的公司能够获得生产经验，这反过来又创造了从实践中学习的机会，并加强了对科学培训和发明所需其他技能的投资的激励。该项目使用第一次世界大战后强制许可的外生事件来衡量强制许可对许可国国内发明的长期影响。具体地说，我们比较了受第一次世界大战《与敌贸易法》(TWEA)强制许可影响不同的美国化学发明中国内发明家专利的变化。对化学专利子集的初步测试表明，强制许可对国内发明有很大的积极影响。初步测试还表明，强制许可的全部效果只在大约10年后才会显现，尽管一些效果在大约5年后出现。因此，由于其长期性，在分析当代数据时，可能会遗漏强制许可的全部影响。