Experimental Investigations of Infinitely Repeated Games

无限重复博弈的实验研究

• 批准号: 0924780
• 负责人: Guillaume Frechette
• 金额: $ 33.62万
• 依托单位: New York University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-15 至 2013-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0924780&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Experimental; Investigations; Infinitely; Repeated; Games

A large variety of social settings involve people repeatedly interacting with each other in the same strategic situation.. For example, firms play repeated games when competing, nations repeatedly interact on the international stage, and workers and employees repeatedly interact in the workplace. These repeated games have been analyzed by game theorists, who have developed a broad range of predictions. This project uses laboratory experiments to answer a series of questions about how well those theories predict actual behavior in controlled strategic settings.The first set of experiments examine how to infer strategies by observing decisions made by a specific participant. The second set investigates the role of renegotiation proofness in equilibrium selection. The third group of experiments test the ability of subjects to support cooperative outcomes when they interact in multiple domains at the same time. The last project tests a widely made assertion that participants play the same way in infinitely repeated games with discounting and in randomly terminated games.The project is intrinsically interdisciplinary, because the game theory methods and ideas being tested with the experiments are widely used in economics, political science, management, psychology, and sociology. The PI will be integrating this research effort into both graduate and undergraduate classes.

在各种各样的社交环境中，人们会在相同的战略情境中反复互动。例如，公司在竞争时重复游戏，国家在国际舞台上反复互动，工人和雇员在工作场所反复互动。博弈论家对这些重复的博弈进行了分析，并提出了广泛的预测。这个项目使用实验室实验来回答一系列关于这些理论在受控战略环境下预测实际行为的问题。第一组实验研究如何通过观察特定参与者的决策来推断策略。第二组研究了重新协商证明在均衡选择中的作用。第三组实验测试受试者在多个领域同时互动时支持合作结果的能力。最后一个项目测试了一个广为流传的断言，即参与者在无限重复的折扣游戏和随机结束的游戏中以相同的方式进行游戏。该项目本质上是跨学科的，因为通过实验测试的博弈论方法和思想被广泛应用于经济学、政治学、管理学、心理学和社会学。PI将把这项研究成果整合到研究生和本科生课程中。