Experimental Investigations of Infinitely Repeated Games

无限重复博弈的实验研究

• 批准号: 0924780
• 负责人: Guillaume Frechette
• 金额: $ 33.62万
• 依托单位: New York University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-15 至 2013-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0924780&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Experimental; Investigations; Infinitely; Repeated; Games

A large variety of social settings involve people repeatedly interacting with each other in the same strategic situation.. For example, firms play repeated games when competing, nations repeatedly interact on the international stage, and workers and employees repeatedly interact in the workplace. These repeated games have been analyzed by game theorists, who have developed a broad range of predictions. This project uses laboratory experiments to answer a series of questions about how well those theories predict actual behavior in controlled strategic settings.The first set of experiments examine how to infer strategies by observing decisions made by a specific participant. The second set investigates the role of renegotiation proofness in equilibrium selection. The third group of experiments test the ability of subjects to support cooperative outcomes when they interact in multiple domains at the same time. The last project tests a widely made assertion that participants play the same way in infinitely repeated games with discounting and in randomly terminated games.The project is intrinsically interdisciplinary, because the game theory methods and ideas being tested with the experiments are widely used in economics, political science, management, psychology, and sociology. The PI will be integrating this research effort into both graduate and undergraduate classes.

在各种各样的社会环境中，人们在同一个战略情境中反复互动。例如，企业在竞争中反复博弈，国家在国际舞台上反复互动，工人和雇员在工作场所反复互动。 这些重复的博弈已经被博弈论家分析过了，他们已经做出了广泛的预测。 这个项目使用实验室实验来回答一系列关于这些理论在受控策略设置中预测实际行为的问题。第一组实验研究如何通过观察特定参与者所做的决定来推断策略。 第二组调查的作用，重新谈判的证据在均衡选择。 第三组实验测试的能力，以支持合作的结果时，他们在多个领域的互动在同一时间。 最后一个项目测试了一个被广泛提出的断言，即参与者在无限重复的折扣博弈和随机终止博弈中的行为方式是相同的。该项目本质上是跨学科的，因为通过实验测试的博弈论方法和思想广泛应用于经济学，政治学，管理学，心理学和社会学。 PI将把这项研究工作融入研究生和本科生课程。