The Economics of Matching, Dynamic Games, and Crime

这个项目包含四个研究领域的子项目：匹配、博弈论、信息和犯罪。第一个？铁尖的铁：重新思考动态匹配理论？挑战了传统的就业经济学理论，即工资上涨时工人会搬家。事实上，我们知道，随着职业生涯的发展，许多人从事薪酬较低但地位较高的工作。这个项目提供了一个易于处理的、参数化的框架，丰富了这一见解的含义，假设个人会因其环境而改变。它应该提供有关就业决策、工作流动率和工资波动的见解。它将解释在一系列经济和社会环境中积极分类的失败和确认。这也应该解释为什么社交匹配往往会产生同质的邻里关系：喜欢应该与喜欢相匹配，一个人的类型被拉到最薄弱的一环。从更实用的角度来看，这应该会为反种族隔离政策和在职培训计划的智慧提供信息。第二个子项目提供了对动态经济学中一个关键的公开理论问题的无关攻击，当个人反复与他人互动时，他们的行为被隐藏起来。这个问题？被称为不完美的私人监控？目前处于经济学博弈论方法的前沿。经济学家早就意识到，隐藏的行为可以奇怪地促进合作，因为个人可以将他们的行为联系起来，从而实现独立发挥不可能的结果。由于这种相关性，第一个项目构建并分析了一组可能的收益的易于处理的上界。第二种介绍了当玩家遭受一种简单形式的来源健忘症时，一类重复的相互作用。忘记了他们是如何获得信息的。虽然这个项目在本质上更具基础性，但它应该阐明健忘的行为含义。最后一个子项目？犯罪和警戒的经济学理论？对犯罪的经济理论进行了战略性的重新表述，并从对警觉和犯罪行为的均衡相互作用的理解中得出了丰富的新含义。具体地说，它通过明确考虑各种犯罪分子选择窃取什么的动机以及潜在受害者选择如何谨慎地保护自己的财产，得出了对不同盗窃级别的犯罪性质的准确预测。这应该有助于我们理解犯罪的根本决定因素中的确切因果关系。

This project contains sub-projects spanning four research areas: matching, game theory, information, and crime. The first ?Iron Sharpens Iron: Rethinking Dynamic Matching Theory? challenges the traditional economic theory of employment, that workers move when the wage rises. In fact, we know that many take lower paying but higher status jobs as ?career moves?. This project offers a tractable and parameterized framework fleshing out the implications of this insight, assuming that individuals are changed by their environments. It should offer insights about employment decisions, job turnover, and wage volatility. It will explain failures and confirmations of positive sorting across an array of economic and social settings. It should also explain why social matching often yields homogeneous neighborhoods: Likes should match with likes one is pulled types down to the ?weakest link?. From a more applied perspective, this should inform the wisdom of anti-segregation policies and on-the-job training programs alike.The second two sub-projects offer unrelated attacks on a key open theoretical problem in dynamic economics known when individuals repeatedly interact with others and their actions are hidden from view. This problem ? known as imperfect private monitoring ? is currently at the frontier of the game theoretic approach to economics. Economists have long realized that hidden actions can strangely facilitate cooperation, because individuals can correlate their behavior, thereby achieving outcomes not possible with independent play. The first project constructs and analyzes a tractable upper bound for the set of possible payoffs owing to such correlation. The second introduces a class of repeated interactions when players suffer from a simple form of ?source amnesia? ? forgetting how they arrived at their information. While more foundational in nature, this project should shed light on the behavioral implications of forgetfulness.The final sub-project ?An Economic Theory of Crime and Vigilance? offers a strategic reformulation of the economic theory of crime, and derives a wealth of new implications that come from an understanding of the equilibrium interplay of vigilance and criminal behavior. Specifically, it derives sharp predictions about the nature of crime across theft levels by explicitly accounting for the motivation of various calibers of criminals in choosing what to steal and potential victims in choosing how carefully to protect their property. This should help us understand the precise cause-effect relation in the underlying determinants of crime.