The Economics of Matching, Dynamic Games, and Crime

这个项目包含四个研究领域的子项目：匹配、博弈论、信息和犯罪。第一个？铁磨铁：重新思考动态匹配理论？挑战了传统的经济就业理论，即工人在工资上涨时流动。事实上，我们知道，许多人把低工资、高地位的工作视为一种幸福。职业行动?。这个项目提供了一个可处理的和参数化的框架，充实了这种见解的含义，假设个人是由他们的环境改变的。它应该提供有关就业决策、工作变动和工资波动的见解。它将解释在一系列经济和社会环境中积极排序的失败和确认。这也可以解释为什么社会匹配通常会产生同质的社区：喜欢应该与喜欢相匹配。薄弱的环节。从更实用的角度来看，这应该为反种族隔离政策和在职培训计划提供智慧。第二个子项目对动态经济学中一个关键的开放式理论问题提出了不相关的攻击，即当个人反复与他人互动并且他们的行为被隐藏在视线之外时。这个问题？被称为不完善的私人监控？目前处于博弈论经济学方法的前沿。经济学家们早就意识到，隐藏的行为可以奇怪地促进合作，因为个人可以将他们的行为联系起来，从而实现独立发挥所不可能实现的结果。第一个项目构建并分析了由于这种相关性而产生的可能收益集的可处理上界。第二种是当玩家遭受简单形式的“？”时，引入一类重复互动。源头性失忆吗?？ 忘记了他们是如何得到信息的。虽然这个项目本质上是基础性的，但它应该能揭示健忘的行为含义。最后的子项目？犯罪与警惕性的经济学理论？对犯罪的经济理论进行了战略性的重新表述，并从对警惕性和犯罪行为的平衡相互作用的理解中获得了丰富的新含义。具体地说，它通过明确地说明不同口径的罪犯选择偷窃的动机和潜在受害者选择如何谨慎地保护他们的财产的动机，得出了对不同盗窃水平的犯罪性质的敏锐预测。这将有助于我们理解犯罪的基本决定因素之间的确切因果关系。

This project contains sub-projects spanning four research areas: matching, game theory, information, and crime. The first ?Iron Sharpens Iron: Rethinking Dynamic Matching Theory? challenges the traditional economic theory of employment, that workers move when the wage rises. In fact, we know that many take lower paying but higher status jobs as ?career moves?. This project offers a tractable and parameterized framework fleshing out the implications of this insight, assuming that individuals are changed by their environments. It should offer insights about employment decisions, job turnover, and wage volatility. It will explain failures and confirmations of positive sorting across an array of economic and social settings. It should also explain why social matching often yields homogeneous neighborhoods: Likes should match with likes one is pulled types down to the ?weakest link?. From a more applied perspective, this should inform the wisdom of anti-segregation policies and on-the-job training programs alike.The second two sub-projects offer unrelated attacks on a key open theoretical problem in dynamic economics known when individuals repeatedly interact with others and their actions are hidden from view. This problem ? known as imperfect private monitoring ? is currently at the frontier of the game theoretic approach to economics. Economists have long realized that hidden actions can strangely facilitate cooperation, because individuals can correlate their behavior, thereby achieving outcomes not possible with independent play. The first project constructs and analyzes a tractable upper bound for the set of possible payoffs owing to such correlation. The second introduces a class of repeated interactions when players suffer from a simple form of ?source amnesia? ? forgetting how they arrived at their information. While more foundational in nature, this project should shed light on the behavioral implications of forgetfulness.The final sub-project ?An Economic Theory of Crime and Vigilance? offers a strategic reformulation of the economic theory of crime, and derives a wealth of new implications that come from an understanding of the equilibrium interplay of vigilance and criminal behavior. Specifically, it derives sharp predictions about the nature of crime across theft levels by explicitly accounting for the motivation of various calibers of criminals in choosing what to steal and potential victims in choosing how carefully to protect their property. This should help us understand the precise cause-effect relation in the underlying determinants of crime.