Dynamic Game Theory and Learning

小行星9711885 本研究对动态博弈论和学习理论做出了方法论和实质性的贡献。 它试图在一个完美的信息框架内，达到解释讨价还价的观察特征的未达到的目标--出价是让步，出价的时间是不受限制的，这个过程本身是一场消耗战。 它实现了“递归”序列均衡支付集的表征，后来又实现了具有隐藏行动和没有汇总公共统计的游戏的民间定理。 它尽可能地推广了Abreu、皮尔斯和Stacchetti提出的将动态博弈简化为一次性“辅助博弈”的方法。“它探索了一个关于最优实验的新猜想--信息需求在后验信念中是准凹的。 该模型提供了一个简单的框架，探索一个给定的项目上的研究支出的随机演变。 它在概念上类似于博弈论的两个项目，试图通过仔细分析可能的延续博弈的横截面来理解跨期动态。“理解私人信息的动态是博弈论面临的最重要的突出问题之一，在较小程度上也是契约理论面临的最重要的突出问题之一。 这项研究将开辟一个非常大的一类模型，经济学家目前根本无法解决。 它还提供了一个简单而又实质性的新的基于动态实验的动态R D纯理论。

9711885 Smith This research makes methodological and substantive contributions to dynamic game theory and learning theory. It seeks to attain unmet goals of explaining observed features of bargaining - offers are concessions, timing of offers is unrestricted, the process itself is a war of attrition - in a perfect information framework. It achieves a characterization of the "recursive" sequential equilibrium payoff set, and later a folk theorem for games with hidden actions and no summary public statistic. It pushes as far as possible the methodology introduced by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti of reducing a dynamic game to a one-shot "auxiliary game." It explores a new conjecture about optimal experimentation - that information demand is quasiconcave in the posterior beliefs. The model offers a simple framework for exploring the stochastic evolution of research expenditures on a given project. It is conceptually similar to both game theory projects in the attempt to understand intertemporal dynamics by carefully analyzing the cross-section of possible continuation "games." Understanding the dynamics of private information is one of the single most important outstanding problems facing game theory and, to a lesser extent, contract theory. This research will open up a very large class of models that economists currently simply cannot solve. It also offers a simple and substantive new pure theory of dynamic R&D founded on dynamic experimentation.