Dynamic Game Theory and Learning

[9711885]史密斯这项研究对动态博弈论和学习理论做出了方法论和实质性的贡献。它试图在一个完美的信息框架中实现未实现的目标，即解释已观察到的讨价还价的特征——出价是让步，出价的时间是不受限制的，这个过程本身就是一场消耗战。它实现了“递归”顺序均衡收益集的特征，后来又实现了带有隐藏行动且没有汇总公共统计的游戏的民间定理。它尽可能地推进了Abreu、Pearce和Stacchetti提出的将动态博弈简化为一次“辅助博弈”的方法。它探索了一个关于最优实验的新猜想——信息需求在后验信念中是准凹形的。该模型提供了一个简单的框架来探索一个给定项目的研究支出的随机演变。它在概念上类似于两个博弈论项目，试图通过仔细分析可能的延续“博弈”的横截面来理解跨期动力学。理解私人信息的动态是博弈论面临的最重要的突出问题之一，在较小程度上，契约理论也面临着同样的问题。这项研究将开启一大类经济学家目前根本无法解决的模型。在动态实验的基础上，提出了一种简单而有实质意义的动态研发新纯理论。

9711885 Smith This research makes methodological and substantive contributions to dynamic game theory and learning theory. It seeks to attain unmet goals of explaining observed features of bargaining - offers are concessions, timing of offers is unrestricted, the process itself is a war of attrition - in a perfect information framework. It achieves a characterization of the "recursive" sequential equilibrium payoff set, and later a folk theorem for games with hidden actions and no summary public statistic. It pushes as far as possible the methodology introduced by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti of reducing a dynamic game to a one-shot "auxiliary game." It explores a new conjecture about optimal experimentation - that information demand is quasiconcave in the posterior beliefs. The model offers a simple framework for exploring the stochastic evolution of research expenditures on a given project. It is conceptually similar to both game theory projects in the attempt to understand intertemporal dynamics by carefully analyzing the cross-section of possible continuation "games." Understanding the dynamics of private information is one of the single most important outstanding problems facing game theory and, to a lesser extent, contract theory. This research will open up a very large class of models that economists currently simply cannot solve. It also offers a simple and substantive new pure theory of dynamic R&D founded on dynamic experimentation.