Information Demand and Dynamic Contests

信息需求与动态竞赛

• 批准号: 0079145
• 负责人: Lones Smith
• 金额: $ 17.14万
• 依托单位: Regents of the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2000
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2000-08-01 至 2003-10-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0079145&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Information; Demand; Dynamic; Contests

This project in economic theory consists of two parts: information demand and dynamic contests. The first is reasonably well developed while the second is in its early stages. Also included is a discussion of an ongoing but much better focused project on bargaining theory, appealing to an established psychological fact that individuals' behavior is largely governed by their aspirations.The first two subprojects are part of a greater agenda to understand the most basic questions about the nature of information demand, namely, does the so-called Law of Demand hold? Well-known counterexamples in static environments suggest not. In fact, we find two separate contexts where it does hold, one extremely relevant in applied contexts. In the most advanced sub-project, we find that if information is very cheap, and thus demand very large, then the law of demand is eventually true. Additionally, in this context, we show that the fundamental insight provided by Blackwell's Theorem largely does not matter. In fact, when one is permitted to acquire a large enough number of independently and identically distributed copies of any given signal, then a complete ordering over experiments/signals arises. That two signals are not sufficient for each other in a statistical sense is no longer relevant. What matters is an asymptotic measure of sufficiency. We extend this so far as to deduce a very simple logarithmic formula for the demand for information, when prices are low enough.This part of the work should make methodological and substantive contributions to Bayesian decision theory and game theory. For Bayesian decision theory, the centrality of the information demand question is manifest. But the methods introduced from asymptotic theory should prove extremely tractable and basic tools for theorists considering information in the future. Economists' traditional narrow focus on an overly stylized of model of one-shot information purchase (today I buy my signal, tomorrow I act) likely owes its roots to Blackwell's Theorem. In some sense, the law of large demand paper starts from a different yet contemporaneous foundation (work by Chernoff).The third project is less developed, being still at an early stage. It proposes a new mechanism design question, namely what is the optimal design of a dynamic contest, as a function of the payoff' and signaling structure? The wide range of cited instances of such contests, from sports to employment arrangements to television game shows, speaks to the importance of understanding this micro market structure. We have formulated this in continuous time, and have proposed some basic features of the nature of the contest design. This work is intended as a first effort on an unconsidered problem that is incredibly generic. The substantive value of such work is hopefully clear. Many of the technical hurdles are as yet unknown.

这个经济学理论课题由两部分组成：信息需求和动态竞争。 第一个发展得相当好，而第二个则处于早期阶段。 本书还讨论了一个正在进行但更有针对性的讨价还价理论项目，该项目诉诸于一个既定的心理学事实，即个人的行为在很大程度上受其愿望的支配。前两个子项目是一个更大议程的一部分，旨在理解关于信息需求本质的最基本问题，即所谓的需求定律是否成立？静态环境中的著名反例表明不是这样。 事实上，我们发现它在两个不同的背景下确实成立，一个在应用背景下非常相关。 在最高级的子项目中，我们发现，如果信息非常便宜，因而需求非常大，那么需求定律最终为真。 此外，在这种情况下，我们表明，布莱克威尔定理提供的基本见解在很大程度上并不重要。 事实上，当一个人被允许获得足够多的独立和相同分布的任何给定信号的副本，然后一个完整的排序实验/信号出现。 从统计学意义上说，两个信号不足以相互作用，这一点不再相关。 重要的是充分性的渐近度量。 我们将其扩展到推导出一个非常简单的对数公式，当价格足够低时，信息的需求。这部分工作应该对贝叶斯决策理论和博弈论做出方法上的和实质性的贡献。 对于贝叶斯决策理论，信息需求问题的中心性是显而易见的。 但是，从渐近理论引入的方法应该被证明是非常容易处理的，并且是未来理论家考虑信息的基本工具。经济学家传统上狭隘地关注过于程式化的一次性信息购买模型（今天我买我的信号，明天我行动），这可能要归功于布莱克威尔定理。 从某种意义上说，大量需求的法律文件开始于一个不同的，但同时的基础（工作由benchoff）。第三个项目是欠发达，仍处于早期阶段。 它提出了一个新的机制设计问题，即什么是动态竞赛的最优设计，作为支付和信号结构的函数？ 从体育运动到就业安排再到电视游戏节目，这类竞赛的广泛实例说明了理解这一微观市场结构的重要性。 我们不断地阐述了这一点，并提出了竞赛设计性质的一些基本特征。 这项工作的目的是作为一个未考虑的问题，是令人难以置信的通用的第一次努力。 希望这种工作的实质性价值是明确的。 许多技术障碍目前还不为人知。