Pairwise Matching Models in Economics

该奖项资助了匹配经济理论中的三个项目。这种经济理论有很多应用吗？比如工人如何匹配工作，学生如何进入学校，或者借款人如何被分配到贷款。在每一种情况下，“配对”都会创造出一种富有成效的关系。第一个项目的目标是开发关于社会最佳配对如何随着生产关系的性质变化而变化的一般结果。例如，如果技术转移不成比例地提高了高技能工人的生产率，这将如何影响最佳的工人-企业匹配？第二个项目探讨了当一方信息不完全时发生的匹配，比如申请大学的学生，并考虑更高的质量是否意味着更高的拒绝率。第三个项目考虑了事故的战略配对理论，并询问在考虑到个人重新优化(所谓的风险补偿)后，旨在降低风险的法规何时实际上会减少事故数量。这个项目开发了在许多相关背景下广泛有用的方法，以帮助阐明市场和政策的设计，以增强社会目标。第一个项目预测非匹配，使用单调方法在排序和共享规则中产生均衡的一般比较静态。结果将显示排序、共享规则和不平等如何随着单调的技术变化而变化。第二个项目将空间竞争模型引入定向搜索。第三个项目开发了一个新的机动车(和类似)事故的战略配对理论模型，并推导了风险补偿不完全的条件。

This award funds three projects in the economic theory of matching. This kind of economic theory has many applications ? such as how workers are matched to jobs, how students are sort into schools, or how borrowers are assigned to loans. In each case, a 'match' creates a productive relationship. The goal of the first project is to develop general results about how socially optimal matches change as the nature of the productive relationship changes. For example, if a technological shift disproportionately raises the productivity of highly skilled workers, how does that affect optimal worker-firm matches? The second project explores matching that occurs when there is incomplete information about one side, like students applying to colleges, and considers whether or not higher quality means a higher rejection rate. The third project considers a strategic pairwise matching theory of accidents, and asks when regulations designed to reduce risk will in fact reduce the number of accidents, after taking into account individual re-optimization (so called ?risk compensation?). This project develops methods broadly useful in many related contexts, in order to help shed light on the design of markets and policies that to enhance societal goals.The first project makes predictions for non-assortative matching, using monotone methods to produce equilibrium general comparative statics in sorting and sharing rules. The results will show how sorting, sharing rules, and inequality covary as monotone technological changes occur. The second project introduces spatial competition models into directed search. The third project develops a new strategic pairwise-matching theory model of motor vehicle (and similar) accidents, and derives conditions under which risk compensation is incomplete.