Pairwise Matching Models in Economics

该奖项资助了三个经济理论匹配项目。这种经济理论有很多应用吗？例如工人如何与工作相匹配，学生如何进入学校，或者借款人如何分配贷款。在每一种情况下，“匹配”都创造了一种富有成效的关系。第一个项目的目标是开发关于社会最佳匹配如何随着生产关系的性质变化而变化的一般结果。例如，如果技术转变不成比例地提高了高技能工人的生产率，那么这会如何影响工人与企业的最佳匹配？第二个项目探讨了当一方的信息不完整时发生的匹配，比如申请大学的学生，并考虑更高的质量是否意味着更高的拒绝率。第三个项目考虑了一个战略成对匹配理论的事故，并要求时，法规设计，以减少风险，实际上会减少事故的数量，考虑到个人的再优化（所谓的？风险补偿？）。该项目开发了在许多相关背景下广泛有用的方法，以帮助阐明市场和政策的设计，以提高社会目标。第一个项目对非竞争性匹配进行预测，使用单调方法在排序和共享规则中产生均衡的一般比较静态。结果将显示如何排序，共享规则，和不平等协变的单调的技术变化发生。第二个项目将空间竞争模型引入定向搜索。第三个项目开发了一个新的战略成对匹配理论模型的机动车（和类似）事故，并推导出条件下，风险补偿是不完全的。

This award funds three projects in the economic theory of matching. This kind of economic theory has many applications ? such as how workers are matched to jobs, how students are sort into schools, or how borrowers are assigned to loans. In each case, a 'match' creates a productive relationship. The goal of the first project is to develop general results about how socially optimal matches change as the nature of the productive relationship changes. For example, if a technological shift disproportionately raises the productivity of highly skilled workers, how does that affect optimal worker-firm matches? The second project explores matching that occurs when there is incomplete information about one side, like students applying to colleges, and considers whether or not higher quality means a higher rejection rate. The third project considers a strategic pairwise matching theory of accidents, and asks when regulations designed to reduce risk will in fact reduce the number of accidents, after taking into account individual re-optimization (so called ?risk compensation?). This project develops methods broadly useful in many related contexts, in order to help shed light on the design of markets and policies that to enhance societal goals.The first project makes predictions for non-assortative matching, using monotone methods to produce equilibrium general comparative statics in sorting and sharing rules. The results will show how sorting, sharing rules, and inequality covary as monotone technological changes occur. The second project introduces spatial competition models into directed search. The third project develops a new strategic pairwise-matching theory model of motor vehicle (and similar) accidents, and derives conditions under which risk compensation is incomplete.