RI: Mediuim: Abstraction, Equilibrium Finding, Safe Opponent Exploitation, and Robust Strategies for Imperfect-Information Games
RI:Mediuim:不完美信息博弈的抽象、均衡发现、安全对手利用和稳健策略
基本信息
- 批准号:0964579
- 负责人:
- 金额:$ 71.98万
- 依托单位:
- 依托单位国家:美国
- 项目类别:Continuing Grant
- 财政年份:2010
- 资助国家:美国
- 起止时间:2010-06-15 至 2014-05-31
- 项目状态:已结题
- 来源:
- 关键词:
项目摘要
While game theory has traditionally been used as a thinking tool to analyze small stylized versions of real situations, this project is developing operational tools for analyzing real large-scale settings in full detail. To ensure true scalability, the techniques will be benchmarked on very-large-scale games of negotiation, auctions, and poker. This work is on a path toward a vision where software agents conduct commerce on behalf of humans, or at least advise them to act more intelligently. This will lead to increased social welfare through better decision making. This will also enable broader and fairer access because it will help put less experienced/educated people/companies on an equal footing with expert market participants. Broader access will, in turn, increase the benefits of (electronic) commerce further, and the benefits will be distributed more fairly across segments of society. The paradigm will also yield a form of increased security because strategies generated by the proposed techniques cannot be taken advantage of (at least not by much and not easily). The projects particular contributions to computational game theory include the development of (lossless and lossy) game-abstraction methods to allow scale-up to larger 'games' of societal import, techniques for settings with more than two agents, techniques for dealing with less-than-rational opponents robustly, and derivation of worst-case guarantees on approximate solutions via nemesis computation.
虽然博弈论传统上被用作分析真实的情况的小型程式化版本的思维工具,但本项目正在开发用于全面详细分析真实的大规模设置的操作工具。为了确保真正的可扩展性,这些技术将在谈判,拍卖和扑克等超大规模游戏上进行基准测试。这项工作是朝着一个愿景的道路上,软件代理代表人类进行商业活动,或至少建议他们更聪明地行事。这将通过更好的决策来增加社会福利。这也将使更广泛和更公平的准入,因为它将有助于使经验/教育程度较低的人/公司与专家市场参与者处于平等地位。更广泛的准入反过来又会进一步增加(电子)商务的好处,而好处将在社会各阶层之间更公平地分配。该范例还将产生一种形式的增强的安全性,因为由所提出的技术生成的策略不能被利用(至少不能被利用得太多,也不容易)。该项目对计算博弈论的特殊贡献包括(无损和有损)游戏抽象方法的开发,以允许扩展到社会意义上的更大的“游戏”,用于两个以上代理的设置的技术,用于稳健地处理低于理性对手的技术,以及通过复仇计算近似解的最坏情况保证的推导。
项目成果
期刊论文数量(0)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
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Tuomas Sandholm其他文献
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
- DOI:
10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.009 - 发表时间:
2012-01-01 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:
- 作者:
Vincent Conitzer;Tuomas Sandholm - 通讯作者:
Tuomas Sandholm
Optimal Flow Aggregation
最优流量聚合
- DOI:
10.1007/3-540-44985-x_39 - 发表时间:
2000 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
S. Suri;Tuomas Sandholm;P. Warkhede - 通讯作者:
P. Warkhede
Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets
- DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.001 - 发表时间:
2006-05-01 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:
- 作者:
Tuomas Sandholm;Subhash Suri - 通讯作者:
Subhash Suri
Automated negotiation
- DOI:
10.1145/295685.295866 - 发表时间:
1999-03 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Tuomas Sandholm - 通讯作者:
Tuomas Sandholm
Multiagent Systems A Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial Intelligence
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
1999 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Tuomas Sandholm - 通讯作者:
Tuomas Sandholm
Tuomas Sandholm的其他文献
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{{ truncateString('Tuomas Sandholm', 18)}}的其他基金
RI: Medium: Techniques for Massive-Scale Strategic Reasoning: Imperfect-Information Subgame Solving and Offering Guarantees in Simulation-Based Games
RI:中:大规模战略推理技术:不完美信息子博弈解决并在模拟游戏中提供保证
- 批准号:
2312342 - 财政年份:2023
- 资助金额:
$ 71.98万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
RI: Small: New Computational Techniques and Market Designs for Kidney Exchanges and Other Barter Markets
RI:小型:肾脏交换和其他易货市场的新计算技术和市场设计
- 批准号:
1718457 - 财政年份:2017
- 资助金额:
$ 71.98万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
RI: Small: Computational Techniques for Large Multi-Step Incomplete-Information Games
RI:小型:大型多步不完全信息博弈的计算技术
- 批准号:
1617590 - 财政年份:2016
- 资助金额:
$ 71.98万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
EAGER: Exploiting a myopic opponent in imperfect-information games: Toward medical applications
EAGER:在不完美信息游戏中利用短视的对手:迈向医疗应用
- 批准号:
1546752 - 财政年份:2015
- 资助金额:
$ 71.98万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
RI: Small: Expressiveness and Automated Bundling in Mechanism Design: Principles and Computational Methodologies
RI:小:机制设计中的表现力和自动捆绑:原理和计算方法
- 批准号:
1320620 - 财政年份:2013
- 资助金额:
$ 71.98万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
AIR: Sophisticated Electronic Markets for TV Advertising, Powered by Novel Optimization
AIR:由新颖优化提供支持的复杂的电视广告电子市场
- 批准号:
1127832 - 财政年份:2011
- 资助金额:
$ 71.98万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
ICES: Small: New and Better Markets via Automated Market Making
ICES:小型:通过自动化做市创造新的、更好的市场
- 批准号:
1101668 - 财政年份:2011
- 资助金额:
$ 71.98万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
RI: Medium: Algorithms for Robust Barter Exchanges, with Application to Kidneys
RI:媒介:稳健的易货交换算法,适用于肾脏
- 批准号:
0905390 - 财政年份:2009
- 资助金额:
$ 71.98万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
ITR - (ECS+ASE) - (dmc+soc): Automated Mechanism Design
ITR - (ECS ASE) - (dmc soc):自动化机构设计
- 批准号:
0427858 - 财政年份:2004
- 资助金额:
$ 71.98万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
CAREER: Coalition Formation Among Self-Interested Computationally Limited Agents
职业:在自利的、计算受限的智能体之间形成联盟
- 批准号:
0234693 - 财政年份:2001
- 资助金额:
$ 71.98万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant