RI: Mediuim: Abstraction, Equilibrium Finding, Safe Opponent Exploitation, and Robust Strategies for Imperfect-Information Games
RI: Mediuim: Abstraction, Equilibrium Finding, Safe Opponent Exploitation, and Robust Strategies for Imperfect-Information Games
批准号:
0964579
负责人:
Tuomas Sandholm
金额:
$71.98万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2010
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2010-06-15 至 2014-05-31
中文摘要
虽然博弈论传统上被用作分析真实情况的小型风格化版本的思维工具,但该项目正在开发可操作的工具,用于全面详细地分析真实的大规模场景。为了确保真正的可伸缩性,这些技术将以非常大型的谈判、拍卖和扑克游戏为基准。这项工作正在朝着这样一种愿景迈进:软件代理代表人类进行商业活动,或者至少建议他们采取更明智的行动。这将通过更好的决策来增加社会福利。这也将使更广泛和更公平的机会,因为它将有助于让经验较少/受教育程度较低的人/公司与专业市场参与者处于平等的地位。反过来,更广泛的准入将进一步增加(电子)商务的好处,这些好处将在社会各阶层之间更公平地分配。该范例还将产生一种增强安全性的形式,因为所提议的技术所产生的策略不能被利用(至少不会被利用太多,也不容易)。这些项目对计算博弈论的特别贡献包括开发(无损和有损)博弈抽象方法,以允许扩大到更大规模的社会输入“博弈”,使用两个以上代理人的设置技术,稳健地处理不太理性的对手的技术,以及通过复仇计算推导出近似解的最坏情况保证。
英文摘要
While game theory has traditionally been used as a thinking tool to analyze small stylized versions of real situations, this project is developing operational tools for analyzing real large-scale settings in full detail. To ensure true scalability, the techniques will be benchmarked on very-large-scale games of negotiation, auctions, and poker. This work is on a path toward a vision where software agents conduct commerce on behalf of humans, or at least advise them to act more intelligently. This will lead to increased social welfare through better decision making. This will also enable broader and fairer access because it will help put less experienced/educated people/companies on an equal footing with expert market participants. Broader access will, in turn, increase the benefits of (electronic) commerce further, and the benefits will be distributed more fairly across segments of society. The paradigm will also yield a form of increased security because strategies generated by the proposed techniques cannot be taken advantage of (at least not by much and not easily). The projects particular contributions to computational game theory include the development of (lossless and lossy) game-abstraction methods to allow scale-up to larger 'games' of societal import, techniques for settings with more than two agents, techniques for dealing with less-than-rational opponents robustly, and derivation of worst-case guarantees on approximate solutions via nemesis computation.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
RI: Medium: Techniques for Massive-Scale Strategic Reasoning: Imperfect-Information Subgame Solving and Offering Guarantees in Simulation-Based Games
-
批准号:2312342
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$85.49万
-
财政年份:2023
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
RI: Small: New Computational Techniques and Market Designs for Kidney Exchanges and Other Barter Markets
-
批准号:1718457
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$42.0万
-
财政年份:2017
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
RI: Small: Computational Techniques for Large Multi-Step Incomplete-Information Games
-
批准号:1617590
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$45.0万
-
财政年份:2016
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
EAGER: Exploiting a myopic opponent in imperfect-information games: Toward medical applications
-
批准号:1546752
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$10.0万
-
财政年份:2015
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
RI: Small: Expressiveness and Automated Bundling in Mechanism Design: Principles and Computational Methodologies
-
批准号:1320620
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$42.5万
-
财政年份:2013
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
AIR: Sophisticated Electronic Markets for TV Advertising, Powered by Novel Optimization
-
批准号:1127832
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$30.0万
-
财政年份:2011
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
ICES: Small: New and Better Markets via Automated Market Making
-
批准号:1101668
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$32.43万
-
财政年份:2011
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
RI: Medium: Algorithms for Robust Barter Exchanges, with Application to Kidneys
-
批准号:0905390
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$85.53万
-
财政年份:2009
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
ITR - (ECS+ASE) - (dmc+soc): Automated Mechanism Design
-
批准号:0427858
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$0.0万
-
财政年份:2004
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
CAREER: Coalition Formation Among Self-Interested Computationally Limited Agents
-
批准号:0234693
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$17.75万
-
财政年份:2001
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
ITR: Secure Automated Negotiation under Limited Computation: Deliberation in Equilibrium
-
批准号:0234694
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$38.82万
-
财政年份:2001
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
ITR/PE+SY: Collaborative Research: Foundations of Electronic Marketplaces: Game Theory, Algorithms and Systems
-
批准号:0121678
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$120.03万
-
财政年份:2001
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
ITR: Secure Automated Negotiation under Limited Computation: Deliberation in Equilibrium
-
批准号:0081246
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$38.82万
-
财政年份:2001
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
Advanced Contract Types for Automated Negotiation
-
批准号:0234695
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$7.19万
-
财政年份:2001
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
Advanced Contract Types for Automated Negotiation
-
批准号:9800994
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$12.0万
-
财政年份:1998
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
Optimal Mechanisms for Negotiation Under Message Passing andBelief Revision
-
批准号:9610122
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$20.11万
-
财政年份:1997
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位:
CAREER: Coalition Formation Among Self-Interested Computationally Limited Agents
-
批准号:9703122
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$45.61万
-
财政年份:1997
-
负责人:Tuomas Sandholm
-
依托单位: